We examine the association between permissible non-audit services provided by auditors and the timeliness of earnings announcements. Although earnings announcements are unaudited, audit progress influences management’s ability to release earnings while maintaining confidence in reported results. We posit that non-audit services generate earnings announcement timeliness benefits by improving the efficiency and timing of audits through knowledge transfer. We find that tax non-audit services are associated with timelier earnings announcements while nontax non-audit services are not. These benefits are concentrated in the pre-regulatory period before changes in the mid-2000s. Following these changes, the association persists for firms with weaker information environments, poorer performance, and greater audit-related challenges. Overall, our findings show that auditor-provided tax services are associated with enhanced timeliness of unaudited disclosures and that these benefits vary across firms and over time, highlighting previously undocumented spillovers from non-audit services with implications for academic research and regulation.

Cryptocurrency has been the subject of heightened regulatory and investor attention in recent years, and regulators and policymakers across the globe are deliberating on how to account for, regulate, tax, and oversee digital assets and cryptocurrency marketplaces. Yet researchers have a limited understanding of key attributes of those who deal in crypto assets, such as whether their financial sophistication differs from that of other investors. Using U.S. administrative data, we provide evidence on (i) the attributes of taxpayers reporting cryptocurrency sales to the IRS, (ii) how these attributes are evolving, and (iii) how investors treat cryptocurrency versus other financial assets in certain settings. The results suggest that average reporting cryptocurrency sellers exhibit demographic attributes generally associated with less financial sophistication and are more likely to trade in meme stocks. Overall, we provide timely evidence that can inform cryptocurrency policy deliberations by highlighting the characteristics of taxpayers who appear to report cryptocurrency sales.

This paper presents a parsimonious, structural model that isolates primary economic determinants of the level and dispersion of managerial ownership, firm scale, and performance and the empirical associations among them. In particular, variation across firms and through time of estimated productivity parameters for physical assets and managerial input and corresponding variation in optimal compensation contract and firm size combine to deliver the well-known hump-shaped relation between Tobin's Q and managerial ownership. To assess the effectiveness of standard econometric approaches to the endogeneity problem, we apply those remedies to panel data generated from the model. The unfortunate conclusion is that, at least in the ownership–performance context, proxy variables, fixed effects, and instrumental variables do not generally provide reliable solutions to simultaneity bias.

The sequential nature of activities like research, development, or exploration requires optimal funding criteria to take account of the fact that subsequent funding decisions will be made throughout the future. Thus, there is a continual possibility of reviewing a project's status, based on the latest information. After setting up a model to capture this feature, optimal funding criteria are investigated. In an important special case, an explicit formula is derived. As well as throwing light upon the nature of development activities, the analysis is also relevant to the general theory of information gathering processes.

The market for corporate control is generally regarded as an important disciplinary mechanism in well developed economies. Entrenchment mechanisms commonly used by US firms in the form of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) may offer some protection from disciplinary action, facilitating entrenchment and value-reducing behavior. One manifestation of entrenchment is poor acquisitions, with the literature reporting significant losses to large acquirers, and to acquirers with a higher number of ATPs. We examine the profitability of acquisitions in Australia, a market where US-style ATPs are prohibited. The results show that unlike their US counterparts, large Australian acquirers earn significant value for their shareholders, both in terms of announcement returns and long-run operating performance improvements. Takeover premiums are also substantially lower than those reported for the US and UK, and do not differ between large and small acquirers. Premiums are also positively correlated with long-run operating performance, indicating that they reflect real synergies, as opposed to hubris or overpayment. We also find that bidders who destroy value in takeovers are likely to be subsequently acquired. However, unlike US evidence, larger acquirers are just as likely to be targeted for takeover as smaller acquirers, indicating that size is not an effective impediment to the disciplining function of the market for corporate control in Australia. The findings are robust to several econometric issues common to the type of models used in our analysis.

Important progress has been made in economists' understanding of the Beveridge curve, from its measurement to its expression in canonical labor market models. Yet enduring puzzles remain. Chief among these are the empirical role of vacancies in the recruitment process; the amplitude, comovement, and persistence of cyclical unemployment–vacancy dynamics; and the sources of lateral shifts in the Beveridge curve. The synthesis of these themes identifies several priorities for ongoing research, including the role of entry costs into vacancy creation in shaping Beveridge dynamics; the cyclicality of search intensity, both off and on the job, and its relation to participation and job-to-job transitions; the theory and measurement of mismatch; and the sources of hysteresis in unemployment flows.