Knowledge that Transforms

Previous article FreeJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two YearsFull TextPDF Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years Outcome of 1st Round DecisionsMean Days to DecisionMedian Days to DecisionDecision Later than Six Months after Submission (as percentage of decisions within decision type)Desk Rejection48%1070%Reject with Reviews45%1189813%Revise7%17015938%Average time from original submission to acceptance (omitting time with author in revision) = 442 days View Table Image Previous article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 128, Number 5May 2020 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/709120 Views: 127 © 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Previous articleNext article FreeRecent RefereesFull TextPDF Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJournal of Political Economy acknowledges the assistance of:Martin AbelJohannes AbelerEliot AbramsAnna AizerCarlo AltavillaMarianne AndriesFrancisca AntmanJose ApesteguiaPeter ArcidiaconoCostas ArkolakisCarolina ArteagaEnghin AtalaySina AtesNicholas BarberisHeski Bar-IsaacAmber BarnatoRaquel BernalJohn BeshearsMichael BestV. BhaskarAnna BindlerAislinn BohrenStephane BonhommeMark BorgschulteKevin BoudreauSerguey BraguinskyJohn CampbellIvan CanayAlexander CappelenChristopher ChambersJames ChoiSteve CicalaChristopher ClappDamon ClarkJeffrey ClemensPaola ConconiDean CorbaeClement de ChaisemartinAlessandro De ChiaraGeoffroy de ClippelMark DeanDavide DebortoliMelissa DellOlivier DeschenesWouter DesseinWill DobbieDave DonaldsonOlivier DonniLaura DovalOrla DoyleAnna Dreber AlmenbergPiotr DworczakMark EganTore EllingsenPablo FajgelbaumMax FarrellShuaizhang FengDavid FiglioFrederico FinanRaymond FismanJon H. FivaThomas FujiwaraDouglas GaleSimone GalpertiDaniel GarrettCecile GaubertFrancois GerardRobert GertnerRicard GilRita GinjaPaul Goldsmith-PinkhamRadhakrishnan GopalanOlga GorelkinaTodd GormleyEric GouldSimon GrantPaul GriecoJohn GrigsbyJang-Ting GuoDaniel HaanwinckelColm HarmonSamuel HartzmarkMoshe HazanJie HeZhiguo HeKeith HeadEmma HeikenstenKyle HerkenhoffAnthony HeyesJames HinesRandi HjalmarssonMitchell HoffmanBengt HolmstromRichard HornbeckWei HuangSteffen HuckIngrid HuitfeldtPeter HullMatteo IacovielloAkifumi IshiharaKoichiro ItoLaurence JacquetTomas JagelkaPamela JakielaGregory JolivetMarc KaufmannShaowei KePatrick KehoeJun Hyung KimPatrick KlineJozef KoningsDmitri KoustasAmanda KowalskiDaniel KrahmerRachel KrantonIlan KremerGuido KuersteinerPeter KuhnGuy LacroixRicardo LagosRasmus LandersoePeter LandryKevin LangFabian LangeBrad LarsenJohn LeahyMunseob LeeTeng LiChe-Yuan LiangNicola LimodioJo Thori LindIlse LindenlaubAttila LindnerKatrine LokenDong LouElena LoutskinaCorinne LowErik MadsenPaola ManziniRobert MargoRamon MarimonMarco MariottiLeslie MarxXavier Mateos-PlanasNiko MatouschekGregor MatvosThomas McInishKatherine MeckelLeonardo MelosiKonrad MenzelGuy MichaelsStanley MilesKevin MilliganKarl MoeneFrancesca MolinariCorina MommaertsSimon MongeyAmeet MorjariaJack MountjoyRebecca MyersonAbhishek NagarajSuresh NaiduPatricia NaranjoSusanne NeckermannNick NetzerDavid NeumarkHiroki NishimuraVolker NockeSam NorrisTerrance OdeanChristopher OdyHessel OosterbeekMichaela PagelAmanda PallaisLubos PastorChristina PattersonMark PaulyEduardo Perez-RichetPetra PerssonMaria PetrovaPaolo Giovanni PiacquadioA. Mitchell PolinskyMaria PolyakovaGiovanni PontiAndrea PratValerie RameyHeikki RantakariDavid RapachEvan RawleyLuis RayoAlex Rees-JonesDavid RibarJames RobertsArthur RobsonMatthias RodemeierDaniel RoggerKirsten RohdeMaya Rossin-SlaterJesse RothsteinAldo RustichiniLuca SalaYuval SalantAnya SamekNicholas SandersSeth SandersFlorian ScheuerFrank SchilbachLawrence SchmidtBenoit SchmutzMolly SchnellAndrew SchotterMoritz SchularickDaniel SchunkMichael SchwertFiona Scott MortonPetr SedlacekDavid SeimSteven ShavellAndrew ShephardLan ShiHolger SiegJames SmithAlbert Solé OlléDavid SolomonPeter SorensenStefanie StantchevaChristopher StantonJon SteinssonVincent SterkLudwig StraubBruno StruloviciChris SwannBalazs SzentesGuido TabelliniMax Tabord-MeehanOmer TamuzDuncan ThomasChristopher TonettiAlexander TorgovitskyRagnar TorvikBertil TungoddenSarah TurnerChristopher UdryJohn Van ReenenMaria Ana VitorinoHans VothJessica WachterMichael WaldmanReed WalkerChristopher WaltersMelanie WassermanRyan WebbHongcen WeiCatherine WeinbergerAlexander WhalleyNoah WilliamsAlexander WolitzkyJens WronaKairong XiaoNathan YangJunjian YiH. YoungHasin YousafAli YurukogluSeth Zimmerman Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 128, Number 5May 2020 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/709828 Views: 159 © 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Following the theoretical innovations of complementarity theory, management control studies have investigated interdependencies between different management control practices. In this paper, we compare the two dominant statistical specifications to test for the presence of an interdependency. We show theoretically how the power of the demand and the performance specification varies with the level of optimality in the sample and how those specifications are vulnerable to correlated omitted variable bias. Our simulation results reveal that the demand specification is more robust to variations in optimality and correlated omitted variables than the performance specification. We use these results to formulate recommendations for future research into management control interdependencies.

This study adds to the literature on accounting incompleteness and instability an understanding of how accounting acts upon an object that is practised as a multiple. It explores how accounting, in the form of a sales and operations planning (SO this adds new accountings onto existing ones, all of which exist simultaneously.

Despite third parties being important conduits of trust, little is known about the mechanisms and conditions relevant to their influence on trust formation and partner selection in interfirm relationships. In this study, we experimentally examine how varying levels of third-party information shape the trust that buyer managers have in a potential supplier firm, and how this trust affects subsequent selection decisions. In addition, we investigate when this information is most influential, by accounting for the moderating impact of the focal firm’s own prior experience. As expected, both neutral and favorable third-party information are able to elicit trust, yet with different effects on competence and goodwill trusting beliefs. These trusting beliefs, in turn, are positively associated with the likelihood of the supplier to be selected. Notably, we find third-party effects over and above the effects resulting from own prior experience. Overall, by investigating differences with regard to the origin and content of information and the specific type of trust, this study advances a more nuanced understanding of the partner selection process.

We examine accounting professionalization in Iran to understand state-controlled adaptation of Iran’s professional accounting organization in response to transnational pressure. Using a neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony, the study shows that Iran’s accounting occupation as an element of civil society was re-constituted through the interplay of shifting state ideology and transnational capitalism over the past five decades. The state’s desire to integrate Iran with the global financial system in recent decades drove changes to Iran’s accounting professional organization for alignment with transnational norms. The adaptation occurred amidst local resistance to transnational preference for granting regulatory powers to an autonomous professional accounting body. The study highlights professional autonomy as a contested ideational site of struggle in this process. The state preserved standard setting authority within the state apparatus, granted statutory audit and professional certification powers to an ideologically-trusted professional body, and relegated an accounting association construed as espousing neoliberal ideology to the politically less sensitive responsibility of offering professional education. We interpret this regulatory role specialization of the occupational groups as a product of the state’s selective co-optation of the groups on ideological grounds. The study highlights the role of a country’s ideological distance from neoliberalism in shaping adaptation of regulatory institutions for alignment to transnational norms.

This paper adds to the literature on the role of financial economics in accounting standard-setting by analyzing the co-performation of an economic theory – the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) – in the construction of a new approach to accounting for credit losses in financial reporting. Inspired by actor-network theory and its notions of performativity and translation, the paper draws on interview data and documents to reconstruct the process by which the devalued “incurred loss” impairment model was replaced with a more forward-looking “expected loss” approach under IFRS in response to the 2008 financial crisis. These actions comprised of a series of experiments and negotiations, including an unsuccessful effort to establish an “ideal”-type model and the failure of a joint initiative between the IASB and the FASB. Alongside extensive considerations over how to make the approach operational, the influence of the EMH regarding the relationship between loan pricing and initial expectations of credit losses is elucidated. We show how a standard-setting objective grounded in financial economics is translated through a process of approximation as it forges linkages with other matters of concern. This process sheds light on the transformations involved in finding tolerable solutions when utilizing financial economics in the setting of accounting standards.

This paper aims to understand the mechanisms through which organizations, over time, manage competing logics within budgeting practices. We draw insights from new institutional studies in accountingto highlight the importance of practice-level negotiations for managing institutional conflicts, but we complement them with a focus on the organizational embeddedness of hybrid practices from organizational studies in accounting. More specifically, we build on the notion of ‘structured flexibility,’ according to which organizational structures frame and enable negotiations on hybrid practices, as critical to manage complexity in face of changing environmental conditions. We thus show how ‘structured flexibility’ is made possible by a number of characteristics of decision-making that have been widely studied by the behavioral theory of the firm, i.e. the decomposition of decision-making processes, the framing of local negotiations and the search for satisficing solutions. Our findings from a case study of a public university facing the conflict between a professional and a managerial logic shed light on how organizations may actively manage institutional complexity over time and suggest specific interventions to transform complexity into a source of strategic advantage.

It has been argued that accountancy and finance have struggled to promote gender equality despite their intentions and efforts to do so. The paper contributes to explanations for this ongoing inequality by theorising the psychic life of women working in these fields, as displayed in their reflections on moments where they have failed to embody an identity that is the discursive and structural ideal within the profession. The ‘perfect worker’ is an idealised subjectivity modelled on the traditional male career and inflected by neoliberalism. Prior critiques of ‘postfeminism’ identify a pattern of self-blaming for inequality among women, but do not explain how and why they readily responsibilize themselves. Drawing on Freud’s theory of melancholia we suggest self-blame is the result of an unconscious confrontation with the loss of the perfect worker ideal: the ego’s response leading to a destructive cycle of self-reproach and atonement. The implication of melancholia is that structural contributors to inequality are reinforced. Furthermore, we develop Freud’s melancholia to theorise a contemporary manifestation that sees neoliberalism acting in concert with the psyche’s predisposition to defense, precipitating an epidemic of individualisation. This implies that neoliberalism employs a form of ‘perfectionist power’ that reinforces oppression at the level of the unconscious. We conclude that the advancement of equality requires a deliberate intervention in the melancholic cycle by moving the psyche into a process of mourning that recognises sociality as a condition of solidaristic resistance.