ABSTRACT We combine a fundamental property of accruals and a behavioral phenomenon to provide an explanation for the accrual anomaly. The fundamental property is accruals that originate must subsequently reverse. The behavioral phenomenon is individuals tend to underestimate the variance of noisy signals in various domains of decision making. We argue that originating accruals represents a noisier signal than reversing accruals because the uncertainty of whether originating accruals will eventually convert into cash is high, while there is no uncertainty regarding reversing accruals. If investors underestimate the variance of originating accruals but understand reversing accruals, then originating accruals will be mispriced while reversing accruals will not. To test this prediction, we first develop and empirically validate a novel method for ex ante detecting accrual originations and their reversals. Then we document that investors face increased uncertainty when accruals originate and decreased uncertainty when accruals reverse, and we provide evidence that only originating accruals are mispriced. We further demonstrate that our findings can be useful for improving the accrual‐based trading strategy by ex ante detecting and removing accrual reversals from extreme accrual portfolios. Overall, we provide a behavioral explanation for the accrual anomaly that is consistent with the mispricing of originating accruals only.

We examine how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in continental Europe affects the contractual usefulness of accounting information in executive compensation, as reflected in pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and relative performance evaluation (RPE). The empirical evidence indicates a weak increase in accounting-based PPS in the post-adoption period, primarily driven by countries with large differences between IFRS and their previously adopted local accounting standards. We also document a significant increase in accounting-based RPE using foreign peers after the adoption. Additional analysis shows that the increase in RPE is greater for firms with more foreign sales, and for those with lower availability of domestic peers of comparable size. The overall results are consistent with the compensation committees in those countries perceiving earnings after IFRS adoption to be of higher quality and comparability. Our paper highlights an important benefit of IFRS largely ignored by the literature, that is, the higher earnings quality and comparability brought by the adoption of IFRS facilitate executive compensation contracting.

ABSTRACT Using the timeliness of misstatement discovery as a proxy for audit quality, we examine the association between audit firm tenure and audit quality in a setting that alleviates the endogeneity problem endemic to this line of research. We find that longer audit firm tenure leads to less timely discovery and correction of misstatements, which is consistent with a negative effect of long auditor tenure on audit quality. In addition, using the non-voluntary auditor change following the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002 as a natural experiment, we show that the misstatements of its former clients were discovered faster than those of comparable companies that retained their auditors throughout the misstatement. This finding speaks to the benefit of a fresh look by a new auditor. An extended analysis shows that longer auditor tenure also leads to misstatements of greater magnitudes, and that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has mitigated, but not eliminated, the negative effect of long auditor tenure. Last, we show that the negative association between auditor tenure and timely discovery of misstatements is mainly present in the first ten years of an audit engagement. Our study has implications for regulators who continue to express concern regarding lengthy auditor-client engagement. JEL Classifications: K22; K23; L51; M41; M42; M48.