Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the conventional monetary equation of exchange rate determination. Under certain exogeneity conditions, one can write the price level, at home and abroad, as the ratio of the nominal money supply to the demand for real money balances. Then, since the exchange rate is the domestic price of foreign exchange, one can equate the exchange rate to the ratio of domestic to foreign prices. This then allows one to write, and estimate, the exchange rate as a function of the money supply differential, income differential and interest rate differential. If the domestic and foreign money demand errors are autocorrelated, and if deviations from purchasing power parity are autocorrelated, tests based on the above model may be invalid. Only if all autoregressive parameters are equal will test results be valid. A full information maximum likelihood procedure is used to estimate and test the assumptions necessary for the conventional procedure to be correct. Finally, two alternative models of exchange rate determination are considered to illustrate the importance of introducing the error terms at the beginning of the analysis.

This paper is an econometric analysis of the on-the-job training (OJT) decisions of a group of white American males during 1975. The data are obtained from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which asked a very careful series of questions concerning the individual's OJT status. Each individual's internal rate of return is estimated and used as an explanatory variable to predict the probability of taking OJT. The individual's marginal tax rate is also entered in the equation. The results suggest that income taxation has tended to increase the probability of being involved in OJT. I conjecture that this is because income taxation makes investment in physical capital a less desirable vehicle for carrying consumption into the future, and hence increases the attractiveness of human capital.

P REVIOUS studies of the effects of U.S. tariffs and quotas on U.S. real income and its distribution have concluded that these effects are minimal. Moreover, this conclusion has

One of the aspects of the economic difficulties Poland is experiencing is an acute shortage of consumer goods. Since the per capita consumption of particular goods has been relatively high, the source of trouble arises from the wrong structure of prices that are (administratively) set. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the equilibrium prices for main groups of commodities for the period 1965-1978. Concurrently, the estimates of the quantity-term disequilibria are computed. The analysis are based on the Extended Linear Expenditure Systems for Ireland and Italy adjusted to the historical data for Poland.

Peer Reviewed

In Hart (1979), a model of monopolistic competition in a large economy with differentiated commodities was developed. In this model, firms had a choice whether to set up or not. One feature of the model was that free entry of firms was not assumed. Barriers to entry were captured by assuming that there was a large (generally, infinite) set of potential firms F. Corresponding to each f ∊ F, there was a firm (called “firm f”) with a production set Y(f). Each firm had a set-up cost associated with it. Only very weak conditions were placed on the set F and the production set mapping Y(·), so that in particular the case where different firms could produce a commodity on different terms was allowed for. The economy was made large by replicating the consumer sector, keeping the production sector, i.e. the set of potential firms F, fixed. The number of operating firms in equilibrium generally increased, however, since in view of the set-up costs there was “room” for more firms in a large economy. Unfortunately, it turns out that this procedure, while correct, does not capture quite what was intended. In particular, while in the resulting monopolistically competitive equlibrium, some firms will earn supernormal profits, it can be shown that, for any η > 0, the per capita number of firms earning profits in excess of η tends to zero as the size of the consumer sector tends to infinity (see Corollary 6 in the Appendix to Hart (1979)). In other words, in per capita terms, almost all firms earn approximately zero profits in a large economy. Thus while barriers to entry may be significant in absolute terms, in per capita terms they are negligible. The way round this difficulty is to drop the assumption that the set of potential firms is fixed. Instead substitute the assumption that the set of potential firms in the economy rE, where the consumer sector is replicated r times, is given by where F is as before. That is, one replicates the set of potential firms at the same time as the consumer sector. Then the theorems of Hart (1979) continue to hold. Corollary 6 in the Appendix must be modified as follows. Corollary 6′. There exists h > 0 such thatfor all f ∊ F. Corollary 6′ is proved below. Otherwise the proofs of Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 are unchanged (one no longer sets h = 1 after Corollary 6). As an example, F might consist of one firm with an efficient technology for producing some commodity and one firm with an inefficient technology. Then in the economy rE, there will be r potential firms with the efficient technology and r potential firms with the inefficient technology. It is easy to construct cases where both types of firms operate in the monopolistically competitive equilibrium in rE and the efficient firms earn supernormal profits which are bounded away from zero as r → ∞. Thus barriers to entry which are significant in per capita terms are now allowed for. A justification for replicating F along with the consumer sector can be given. In the above example, the efficient firms may owe their superior technology to the fact that they are situated on good land, say, of which there is a scarcity (thus the supernormal profits are just rents on the land). When one replicates the economy, it is natural to replicate the scarce land and hence the number of firms which are situated on it, so as to keep everything constant except for scale. Note finally that it may be possible to generalize the analysis to the case where the set of potential firms in the economy rE is given by rF, where 1F, 2F are exogenously specified sets and rF is not necessarily the r-fold union of some set F. We have not investigated this, however. Proof of Corollary 6′. Suppose not. Then for each h > 0, we can find f ∊ F with . By Lemma 5 (2), rπf > h for all r ≧ some r*. But in rE there are r firms identical to firm f and so each of these firms makes profit in excess of h in the monopolistically competitive equilibrium when r ≧ r*. Hence total per capita profits of all firms exceed h in equilibrium when r ≧ r*. It follows that, letting h → ∞, we can find a subsequence of the economies rE such that total per capita profits tend to infinity along the subsequence. However, applying Corollary 4 and an argument similar to that in (A.30)–(A.32), we see that ʃArp(a)drY1(a) is bounded. Hence so are per capita profits, ʃArp(a)drY1(a) + rY0. Contradiction. ||

This paper examines the interactions between market structure and resource allocation over time when there is endogenous technical progress. The structures considered are a planned economy, pure monopoly, and competition with patent rights. In an efficient allocation the date of invention coincides with the date of innovation (the date at which technology is used). This is also true with a pure monopoly, but monopoly retards technical progress relative to the efficient level. Competition for patents rights to a new technology results in excessively rapid technical progress if the resource endowment of the economy is sufficiently large. Also, competition may lead to “sleeping patents” where invention strictly precedes the date of innovation.

This paper studies a central aspect of optimal income taxation as modelled in Mirrlees' original paper on the topic (identical leisure/consumption preferences, qualitatively homogeneous "skills" in production), namely, whether given concave utilitarianism alone the optimal marginal income tax will be non-negative. A well-known positive answer to this question (in weak inequality form) was given in the said paper which, however, we show requires additive separability of individual utility (in the ordinal and cardinal senses). Our main result here is to derive the required (strict) positivity of the marginal tax under weak conditions, slightly wider than noninferiority of consumption and leisure, with preferences otherwise arbitrary.

It is well known that a domestic resource discovery gives rise to wealth effects that cause a squeeze of the tradeable good sector of an open economy. The decline of the manufacturing sector following an energy discovery has been termed the "Dutch disease," and has been investigated in many recent studies. Our model extends the principally static analyses to date by allowing for: (1) short-run capital specificity and long-run capital mobility; (2) international capital flows; and (3) far-sighted intertemporal optimizing behavior by households and firms. The model is solved by numerical simulation.

This paper establishes that when there is not a complete set of markets but more than one commodity the stock market equilibrium will not in general be a constrained Pareto optimum. The economy will lack both the property of exchange and production efficiency. Necessary conditions which must be satisfied if the economy is to be a constrained Pareto optimum for all technologies are derived; if all individuals have identical, homothetic indifference maps, then either there must be unitary price elasticities (so there is no effective risk) or all individuals must have the same degree of risk aversion (so there is no trade on the stock market).