In this paper we bring new empirical evidence that political uncertainty is associated with higher corporate debt financing costs. Controlling for all bond and firm characteristics that could affect a firm's cost of debt financing, the uncertainty associated with the outcome of U.S. presidential elections leads to a 34 basis point increase in corporate bond spreads, with closer campaign years associated with additional costs. Similar results hold when we use the continuous measure of the Political Uncertainty Index by Baker et al. (2012). The uncertainty associated with gubernatorial elections, on the other hand, has no effect on the pricing of corporate bonds.

This paper studies the impact of diversification on firms that file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Prior research suggests that diversification affects both the probability and costs of distress. Treating bankruptcy as a special case of distress, we find that diversification reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy and liquidation in Chapter 11, which is consistent with the coinsurance hypothesis. However, we observe higher bankruptcy costs as measured by time spent in Chapter 11 and inefficient segment investment for diversified firms. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that diversification provides benefits to managers in terms of job security rather than to firms. Our findings may help firms to make diversification decisions and creditors determine lending policies toward different forms of organizations.

Can leaders’ names have an impact on their compensation and firm performance? We reason about how and why certain leaders’ names are related to higher financial compensation, yet unrelated to their ability to lead a company and thus firm performance. Based on a sample of 6132 CEOs working at large, publicly traded (S&P 1500) firms, we find that CEOs who have more “fluent” names—or names associated with feelings of cognitive ease (e.g., shorter length, more common)—obtain greater financial as well as non-financial perks, even though they are no more competent. Therefore, the study looks beyond the influence of sex- and race-typed names to help explain the observed mismatch between top management compensation and firm performance. We discuss the theoretical implication of this study for the cognitive bias and discrimination literature, and managerial implications for strategic human resource management.

The paper develops a network-based framework to assess the impact of a firm's financial interconnections and interdependencies on it optimal hedging and risk transfer strategy. This is important consideration as risk concentrations and propagation embedded in risk transfers pose as a significant challenge for financial regulations and risk management. Using an a priori and an a posteriori analysis, we investigate the impact of the network structure on optimal hedge decisions and hedge efficacy. The a priori analysis shows that network features play an important role in determining corporate hedging decisions through their impact on hedge costs. In the a posteriori analysis for counterparty risk, benefit of modification from the a priori optimal hedge decision is realized when variance of firm value matters, but not when tail risk measures are utilized. Financial network assessment indicates that an a priori analysis is insufficient for robust hedging decisions, and choice of risk measures behind risk management objectives dictates the extent of impact of network characteristics.

There is scant evidence on how risk-taking incentives impact specific firm risks. This has implications for board oversight of managerial risk taking, firms' development of comparative advantage in taking particular risks, and compensation design. We examine this question for exchange rate risk. Using multiple identification strategies, we find that vega increases exchange rate exposure for purely domestic and globally engaged firms. Vega's impact increases with international operations, declines post-SOX, and is robust to firm-level governance. Our results suggest that evidence that exposure reduces firm value can be viewed, in part, as a wealth transfer from shareholders and debt-holders to managers.