Ezequiel L. Machado, Willard T. Carleton, Financial Planning in a Regulated Environment, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 4, Proceedings of Thirteenth Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 20-26, 1978 (Nov., 1978), pp. 759-777

The author determines which revenue schedule, when applied by economic regulation to production units, will result in an optimum response. He points out that regulations must be stable for a long-enough period to be taken seriously by a firm, although they should not be considered to be immutable, and that good regulatory strategy encourages cheap firms to produce more and expensive firms to produce less. A model framework is described for determining optimal revenue function and the various dependency factors are characterized. Two components, the traditional price signal and a penalty for departure from the quantity target, comprise the optimal reward function, which means that it is not redundant for economic planners to set both prices and production quotas. This analysis can be applied to environmental economics in terms of effluent standards

Recent changes in campaign finance legislation (passed by a heavily Democratic Congress) are considered within the context of the two competing theories of regulation, the "public-interest" theory and the economic theory of regulation. Empirical evidence is presented in support of the economic theory's explanation for these major regulatory changes in the political process. The evidence suggests that these changes were highly beneficial to the Democratic party and that they were instrumental in Jimmy Carter's defeat of Gerald Ford in the 1976 presidential election

Roger G. Clarke, The Impact of a Fuel Adjustment Clause on the Regulated Firm's Value and Cost of Capital, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 4, Proceedings of Thirteenth Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 20-26, 1978 (Nov., 1978), pp. 745-757

R. A. Haugen, A. L. Stroyny, D. W. Wichern, Rate Regulation, Capital Structure, and the Sharing of Interest Rate Risk in the Electric Utility Industry, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 33, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting American Finance Association, New York City December 28-30, 1977 (Jun., 1978), pp. 707-721

Frank K. Reilly, Rate Regulation, Capital Structure, and the Sharing of Interest Rate Risk in the Electric Utility Industry: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 33, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting American Finance Association, New York City December 28-30, 1977 (Jun., 1978), pp. 752-754

Willard T. Carleton, Rate Regulation, Capital Structure, and the Sharing of Interest Rate Risk in the Electric Utility Industry: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 33, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting American Finance Association, New York City December 28-30, 1977 (Jun., 1978), pp. 750-751

Edward J. Kane, Getting Along Without Regulation Q: Testing the Standard View of Deposit- Rate Competition During the "Wild-Card Experience", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 33, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting American Finance Association, New York City December 28-30, 1977 (Jun., 1978), pp. 921-932