Laws governing the foreclosure process can have direct consequences for the costs of foreclosure and, therefore could affect lending decisions. We exploit the heterogeneity in judicial requirements across US states to examine their impact on banks’ lending decisions in a sample of urban areas straddling state borders. A key feature of our study is the way it exploits an exogenous cutoff in loan eligibility to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) guarantees, which shift the burden of foreclosure costs onto the GSEs. We find that judicial requirements reduce the supply of credit only for jumbo loans, which are ineligible for GSE guarantees, i.e., in the nonsubsidized segment of the market. Thus, while we find a significant effect on credit supply, the aggregate impact is muted by the indirect cross-subsidy by the GSEs to borrower-friendly states.

We provide evidence that small banks responded faster to Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan requests and lent more intensively to small businesses than larger banks. Using community bank pre-pandemic share of deposits/assets as an instrument for the intensity of PPP lending, we find a negative and significant relationship between county level bankruptcy filings and PPP lending per small business. Overall, our findings suggest that community banks remain an important conduit for small business credit particularly during crises when a rapid response is required.