Auditing is often depicted in scientific and professional literature as being subject to conflicting forces, such as mechanization versus flexibility, and professionalism versus commercialism. This paper examines how auditors actually make the client‐acceptance decision in the midst of these forces. The investigation was conducted via a field study at three Big 6 firms located in Canada. The results show that in all firms the client‐acceptance decision process in action is largely flexible, being characterized by a high degree of informal communication and the adaptation of the client‐acceptance written policies and decision aids to circumstances. Furthermore, while commercialism in one firm (A) has a significant influence on the decision process, in the two other firms (B and C) the decision process is mostly consistent with professionalism. This result conflicts with the concerns that North American regulators have recently expressed about auditors' professionalism.

Auditing is often depicted in scientific and professional literature as being subject to conflicting forces, such as mechanization versus flexibility, and professionalism versus commercialism. This paper examines how auditors actually make the client-acceptance decision in the midst of these forces. The investigation was conducted via a field study at three Big 6 firms located in Canada. The results show that in all firms the client-acceptance decision process in action is largely flexible, being characterized by a high degree of informal communication and the adaptation of the client-acceptance written policies and decision aids to circumstances. Furthermore, while commercialism in one firm (A) has a significant influence on the decision process, in the two other firms (B and C) the decision process is mostly consistent with professionalism. This result conflicts with the concerns that North American regulators have recently expressed about auditors' professionalism.

This paper examines the attempts by the North American accounting institutes to develop a new market in e‐commerce assurance based on their claims to professional expertise through the WebTrust project. Employing actor‐network theory in an in‐depth longitudinal field study, we investigate how WebTrust was originally developed and promoted as a seal of business‐to‐consumer assurance, which largely failed to generate support in the marketplace. Proponents were subsequently able to generate more interest in the eyes of managers of online organizations by reshaping WebTrust as a flexible set of principles and criteria for systems advice and business‐to‐business assurance. Our analysis suggests that attempts to expand the accounting profession's domain of expertise reflect a trial‐and‐error process where the outcome achieved may be far from the vision that motivated the institutes into undertaking the project in the first place. We further show that the initial network of support for such projects can be quite fragile and dynamic as various actors reposition themselves around the shifting meanings attributed to the project.

This paper provides insights into the dynamics underlying the construction of controllability boundaries surrounding the financial audit function, through an analysis of the sensemaking narratives of former members of Arthur Andersen reflecting upon the collapse of their firm. Our focus is how members, in light of their firm’s downfall, assess the abilities of public accounting firms to control financial audit work and auditor behaviour (i.e., organizational controllability), and the abilities of outside, non-accounting bodies to regulate financial auditing (i.e., regulatory controllability). The investigation is predicated on interviews with twenty-five former partners and employees of Arthur Andersen, mostly in Canada and the United Kingdom. Our qualitative analysis indicates that a majority of interviewees adheres to the view that financial auditing can best be controlled via a network of bureaucratic and clan controls established within accounting firm organizations, without any direct involvement from the part of regulators. A number of interviewees, though, consider that a reinforcement of outside regulation is necessary to discipline financial auditors. In spite of these differences, the vast majority of interviewees consider that financial auditing is controllable (via organizational or regulatory control), which is of interest given their spatial and emotional proximity from the controversial collapse of their firm. Also, most participants do not see the professional association as a useful or relevant party in helping the professional accounting community manoeuvring in times of turmoil. Important governance issues, ensuing from our analysis, are discussed.