Knowledge that Transforms

I study optimal managerial contracts in two contracting environments. When the investment return is contractible, an optimal contract combines a base salary, golden parachute, and bonus. When the return is not contractible, two types of optimal contracts are studied: a contract with restricted stock and a contract with stock options. These three types of contracts are equivalent: they implement the same outcome and lead to the same expected payoff for the manager, implying that the choice of contractual form is irrelevant in the environment I study. I suggest directions of research for the relevance of different contractual forms.

In some OECD countries the male and female unemployment rates are very similar but in others (notably the Mediterranean countries) the female unemployment rate is much higher than the male. Explaining these cross‐country differences is the subject of this article. We show that, in countries where there is a large gender gap in unemployment rates, there is a gender gap in both flows from employment into unemployment and from unemployment into employment. We conclude that differences in human capital accumulation between men and women interacted with labor market institutions is an important part of the explanation.

This paper established that a low dimensional vector of cognitive and noncognitive skills explains a variety of labor market and behavioral outcomes. For many dimensions of social performance cognitive and noncognitive skills are equally important. Our analysis addresses the problems of measurement error, imperfect proxies, and reverse causality that plague conventional studies of cognitive and noncognitive skills that regress earnings (and other outcomes) on proxies for skills. Noncognitive skills strongly influence schooling decisions, and also affect wages given schooling decisions. Schooling, employment, work experience and choice of occupation are affected by latent noncognitive and cognitive skills. We study a variety of correlated risky behaviors such as teenage pregnancy and marriage, smoking, marijuana use, and participation in illegal activities. The same low dimensional vector of abilities that explains schooling choices, wages, employment, work experience and choice of occupation explains these behavioral outcomes.

Editor's Note The Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) regularly reviews books of interest to the economics profession. The Economic Report of the President (ERP) falls under that purview. I have asked a handful of very prominent economists to review the 2006 ERP. Reviewers were chosen to reflect expertise on what I guessed would be key issues. The ERP in principle should provide an accurate assessment of the consensus professional views of economists on any given issue, based on the research to date. Reviewers were asked to evaluate whether the discussion in the ERP in fact accurately summarizes what we as economists know? Reviewers were given free rein over what material they would review in the ERP but were urged to focus on their areas of particular expertise. In the reviews that follow, Martin Feldstein reviews the overview chapter as well as topics relating to macroeconomics. Alan Auerbach reviews the ERP's discussion of tax-related issues, while Ken Rogoff reviews the ERP's discussion of international economic topics. Rebecca Blank writes on labor market issues in the ERP, and Michael Katz reviews the ERP's discussion of health care issues. Many thanks to the reviewers for the quick turnaround.

Following George Stigler (1964), many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts b firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output. But the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well. Theory cannot tell us, a priori, which effect will dominate: whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question. We examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions: (1) Can cartels succeed? (2) If so, for how long? (3) What impact do cartels have? (4) What causes cartels to break up? We conclude that many cartels do survive, and that the distribution of duration is bimodal. While the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years, many cartels break up very quickly (i.e., in less than a year). But there are many others that last between five and ten years, and some that last decades. Limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits, to varying degrees. Cartels can also affect other non-price variables, including advertising, innovation, investment, barriers to entry, and concentration. Cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring, but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions. Cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive. Price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances. Sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry.

Most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment's heating or our washing machine breaks down, or when our car starts to make strange noises. And for most of us, commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern. This concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill. On the contrary, one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment. This article studies the economics underlying these worries. Under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment? What types of fraud exist? What are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems? Under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior? And what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated?

New developments in the world economy have triggered research designed to better understand the changes in trade and investment patterns, and the reorganization of production across national borders. Although traditional trade theory has much to offer in explaining parts of this puzzle, other parts required new approaches. Particularly acute has been the need to model alternative forms of involvement of business firms in foreign activities because organizational change has been central in the transformation of the world economy. This paper reviews the literature that has emerged from these efforts. The theoretical refinements have focused on the individual firm, studying its choices in response to its own characteristics, the nature of the industry in which it operates, and the opportunities afforded by foreign trade and investment. Important among these choices are organizational features, such as sourcing strategies. But the theory has gone beyond the individual firm, studying the implications of firm behavior for the structure of industries. It provides new explanations for trade structure and patterns of foreign direct investment, both within and across industries, and has identified new sources of comparative advantage.

In popular discussion much has been made recently of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners. The general presumption has also been that such interactions have a deleterious effect on the home economy. However, it can be argued that, in a trade policy context, bending policy in a direction that would suit foreigners may not in fact be harmful: If the policy outcome absent any lobbying by foreigners is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, lobbying by foreigners may result in reductions in such barriers and raise consumer surplus (and possibly improve welfare). Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the US, this paper investigates the relationship between trade protection and lobbying activity empirically. The approach taken in this paper is primarily a structural one. To model the role of foreign and domestic lobbies in determining trade policy, we develop first a theoretical framework building on the wellknown work of Our analysis of the data suggests that foreign lobbying activity has significant impact on trade policy -and in the predicted direction: Tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity. We consider also extended specifications in which we include a large number of additional explanatory variables that have been suggested in the literature as determinants of trade policy (but that emerge from outside of the theoretical structure described above) and confirm the robustness of our findings in this setting.

This paper provides new evidence on the predictive power of dividend yields for U.S. aggregate stock returns. Following Miller and Modigliani, we construct a measure of the dividend yield that includes all cash flows to shareholders. We show that this alternative cash-flow yield has strong and stable predictive power for returns, and appears robust to a battery of tests that have been proposed in recent critiques of the predictability literature.