Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines empirically the effects of domicile and SEC registration and reporting requirements on information asymmetry. We compare the adverse-selection component of the relative bid–ask spread (our measure of information asymmetry) for three samples of Nasdaq NMS companies that trade in different home markets and are subject to different standards of disclosure: registered U.S. companies, registered non-Canadian foreign companies, and unregistered non-Canadian foreign companies covered by the information-supplying exemption of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. We find that the adverse-selection component is not significantly larger for the two foreign samples, and it is not reliably different for the registered and unregistered foreign samples. Therefore, we are unable to document that less stringent SEC registration and reporting requirements for foreign companies are associated with greater information asymmetry among investors for non-U.S. securities traded on Nasdaq.

This article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets. Firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle. We show the sources of small business finance, and how capital structure varies with firm size and age. The interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment. We also analyze a number of research and policy issues, review the literature, and suggest topics for future research.

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. The value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project. The allocation of the funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard. The optimal contract is a time-varying share contract which provides intertemporal risk-sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur. The share of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option. The option itself is based on the control of the funds. The dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to an inefficient early stopping of the project. A positive liquidation value explains the adoption of strip financing or convertible securities. Finally, relationship financing, including monitoring and the occasional replacement of the management improves the efficiency of the financial contracting.

Following the ongoing debate on risks in interbank payment networks, gross settlement systems are being adopted in several industrialized countries. These systems, which effect real-time transfers of monetary base among bank accounts, add management of intraday liquidity to the duties traditionally performed by central banks, and require new, ad hoc policy instruments. The paper presents a simple model of a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system, which is used to analyze the reaction of banks and monetary policy variables to this new environment. It is shown that if daylight liquidity is costly, a network externality may induce banks to postpone payment activity, thereby affecting the quality of the information available to counterparts for cash management purposes. The increased noise may in turn induce higher than optimal levels of banks' end-of-day reserve holdings, relative to a social optimum, with adverse effects on expected profits. The rise of a daylight market for funds, predicted by the model, does not solve the mentioned externality problem. Some corrective policy measures are discussed.

Recent widespread consolidation in the banking industry has elicited concern that lending to small businesses will be reduced by the banking industry. The consolidation, though, has stimulated an upsurge in new bank charters. This study compares the lending by de novo banks to small businesses with the lending by similarly sized incumbent banks for the years 1987–1994. We find that the portfolios of de novo banks consistently contain a substantially higher percentage of small business loans than do the portfolios of similar incumbents. These results indicate that de novo banks can be part of the solution to the problems that consolidation may create.

A model is developed wherein entrepreneurs and venture capitalists contract under symmetric information. Asymmetric information may arise following first contracting. It is shown this can lead to debt infeasibility and preferred equity usage. Control is linked to choice between common and preferred. Results are robust to multiperiod extensions. Roles of convertible preferred, retained equity, and debt in IPOs are considered. An empirical survey of venture capital firms is presented demonstrating preferred dominates in early financing. Debt and common are used far less – generally at later stages under lower probability of asymmetric information. These results agree with the theory's implications.

This study argues that an interest rate swap, as a non-redundant security, creates surplus which will be shared by swap counterparties to compensate their risks in swaps. This action in turns affects swap spreads. Analyzing the time series impacts of the changes of risks of swap counterparties on swap spreads, we conclude that both lower and higher rating bond spreads have positive impacts on swap spreads. We also derive a risk–spread relation to test if swap counterparties are firms with differential credit ratings. Since the risk allocation between swap counterparties varies over business cycles, hence this factor needs to be controlled. We conclude that (1) similar results hold if the business cycle factor is controlled and (2) swap spreads contain procyclical element and are less cyclical than lower credit rating bond spreads.

This paper is an empirical exploration of the determinants of the required credit spreads on highly leveraged transaction (HLT) loans. The analysis uses a multi-factor spread model to estimate the movement of loan spreads relative to spreads required in the (competing) corporate bond market as well as the significance of loan-specific characteristics in determining loan spreads. The empirical estimates are based on the Loan Pricing Corporation's database which consists of over 4000 loan transactions between 1987 and 1994. We find a positive HLT loan spread sensitivity to changes in spreads in the corporate bond market, but this sensitivity is significantly less than unity; indicating that the HLT loan market and high yield public debt market are not fully integrated. Furthermore, there is evidence that lenders augment, rather than substitute, loan yield spreads with additional fees for syndication, commitment and cancellation risks. In general syndicated loans have lower yield spreads than other HLT loan types.

Using a market segmentation argument, this paper uses the interest rate derivative's arbitrage-free methodology to value both demand deposit liabilities and credit card loan balances in markets where deposits/loan rates may be determined under imperfect competition. In this context, these financial instruments are shown to be equivalent to a particular interest rate swap, where the principal depends on the past history of market rates. Solutions are obtained which are independent of any particular model for the evolution of the term structure of interest rates.

This paper surveys the empirical and theoretical literature on the mechanisms of corporate governance. We focus on the internal mechanisms of corporate governance (e.g., corporate board of directors) and their role in ameliorating various classes of agency problems arising from conflicts of interests between managers and equityholders, equityholders and creditors, and capital contributors and other stakeholders to the corporate firm. We also examine the substitution effect between internal mechanisms of corporate governance and external mechanisms, particularly markets for corporate control. Directions for future research are provided.