If the location of firm operations is relevant for financing, multinationals should have easier access to different foreign sources of funding relative to domestic firms. I document that U.S. multinationals are more likely to borrow from a foreign bank and to issue international bonds than are U.S. domestic firms. Multinationals are less affected than domestic firms by capital market dislocations because of greater funding flexibility. Using the 2007–2009 financial crisis as a capital supply shock, I find that multinationals relied more on foreign funding sources in bank loans and consequently reduced domestic investment less than did domestic firms. Received January 27, 2015; editorial decision March 20, 2017 by Editor David Denis.

We examine how cross-country differences in capital regulations shape the structure of global lending syndicates. Using globally syndicated loans extended by banks from forty-four countries, we find that strictly regulated banks participate more in syndicates originated by lead lenders facing less stringent capital regulations. The resulting lending syndicates extend loans to riskier borrowers, charge higher spreads, forego covenants more frequently, and incur higher default rates. Such syndication activity also facilitates the access to credit by riskier corporations and exposes both participants and lead arrangers to greater systemic risk. Overall, our finding is consistent with the explanation that strictly regulated banks rely on the expertise of loosely regulated banks to procure risky deals outside the border.

Managers often claim that target firms are financially constrained prior to being acquired and that these constraints are eased following the acquisition. Using a large sample of European acquisitions, we document that the level of cash that target firms hold, the sensitivity of cash to cash flow, and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow all decline, while investment increases following the acquisition. These effects are stronger in deals that are more likely to be associated with financing improvements. Our findings suggest that acquisitions relieve financial frictions in target firms, especially when the target firm is relatively small.