Knowledge that Transforms

This article derives three dynamic models of worker effort determination, based on a shirking efficiency wage model, a compensating differentials model, and a union-firm bargaining model. It shows that all of these three models have the same long-run comparative statics but differ in their short-run dynamics. We use these different predictions about the dynamics as a basis for testing the models. Euler equations for each model are estimated using panel data on 486 U.K. companies. The evidence supports the shirking model in firms with low levels of unionization but the bargaining model in highly unionized industries.

This article investigates whether prenotification decreases postdisplacement joblessness. Reduced-form estimates indicate that lengthy written notice is associated with small increases in the probability of avoiding nonemployment but with no decline in average durations. Significant reductions are found, however, for household heads, women, nonwhites, and in local labor markets with high unemployment rates. A new method is developed to control for the endogeneity of voluntarily provided advance notice. This procedure suggests that previous research substantially overstates the degree to which prenotification reduces nonemployment and indicates that the actual decrease is between 2 and 5 working days.

This article presents an equilibrium model of a dual labor market. Firms are assumed to be identical ex ante, and dualism arises endogenously. The dual labor market outcome is supported by efficiency wage and search considerations. Firms choose wage/effort requirement packages optimally given optimal search and effort choice by workers, and vice versa. We prove existence and investigate the occurrence and nature of dual labor market equilibria.

In this paper I show that the Medicaid program can improve the access of financially indigent patients to nursing home care by raising the rate of return paid on Medicaid patients' care, but only at the cost of lower quality of care. To quantify the policy tradeoff, I derive expressions for the elasticity of access with respect to total Medicaid expenditures and the elasticity of access with respect to quality. These elasticities expressions are complicated by the fact that Medicaid payment formulas are cost based and, therefore, depend on the quality choices of nursing homes. Using New York State data, I find that a 10% increase in Medicaid expenditures induces a 4.1% increase in Medicaid patient care but also reduces nursing home expenditures on patient services by about 3.4%.

Bargaining models suggest that firm-specific variables play an important role in wage determination. Yet previous empirical studies of wage determination have largely ignored these variables. Our analysis of a large panel data set of U.S. wage contracts suggests that firm-specific variables suggested by bargaining models. such as the values of sales. the capital-labor ratio, and the financial liquidity of the firm. are important determinants of negotiated real wages.

Unit-root and variance-ratio tests are used to ex- amine the trend properties and degree of persistence of industrial production in U.S. industries and comparable aggregates during the post World War II period. The evidence from unit-root tests suggests that less than one-half of these industries have output which may be characterized as a random walk. The variance-ratio test results generally support this conclusion. Consistent with standard economic theory, fluctuations in durable-goods industries are less persistent than in nondurable goods industries. Finally, tests find relatively greater persistence in the aggregate industrial production data.

We analyze taxpayer choices of return preparation services. We distinguish between two types of nonpaid preparers, six types of paid third parties, and self-preparation. Among other things, we find significant differences in the factors which explain the demand for paid third parties who are and are not able to represent clients before the IRS. Among these factors are increases in IRS audit rates and the frequency of IRS penalties.

Nasser Daneshvary, Henry W. Herzog, Jr., Richard A. Hofler, Alan M. Schlottmann, Job Search and Immigrant Assimilation: An Earnings Frontier Approach, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Aug., 1992), pp. 482-492

Experimental duopolies are analyzed to answer two questions: Are asymmetric duopolies less likely to collude than symmetric duopolies? Is the time it takes to reach an equilibrium affected by asymmetry? In a repeated game where output is the choice, we have data 19 (respectively, 21) subject pairs where both agents are low-cost (respectively, high-cost) and 25 subject pairs where one agent in high-cost and one is low-cost. Subjects make choices for at least 35 periods. Results indicate that asymmetric markets are less cooperative and take longer to reach equilibrium than symmetric markets.