This paper studies the interaction between default and liquidity for corporate bonds that are traded in an over-the-counter secondary market with search frictions. Bargaining with dealers determines a bond's endogenous liquidity, which depends on both the firm fundamental and the time-to-maturity of the bond. Corporate default decisions interact with the endogenous secondary market liquidity via the rollover channel. A default-liquidity loop arises: Assuming a relative illiquid secondary bond market in default, earlier endogenous default worsens a bond's secondary market liquidity, which amplifies equity holders' rollover losses, which in turn leads to earlier endogenous default. Besides characterizing in closed form the full interdependence between liquidity and default for credit spreads, our calibrated model can jointly match empirically observed credit spreads and liquidity measures of bonds across different rating classes.

This paper studies the optimal compensation problem between shareholders and the agent in the Leland (1994) capital structure model, and finds that the debt-overhang effect on the endogenous managerial incentives lowers the optimal leverage. Consistent with data, our model delivers a negative relation between pay-performance sensitivity and firm size, and the interaction between debt-overhang and agency issue leads smaller firms to take less leverage relative to their larger peers. During financial distress, a firm's cash flow becomes more sensitive to underlying performance shocks due to debt-overhang. The implications on credit spreads and debt covenants are also considered.

This article studies a dynamic agency problem in which a risk-averse agent can save privately. In the optimal contract, (i) cash compensations exhibit downward rigidity to failures; (ii) permanent pay raises occur when the agent's historical performance is sufficiently good; (iii) and when the agent is dismissed due to poor performance, he walks away with severance pay to support his post-firing consumption at the current compensation level. Thus, the theory can simultaneously explain the popularity of options-like compensation contracts and the increasing incidence of forced turnovers with sizeable severance pay.

This paper studies a continuous-time agency model in which the agent controls the drift of the geometric Brownian motion firm size. The changing firm size generates partial incentives, analogous to awarding the agent equity shares according to her continuation payoff. When the agent is as patient as investors, performance-based stock grants implement the optimal contract. Our model generates a leverage effect on the equity returns, and implies that the agency problem is more severe for smaller firms. That the empirical evidence shows that grants compensation are largely based on the CEO's historical performance--rather than current performance--lends support to our model. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

By generalizing the Leland and Pyle (1977) model to the case of multiple correlated assets, this paper studies the signaling and hedging behavior of an intermediary who sells multiple assets in financial markets. Based on information asymmetry, this paper demonstrates the intrinsic interdependence of risk management and asset selling for intermediaries, and obtains several testable empirical implications. For instance, an intermediary with a more diversified underlying portfolio will face greater liquidity (a smaller price impact) when selling assets to the market. Several applications are discussed, including bank loan sales and selling mechanisms. (JEL D40, D82, G20) Financial intermediaries manage and trade large portfolios of assets. For in-stance, Fannie Mae, a leading firm in the Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) industry, issued 32 Fannie Mae MBS pools on 1 November 2004.1 Meanwhile, active risk management is becoming increasingly important for financial inter-mediaries,2 possibly due to the longterm capital management crisis in the fall of 1998. Motivated by these facts, this paper generalizes the Leland and Pyle (1977,

This paper develops a model to explain the widely used investment mandates in the institutional asset management industry based on two insights: first, giving a manager more investment flexibility weakens the link between fund performance and his effort in the designated market, and thus increases agency cost. Second, the presence of outside assets with negatively skewed returns can further increase the agency cost if the manager is incentivized to pursue outside opportunities. These effects motivate narrow mandates and tight tracking error constraints to most fund managers except those with exceptional talents. Our model sheds light on capital immobility and market segmentation that are widely observed in financial markets, and highlights important effects of negatively skewed risk on institutional incentive structures.

Measured as yield spreads against Treasury securities and AAA corporate bonds, the convenience premium of newly issued agency MBS averages more than half of the long-term Treasury convenience premium. The agency MBS convenience premium and issuance amount vary negatively with mortgage rate, consistent with a prepayment-driven channel. Placing agencies into conservatorship in 2008 and introducing liquidity regulations in 2013 significantly affected MBS convenience premium, consistent with government guarantee and regulatory treatment channels. Analyses of dispersion of dealers’ prepayment forecasts, seasoned MBS, and investors’ MBS holdings deliver further economic implications for agency MBS as safe assets.

A firm chooses its debt maturity structure and default timing dynamically, both without commitment. Via the fraction of newly issued short-term bonds, equity holders control the maturity structure, which affects their endogenous default decision. A shortening equilibrium with accelerated default emerges when cash flows deteriorate over time so that debt recovery is higher if default occurs earlier. Self-enforcing shortening and lengthening equilibria may coexist, with the latter possibly Pareto dominating the former. The inability to commit to issuance policies can worsen the Leland problem of the inability to commit to a default policy–a self-fulfilling shortening spiral and adverse default policy may arise.

This article analyzes the dynamic coordination problem among creditors of a firm with a time-varying fundamental and a staggered debt structure. In deciding whether to roll over his debt, each maturing creditor is concerned about the rollover decisions of other creditors whose debt matures during his next contract period. We derive a unique threshold equilibrium and characterize the roles of fundamental volatility, credit lines, and debt maturity in driving runs. In particular, we show that when fundamental volatility is sufficiently high, commonly used measures such as temporarily keeping the firm alive under runs and increasing debt maturity can exacerbate rather than mitigate runs.

We study an impatient, risk-neutral government that cannot commit to a particular debt path, financed by competitive lenders. In equilibrium, debt adjusts slowly toward a debt-to-income target, exacerbating booms and busts. Strikingly, gains from trade dissipate when trading is continuous, leaving the government no better off than in financial autarky, owing to a sovereign “debt ratchet effect.” Moreover, citizens who are more patient than their government are strictly harmed. We characterize equilibrium debt dynamics, ergodics, and comparative statics when income follows a geometric Brownian motion and analyze devices that allow the sovereign to recapture gains from trade.