Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a simple approach to valuing stocks in the presence of learning about average profitability. The market‐to‐book ratio (M/B) increases with uncertainty about average profitability, especially for firms that pay no dividends. M/B is predicted to decline over a firm's lifetime due to learning, with steeper decline when the firm is young. These predictions are confirmed empirically. Data also support the predictions that younger stocks and stocks that pay no dividends have more volatile returns. Firm profitability has become more volatile recently, helping explain the puzzling increase in average idiosyncratic return volatility observed over the past few decades.

We show that top management incentives vary by responsibility. For oversight executives, pay‐performance incentives are $1.22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than for divisional executives. For CEOs, incentives are $5.65 higher than for divisional executives. Incentives for the median top management team are substantial at $32.32. CEOs account for 42 to 58 percent of aggregate team incentives. For divisional executives, the pay– divisional performance sensitivity is positive and increasing in the precision of divisional performance and the pay– firm performance sensitivity is decreasing in the precision of divisional performance. These results support principal–agent models with multiple signals of managerial effort.

This paper analyses the joint provision of effort by an entrepreneur and by an advisor to improve the productivity of an investment project. Without moral hazard, it is optimal that both exert effort. With moral hazard, if the entrepreneur's effort is more efficient (less costly) than the advisor's effort, the latter is not hired if she does not provide funds. Outside financing arises endogenously. This explains why investors like venture capitalists are value enhancing. The level of outside financing determines whether common stocks or convertible bonds should be issued in response to incentives.

IPO underpricing reached astronomical levels during 1999 and 2000. We show that the regime shift in initial returns and other elements of pricing behavior can be at least partially accounted for by marked changes in pre‐IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior over the period, which reduced key decision makers' incentives to control underpricing. After controlling for these changes, the difference in underpricing between 1999 and 2000 and the preceding three years is much reduced. Our results suggest that it was firm characteristics that were unique during the “dot‐com bubble” and that pricing behavior followed from incentives created by these characteristics.

The Federal Reserve sets targets for interest rates which it enforces through direct market intervention. These targets are changed periodically. In this paper, we develop a term structure model in which the short rate is subject to a control which keeps it close to a target which changes from time to time. The probability of target changes is not constant in the model, but changes as a function of observables. The model performs well at explaining the shifts in the yield curve that accompany target changes.

This paper takes a new look at the predictability of stock market returns with risk measures. We find a significant positive relation between average stock variance (largely idiosyncratic) and the return on the market. In contrast, the variance of the market has no forecasting power for the market return. These relations persist after we control for macroeconomic variables known to forecast the stock market. The evidence is consistent with models of time‐varying risk premia based on background risk and investor heterogeneity. Alternatively, our findings can be justified by the option value of equity in the capital structure of the firms.

This paper analyzes the early exercise of exchange‐traded options by different classes of investors over the 1996 to 1999 period. A large number of exercises are identified as clearly irrational without invoking any model of market equilibrium. Customers of discount brokers and customers of fullservice brokers both engage in a significant number of irrational exercises while traders at large investment houses exhibit no irrational early exercise behavior. Rational and irrational exercise is triggered for discount and full‐service customers by the underlying stock price attaining its highest level over the past year and by high returns on the underlying stock.

Green and Hollifield (1992) argue that the presence of a dominant factor would result in extreme negative weights in mean‐variance efficient portfolios even in the absence of estimation errors. In that case, imposing no‐short‐sale constraints should hurt, whereas empirical evidence is often to the contrary. We reconcile this apparent contradiction. We explain why constraining portfolio weights to be nonnegative can reduce the risk in estimated optimal portfolios even when the constraints are wrong. Surprisingly, with no‐short‐sale constraints in place, the sample covariance matrix performs as well as covariance matrix estimates based on factor models, shrinkage estimators, and daily data.

We analyze financial statements from 34 countries for the period 1984–1998 to construct a panel data set measuring three dimensions of reported accounting earnings for each country: earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing. We hypothesize that these three dimensions are associated with uninformative or opaque earnings, and so we combine these three measures to obtain an overall earnings opacity time-series measure per country. We then explore whether our three measures of earnings opacity affect two characteristics of an equity market in a country: the return the shareholders demand and how much they trade. While not all results are consistent for our three individual earnings opacity measures, our panel data tests document that, after controlling for other influences, an increase in overall earnings opacity in a country is linked to an economically significant increase in the cost of equity and an economically significant decrease in trading in the stock market of that country.

We present a continuous-time asset pricing model of the levered firm where shareholders select not only the timing but also the form of abandonment. Shareholders can walk out of the firm either by (i) defaulting on their debt obligations or (ii) selling their shares to alternative operators of, the technologies, as in a corporation sale . The structural model relates shareholders' ex-post choice to both technological and financial factors. Considering that operators' technological supremacy is not universal, we obtain that whereas default necessarily involves an inefficient timing of ownership transfer, corporation sales do not. Then, the likelihood of default being chosen instead of a corporation sale increases with (i) the degree of leverage displayed by the firm and (ii) its technological supremacy. By ignoring corporation sales, existing defaultable bond pricing models have thus a tendency to exaggerate risk premia and underestimate the borrowing ability (debt capacity) of firms.