I. Introduction, 197. — II. Substitutability: theoretical arguments, 198. — III. Empirical tests: general approach, 200. — IV. Conclusions regarding regulations and monetary policy, 213. — Appendix, 213

The article discusses the accounting treatment of accelerated depreciation and rate regulation. The Federal Communications Commission has recently been investigating whether or not American Telephone and Telegraph Company should be forced to use accelerated depreciation for tax purposes. There have been drastically different points of view presented as to the consequences that would result if the company were to use such procedures combined with a policy of continuing to use conventional depreciation for rate regulatory purposes. This article compares the "flow-through" and "normalization" accounting methods. The purchase of a long-lived asset gives rise to benefits extending over the future and that these benefits may be measured in terms of cash flows. At any moment in time the present value of all the future cash flows associated with an investment is a measure of the value of the asset. The taxes saved in the early years are likely to be paid in the later years. The advantage of using accelerated depreciation is that the firm may use the funds that are saved in the time periods before the additional taxes are assessed. The use of accelerated depreciation would result in a shift of benefits from the Treasury to the consumers of the services of the public utilities

SOME DISCUSSION has arisen recently as to whether the imposition of an entrance fee on arriving customers who wish to be serviced by a station and hence join a waiting line is a rational measure. Not much of this discussion has appeared in print; indeed this author is aware of only three short communications, representing an exchange of arguments between Leeman [1, 2] and Saaty [3]. The ideas advanced there were of qualitative character and no attempt was made to quantify the arguments. The problem under consideration is obviously analogous to one that arises in connection with the control of vehicular traffic congestion on a road network. It has been argued2 by traffic economists that the individual car driver on making an optimal routing choice for himself-does not optimize the system at large. The purpose of this communication is to demonstrate that, indeed, analogous conclusions can be drawn for queueing models if two basic conditions are satisfied:

N this study we formulate and estimate a cost function for the United States local service airline industry. Section I discusses certain characteristics of the industry and its regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) which influence the form of the cost function and the method of estimation chosen. The model is outlined in section II. The data available and the method of estimation are discussed in section III. Some tentative conclusions are presented in section IV

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are aptly referred to as "disdosure" statutes. This early, major New Deal legislation was enacted in the aftermath of the stock market "crash" of 1929 and in the depths of the Great Depression, as a remedy to the faults that many believed characterized the stock markets. Considering the current possibility that the SEC will require more disclosure from conglomerates and the 35 years that have elapsed since the Acts were enacted, people should examine whether or not the legislation was, in fact, justified and what its impact has been. This examination is limited to the accounting disclosure requirements of the Securities Acts. While the Acts include provisions for regulating the operation of stock exchanges, registration of brokers, etc., the required disdosure of financial accounting information by corporations is of primary importance. This study sought to answer several questions related to the impact of the SEC's accounting disclosure requirements. The author found that there was little evidence of fraud related to financial statements in the period prior to the enactment of the Securities Acts. Nor was there a widespread lack of disclosure. A considerable number of corporations traded on the New York Stock Exchange disclosed at least sales, gross profit, and depredation and almost all reported net income and detailed balance sheets with current assets and current liabilities given. Investors who wanted accounting data had many investment opportunities available. Hence, the author conclude that there was little justification for the accounting disclosure required by the Acts