Price controls 1 have a major impact on firms' earnings and cash flows. Because price control regulation is costly to firms, it is a type of regulatory intervention that can impact a firm's accounting decisions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Thus, regulatory changes that give firms relief from price controls provide incentives for earnings management. This paper examines discretionary accruals made by New Zealand manufacturing firms in response to two sets of regulations issued in 1971 and 1972. These regulations allowed manufacturing firms to apply for price increases to gain relief from financial hardship caused by the 1970 Price Freeze Regulation. Using a modified accruals mode! that adjusts for price‐level movements, the paper tests discretionary accruals of two samples of manufacturing firms and one control sample of nonmanufacturing firms. The results provide evidence of income decreasing discretionary accruals by manufacturing firms for the years during which they could apply for price increases. The control firms do not exhibit significant discretionary accruals in 1971 or 1972. Also, this paper provides evidence that failing to adjust for price‐level movements in high inflationary periods could result in inferences of income decreasing discretionary accruals where none may exist

This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks' minimum required capital–asset ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries forbids, banks' investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms. There are two sources of moral hazard in the model: one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance, and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project. Among other things, the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank's stability and can also be Pareto-improving. Equity regulation is never Pareto-improving and does not increase the bank's stability

Shared systems in the credit card mode may offer electronic money such as stored value (“smart”) cards, e-cash, and cybermoney. In such consolidations bank partners potentially may come from far outside the customary regulated banking fraternity. While some cyberbanks have been granted official status with its responsibilities, other nonbank cyberbanks have absconded with deposits amidst fraudulent claims. Electronic money is distributed typically in complex tiers, with backup reserves often held by nonbank third parties. The regulatory rules which apply to the mixed systems are therefore uneven and unclear. Banking regulators and the Antitrust Division wrestle with the ensuing dilemmas

Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence from Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions by W. Kip Viscusi and James T. Hamilton. Published in volume 89, issue 4, pages 1010-1027 of American Economic Review, September 1999

In this paper we model the dynamic portfolio choice problem facing banks, calibrate the model using empirical data from the banking industry for 1984–1993, and assess quantitatively the impact of recent regulatory developments related to bank capital. The model implies a U-shaped relationship between capital and risk-taking: As a bank's capital increases it first takes less risk, then more risk. A deposit insurance premium surcharge on undercapitalized banks induces them to take more risk. An increased capital requirement, whether flat or risk-based, tends to induce more risk-taking by ex-ante well-capitalized banks that comply with the new standard. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G20, G28.

We propose a simple model that is suitable for evaluating alternative bank capital regulatory proposals for market risk. Our model formalizes the conflict between bank objectives and regulatory goals. Banks' decisions represent a tension between their desire to exploit the deposit-insurance put option and their desire to preserve franchise value. Regulators seek to balance the social value of deposits in mediating transactions against the deadweight costs of failure resolution. Our social welfare criterion is standard: a weighted average agents' utilities. We demonstrate that banks do not incrementally alter their portfolio risk as the economic environment changes. Rather, banks either choose the minimal feasible risk or the maximal feasible risk. This pattern, in turn, drives regulatory decisions: The first goal of the regulator is to induce banks to choose the minimal risk level. For all nontrivial cases, unregulated banks fail to choose the first-best allocations. Traditional ex-ante capital requirements can induce banks to choose the socially-optimal level of portfolio risk, but the required capital is often inefficiently high. In contrast, variants of the Federal Reserve Board's precommitment proposal imply far smaller efficiency losses, and achieve allocations at or nearthe first-best for most reasonable model specifications. The ex-post penalties required for the optimal implementation of precommitment are not excessively large. The welfare gains from precommitment are even higher when the precommitment penalty function is precluded from sending banks into default. We conclude that state-contingent regulatory mechanisms, of which the precommitment approach is an example, offer the possibility of substantial gains in regulatory efficiency, relative to traditional state non-contingent regulation

This paper develops an optimal resolution triage strategy for a deposit-insurance regulator. The regulator seeks to maximize the market value of the deposit insurance enterprise, subject to budget, personal, bureaucratic, political, informational and legal restraints. Testable hypotheses are derived concerning the timing of insolvency resolutions. The paper tests these hypotheses using a two-step hazards model and a data set of thrift resolutions during 1985–1989. The tests focus on the relative roles of value maximization and constraint pressures in decisions to grant capital forbearance. The results suggest that regulators seldom conformed to the benchmark resolution-timing strategy that an “unconflicted” agent would follow under only a budget constraint. Instead, the evidence shows that the resolution timing decision was distorted by personal, political, informational, and legal constraints

In dealership markets disclosure of size and price of details of public trades is typically incomplete. We examine whether full and prompt disclosure of public-trade details improves the welfare of a risk-averse investor. We analyze a model of dealership market where a market maker first executes a public trade and then offsets her position by trading with other market makers. We distinguish between quantity risk and price revision risk. We show that if the market maker learns some information about the motive behind public trade, neither regime is unambiguously welfare superior. This is because greater transparency improves quantity risk sharing but worsens price revision risk sharing.

I argue that merger policy needs to be driven by different considerations in Europe, Japan and the United States. In Europe the main challenge is to set up a system so that efficient consolidation can occur once the single currency is established. In Japan the policy ought to be directed towards trying to attract foreign institutions to acquire under-capitalized domestic institutions. Japan does not seem to be taking this route. In the US consolidation it is already occurring and the current policy should be continued.