Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We conduct two experiments to investigate the joint effect of two justification factors of earnings management—namely, attribution for the firm's underperformance and benefits accruing to other employees from inflating reported earnings. This investigation is important because prior research examines the effects of individual justification factors, whereas real‐world settings entail more complexity involving multiple justification factors. In Experiment 1, we predict and find that managers are more likely to manage earnings when the firm's underperformance is caused by an external event and misreported earnings benefit other employees besides the reporting manager. Furthermore, we show that the extent to which participants use moral justifications mediates the effect of benefits sharing on earnings management, but only when causal attribution is external, and that it mediates the effect of causal attribution on earnings management, but only when benefits are shared. In Experiment 2, we use a neutral control condition that makes no mention of inconsistent incentives to demonstrate that it is the combination of causal attribution and benefits sharing that triggers earnings management. We contribute to the accounting and psychology literature by proposing and testing a theory that explains how multiple justification factors interact to cause opportunistic behavior. Our results suggest that policy‐makers and governing parties should consider developing a holistic view of possible justification factors, focusing on situational opportunities created by combinations of factors rather than individual factors alone.

Unlike prior research that focuses on determinants of firm-specific stock price crashes (SPCs), we study the consequences of SPCs on market information efficiency. The tension underlying our research question stems from two competing explanations. As an unanticipated shock, an SPC could stimulate (distort) information efficiency by triggering investor rational attention (opinion divergence). Our identification strategy involves a difference-in-differences analysis in which SPC firms in the treatment sample are propensity score matched with non-SPC firms in the industry-peer control sample, as well as placebo tests for falsification. Consistent with the stimulation effect, we find an increase of the earnings response coefficient and a decrease in post-earnings announcement drift, from the pre- to post-SPC period, for SPC firms, but not for non-SPC firms. Further analyses reveal that SPC firms attract increased investor attention, as reflected in greater analyst coverage and more investor access to firms' online financial filings following such an event. Using mutual fund flow redemption pressure based on hypothetical sales as an exogenous shock to SPCs, we provide evidence corroborating our causal interpretation of the main findings. Collectively, the evidence suggests that SPCs can attract increased investor attention, bringing about positive externalities by stimulating market information efficiency.

ABSTRACT Given the uncertainty regarding auditors' responsibilities, standard setters considered the need for clarification of technical terms such as reasonable assurance in the new audit reporting models. The PCAOB ultimately decided to exclude clarifying language from its final standard, while the Auditing Standards Board and IAASB made such language mandatory. Given the difference in reporting models, this study investigates the role clarification of reasonable assurance plays in auditor negligence. We predict and find that, absent clarification, jurors judge auditors to be more negligent when the audit report includes a related critical audit matters disclosure than when it does not. However, consistent with our prediction, clarifying what is meant by reasonable assurance mitigates this increase in auditors' liability exposure by reducing jurors' perceptions of auditors' personal control over the misstatement at the time of the audit. Thus, our evidence suggests that the PCAOB's decision to not include such language in the new audit reporting model may have been shortsighted given the potential for clarification to mitigate a potential negative unintended consequence to auditors' litigation exposure under the new audit reporting model.

ABSTRACT This study investigates the influence of three interest groups—businesses, the tax profession, and civil society—on tax rules in the context of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. Our study is important as prior research has not examined the direct influence of various interest groups on the content of tax rules by means of comment letters. Using content analysis, we seek to explain the lobbying success of the different interest groups by examining the relevance of the kind of information transmitted and the alliance strategies used. Results indicate that lobbying success is mainly explained by the vested interests of the three groups, with businesses less successful than the other two interest groups as long as all interest groups are equally able to provide information. We also find that the lobbying success of businesses increases when proposals require specific expertise. However, bias is still relevant for lobbying success as we find that proposals from tax professionals with practical experience, likely to reflect less bias, are relatively more successful than proposals from businesses. Furthermore, our results suggest that mobilizing commenters who have a shared interest in the form of alliances is a promising lobbying strategy. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of expertise and collective actions for lobbying success.