This study examines the externalities of mandatory IFRS adoption on firms' investment efficiency in 17 European countries. We use the ROA difference between the firm and its peers to proxy for the information on the peers' investment performance. We find that the spillover effect of a firm's ROA difference versus its foreign peers, but not domestic peers, on the firm's investment efficiency increases after IFRS adoption. We also find that increased disclosure by both foreign and domestic peers after IFRS adoption has a spillover effect on a firm's investment efficiency. Further, a firm's investment changes induced by its ROA difference versus foreign peers are more value-relevant after IFRS adoption, and those induced by increased disclosure by foreign peers under IFRS are value-relevant. Additional analyses reveal that our results are affected by legal enforcement strength, peer composition, and industry competition. Overall, we document positive externalities of mandatory IFRS adoption. Data Availability: Data are available from commercial providers (Worldscope, DataStream, and I/B/E/S).

This study investigates why auditors leave public accounting and the consequences of auditor departures, both of which have been of great concern for audit firms and regulators worldwide. Using data from China and controlling for demographics, we find that audit partners and managers, auditors who generate more revenue, and auditors who provide higher audit quality have a lower likelihood of departure, while non–Big 4 auditors have a higher likelihood of departing public accounting. We also find that an audit firm is likely to lose clients when an auditor departs. Clients who stay with the same firm pay lower audit fees but with no drop‐off in audit quality after a signing auditor departs. In supplementary analyses, we also demonstrate that the determinants and consequences of auditor departures are different for auditors who leave the firm but not the profession (i.e., auditor turnover). Specifically, high audit quality is associated with a lower likelihood of auditor departure, but it increases auditor turnover. We also observe that audit quality is reduced for the clients who stay with an audit firm after highly skilled auditors depart for high‐visibility corporate positions. Our study provides insights that should be of interest to the audit profession, audit firms, and regulators.