Knowledge that Transforms

This paper documents a close link between mispricing and liquidity by investigating stocks with high analyst disagreement. Previous research finds that these stocks tend to be overpriced, but that prices correct downwards as uncertainty about earnings is resolved. Our analysis suggests that one reason mispricing has persisted through the years is that analyst disagreement coincides with high trading costs. We also show that in the cross‐section, the less liquid stocks tend to be more severely overpriced. Additionally, increases in aggregate market liquidity accelerate the convergence of prices to fundamentals. As a result, returns of the initially overpriced stocks are negatively correlated with the time series of innovations in aggregate market liquidity.

We study an important recent series of buyback auctions conducted by the U.S. Treasury in retiring $67.5 billion of its illiquid off‐the‐run debt. The Treasury was successful in buying back large amounts of illiquid debt while suffering only a small market‐impact cost. The Treasury included the most‐illiquid bonds more frequently in the auctions, but tended to buy back the least‐illiquid of these bonds. Although the Treasury had the option to cherry pick from among the bonds offered, we find that the Treasury was actually penalized for being spread too thinly in the buybacks.

Previous empirical studies of information cascades use either naturally occurring data or laboratory experiments. We combine attractive elements from each of these lines of research by observing market professionals from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in a controlled environment. Analysis of over 1,500 individual decisions suggests that CBOT professionals behave differently from our student control group. For instance, professionals are better able to discern the quality of public signals and their decisions are not affected by the domain of earnings. These results have implications for market efficiency and are important in both a positive and normative sense.

Theory suggests that reputations allow nonanonymous markets to attenuate adverse selection in trading. We identify instances in which New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks experience trading floor relocations. Although specialists follow the stocks to their new locations, most brokers do not. We find a discernable increase in liquidity costs around a stock's relocation that is larger for stocks with higher adverse selection and greater broker turnover. We also find that floor brokers relocating with the stock obtain lower trading costs than brokers not moving and brokers beginning trading post‐move. Our results suggest that reputation plays an important role in the NYSE's liquidity provision process.

Long‐term reversals in U.S. stock returns are better explained as the rational reactions of investors to locked‐in capital gains than an irrational overreaction to news. Predictors of returns based on the overreaction hypothesis have no power, while those that measure locked‐in capital gains do, completely subsuming past returns measures that are traditionally used to predict long‐term returns. In data from Hong Kong, where investment income is not taxed, reversals are nonexistent, and returns are not forecastable either by traditional measures or by measures based on the capital gains lock‐in hypothesis that successfully predict U.S. returns.

We find that liquidity is priced in corporate yield spreads. Using a battery of liquidity measures covering over 4,000 corporate bonds and spanning both investment grade and speculative categories, we find that more illiquid bonds earn higher yield spreads, and an improvement in liquidity causes a significant reduction in yield spreads. These results hold after controlling for common bond‐specific, firm‐specific, and macroeconomic variables, and are robust to issuers' fixed effect and potential endogeneity bias. Our findings justify the concern in the default risk literature that neither the level nor the dynamic of yield spreads can be fully explained by default risk determinants.

This paper investigates the stock market reaction to sudden changes in investor mood. Motivated by psychological evidence of a strong link between soccer outcomes and mood, we use international soccer results as our primary mood variable. We find a significant market decline after soccer losses. For example, a loss in the World Cup elimination stage leads to a next‐day abnormal stock return of −49 basis points. This loss effect is stronger in small stocks and in more important games, and is robust to methodological changes. We also document a loss effect after international cricket, rugby, and basketball games.

This paper examines model specification issues and estimates diffusive and jump risk premia using S&P futures option prices from 1987 to 2003. We first develop a time series test to detect the presence of jumps in volatility, and find strong evidence in support of their presence. Next, using the cross section of option prices, we find strong evidence for jumps in prices and modest evidence for jumps in volatility based on model fit. The evidence points toward economically and statistically significant jump risk premia, which are important for understanding option returns.

“Limits of Arbitrage” theories hypothesize that the marginal investor in a particular asset market is a specialized arbitrageur rather than a diversified representative investor. We examine the mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) market in this light. We show that the risk of homeowner prepayment, which is a wash in the aggregate, is priced in the MBS market. The covariance of prepayment risk with aggregate wealth implies the wrong sign to match the observed prices of prepayment risk. The price of risk is better explained by a kernel based on MBS market‐wide specific risk, consistent with the specialized arbitrageur hypothesis.

How do exchange rate changes impact firms' cash flows? We extend a simulation method developed in industrial organization to answer this question. We use prices, quantities, and product characteristics for differentiated products, coupled with a discrete choice framework and an assumption of price competition, to estimate marginal costs for all producers. Using a Monte Carlo approach we generate counterfactual prices and profits for different levels of exchange rates. We illustrate the method using the market for bottled water. Our results stress that even in a relatively simple market such as this one, different brands face very different exchange rate risks.