This paper examines whether outstanding employee stock options (ESOs), which represent the firm’s contractual obligation to deliver shares upon ESO exercise, affect firms’ credit ratings. I hypothesize that outstanding ESOs play two information roles—(1) suggesting equity infusion, and (2) predicting share repurchases—that help credit-rating agencies evaluate the issuing company’s debt service ability. Consistent with these hypothesized roles, results indicate that the present values of expected cash proceeds and tax benefits from ESO exercise have favorable effects on credit ratings. In contrast, the present value of the expected cost of ESO-related share repurchases has an unfavorable effect on credit ratings and this unfavorable effect is more pronounced for firms with a greater tendency to repurchase shares. The after-tax fair value of outstanding ESOs, which summarizes the effects of the above three ESO-related cash flows, is negatively associated with credit ratings. Taken together, these findings are consistent with credit-rating agencies incorporating the information conveyed by outstanding ESOs regarding potential equity infusion and ESO-related repurchases in their credit risk assessments and assigning lower credit ratings to firms with greater values of outstanding ESOs.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 130: Reporting Comprehensive Income encourages enterprises to report comprehensive income on a performance statement rather than on a statement of equity. We investigate the reporting decisions of 82 publicly traded property‐liability insurers that are fairly evenly split in their choice. Our results demonstrate that insurers with a tendency to manage earnings through realized securities' gains and losses (that is, cherry pickers), as well as insurers with a reputation for poor disclosure quality, are more likely to report comprehensive income in a statement of equity. Apparently, these insurers face the highest cost of transparency. We do not find a relation between the reporting decision and the volatility of comprehensive income relative to the volatility of net income. Our findings that insurers' comprehensive income reporting choices are a reflection of their proclivity toward cherry picking as well as their level of disclosure quality should be of interest to standard‐setters because of the controversy over standard‐setters' preference for mandating all firms to report comprehensive income in a performance statement.

We examine how the qualitative characteristics of a non-GAAP earnings disclosure reveal the quality of the non-GAAP performance metric itself. We measure the qualitative aspects of the non-GAAP disclosure using an index of 12 hand-coded characteristics and presentation choices that provide context to non-GAAP disclosures. We find that more transparent qualitative information in non-GAAP disclosures is associated with more transitory non-GAAP exclusions and a lower likelihood that managers will aggressively exclude expenses in calculating non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. We also find that the association between non-GAAP exclusions and earnings announcement period returns is less negative for firms with more transparent qualitative information accompanying their non-GAAP disclosures. Overall, these results suggest that qualitative characteristics of non-GAAP disclosures convey useful information about the quality of non-GAAP earnings metrics.