Mortgage companies (MCs) do not fall under the strict regulatory regime of depository institutions. We empirically show that this gap resulted in regulatory arbitrage and allowed bank holding companies (BHCs) to circumvent consumer compliance regulations, mitigate capital requirements, and reduce exposure to loan-related losses. Compared to bank subsidiaries, MC subsidiaries of BHCs originated riskier mortgages to borrowers with lower credit scores, lower incomes, higher loan-to-income ratios, and higher default rates. Our results imply that precrisis regulations had the capacity to mitigate the deterioration of lending standards if consistently applied and enforced for all types of intermediaries.

In the aftermath of the consumer debt–induced recession, policymakers have questioned whether fiscal stimulus is effective during periods of high consumer indebtedness. This study empirically investigates this question. Using detailed data on Department of Defense spending for the 2007–2009 period, we document that the open-economy relative fiscal multiplier is higher in geographies with higher consumer debt. The results suggest that in the short term (2007–2009), fiscal policy can mitigate the adverse effect of consumer (over)leverage on real economic output during a recession. We then exploit detailed microdata to show that both heterogeneous marginal propensities to consume and slack-driven economic mechanisms contribute to the debt-dependent multiplier.

We estimate the effects of deregulation of U.S. banking restrictions on interstate personal income insurance for the period 1970 to 2001. Interstate income insurance occurs when personal income reacts less than one‐to‐one to state‐specific output shocks. We find that insurance improved after banking deregulation, with a larger effect in states where small businesses are more important and on proprietors' income than on other components of personal income. Our explanation centers on the role of banks as a prime source of small business finance and on the close intertwining of the personal and business finances of small business owners.

Post-crisis stress tests have altered banks’ credit supply to small business. Banks most affected by stress tests reallocate credit away from riskier markets and toward safer ones. They also raise interest rates on small loans. Quantities fall most in high-risk markets where stress-tested banks own no branches, and prices rise mainly where they do. The results suggest that banks price the stress-test induced increase in capital requirements where they have local knowledge, and exit where they do not. Stress tests do not, however, reduce aggregate credit. Small banks seem to increase their share in geographies formerly reliant on stress-tested lenders.