In contrast to most developed countries that use registration systems, China has implemented an approval system for initial public offering (IPO) applications. As this IPO approval system involves more than a compliance test, the process allows regulators to exercise a large degree of discretion, which provides an opportunity to observe regulators' decision making in capital markets. We examine the outcomes of firms' IPO applications from 2008 to 2014 and find evidence that the media influence regulators' decisions on IPO applications. Specifically, firms that experience negative news coverage are more likely to have their IPO applications rejected. Negative news influences government decisions via both information and monitoring roles. The political connections of a firm can alleviate an adverse outcome from negative news. Moreover, negative news predicts a higher probability of committing fraud as well as lower earnings persistence in the post-IPO period. The evidence from the post-IPO period suggests that the media help improve the efficiency of regulators' decision making. Our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity issues and to adopting alternative measures of news negativity and an alternative sample.

We examine whether values of equity options traded on individual firms are sensitive to the firm’s capital structure. We estimate the compound option (CO) model, which views equity as an option on the firm. Compared with the Black-Scholes model, the CO model with a term structure of volatility (TSV) reduces pricing errors by 20% on average. The compound option effect is particularly strong for highly levered firms and long-term options, in which the pricing improvement is up to 70% of the Black-Scholes error. Without a TSV, the CO model reduces pricing errors of in-the-money options by 12.74% on average and for out-of-the-money by 9.22%. We show that the CO model implies a market value of firm leverage and allows imputation of the firm’s implied volatility, both of which have potential applications in corporate finance.

Non-compete covenants are widely used in employment contracts to promote employee stability. Using legal amendments of non-compete enforceability as a natural experiment, we find that as non-compete enforceability increases, firms display an increased likelihood of meeting short-term earnings benchmarks, lower discretionary expenditures, and declining future performance. These effects are more pronounced when CEOs have lower ability or shorter tenures, and when firms have more growth opportunities or operate in localized industries. Our results suggest that managers actively adapt investment and financial reporting practices to the changing environment that affects their contractual relations with firms.

We explore the link between credit and equity markets by considering the informational content of the term structure of credit spreads. A shallower credit term structure predicts decreases in default risk and increases in future profitability, as well as favorable earnings surprises. Further, the slope of the credit term structure negatively predicts future stock returns. While systematic slope risk is priced, information diffusion from the credit market to equities, particularly in less visible stocks, plays an additional role in accounting for return predictability from credit slopes. That is, such predictability is less evident in stocks with high institutional ownership, analyst coverage, and liquidity, and vice versa.

We investigate how exposure to the One-Child Policy (OCP) during early adulthood affects marriage and fertility in China. Exploring fertility penalties across provinces over time and the different implementations by ethnicity, we show that the OCP significantly increases the unmarried rate among the Han ethnicity but not among the minorities. The OCP increases Han-minority marriages in regions where Han-minority couples are allowed an additional child, but the impact is smaller in other regions. Finally, the deadweight loss caused by lower fertility accounts for 10% of annual household incomes, and policy-induced fewer marriages contribute to 30% of the fertility decline.

We find that the firm-level variance risk premium has a prominent explanatory power for credit spreads in the presence of market- and firm-level control variables established in the existing literature. Such predictability complements that of the leading state variable—the leverage ratio—and strengthens significantly with a lower firm credit rating, longer credit contract maturity, and model-free implied variance. We provide further evidence that (1) the variance risk premium has a cleaner systematic component than implied variance or expected variance, (2) the cross-section of firms’ variance risk premia capture systematic variance risk in a stronger way than firms’ equity returns in capturing market return risk, and (3) a structural model with stochastic volatility can reproduce the predictability pattern of variance risk premia for credit spreads.