Knowledge that Transforms

This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, how earnings management and ownership retention interact, and how these two jointly affect the equilibrium market valuation of IPO firms in the presence of information asymmetry. Analytically, this paper extends the univariate signaling framework of Leland and Pyle (1977) and derives an efficient signaling equilibrium in which both reported earnings and ownership retention are endogenously chosen to convey the IPO issuer's private information. It is shown that even though either ownership retention or reported earnings communicates the issuer's type to the market unambiguously, the issuer will strategically employ both signals to achieve separation from potential lower quality imitators at minimal cost. Comparative statics analysis shows that the trade-off between the two signals depends critically on the uncertainty over future earnings. The theoretical analysis generates several empirical implications regarding market efficiency, IPO pricing, and the strategic choice of earnings management. Through systematic econometric analysis, I confirm the major predictions of the model.

Focusing on a sample of U.S. retailers, I study the management control systems (MCS) that firms introduce when they first invest in controls, and identify four categories of initial MCS, which are defined in terms of the purposes these MCS fulfill. The first category, “Basic MCS,” is adopted to collect information for planning, setting standards, and establishing the basic operations of the firm. The other three categories are contingent on more specific purposes: “Cost MCS” focus on enhancing operating efficiencies and minimizing costs; “Revenue MCS” are introduced to foster growth and be responsive to customers; and “Risk MCS” focus on reducing risks and protecting asset integrity. I hypothesize and find that the choice among these categories reflects the firms' strategy, and that firms that choose initial MCS better suited to their strategy perform better than others.

It is a common practice for firms to conduct performance evaluations of their employees and yet to withhold this information from those employees. This paper argues that firms strategically withhold performance information to retain workers. In particular, if the worker enjoys high outside options and is tempted to quit, then the firm chooses not to reveal his performance information in order to keep him on the job. The firm's equilibrium strategy is to fire if performance is sufficiently low, reveal information if performance is sufficiently high, and withhold information otherwise. The pooling equilibrium is robust under a wide variety of settings, such as general cost functions, ability-contingent outside options, nonlinear contracts, nonverifiable output, and multiple stages of production.

In recent years, many companies have emphasized adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in their quarterly press releases. While managers use different names to describe these nonstandard earnings metrics, the financial press frequently refers to them as “pro forma” earnings. Managers and other advocates of pro forma reporting argue that these disclosures provide a clearer picture of companies' core earnings. On the other hand, regulators, policymakers, and the financial press often allege that managers' pro forma earnings disclosures are opportunistic attempts to mislead investors. Recent evidence suggests that while many pro forma earnings disclosures are altruistically motivated, some may represent managers' attempts to portray overly optimistic financial performance. If this is the case, then less wealthy, less sophisticated, individual investors are arguably the most at risk of being misled. Consequently, this study investigates who trades on pro forma earnings information. Our intraday investigation of transactions around earnings announcements containing pro forma earnings information reveals that less sophisticated investors' announcement-period abnormal trading is significantly positively associated with the magnitude and direction of the earnings surprise based on pro forma earnings. In contrast, we find no association between sophisticated investors' trading and manager-reported pro forma information. Overall, our analyses and numerous robustness tests suggest that the segment of the market that relies on pro forma earnings information is populated predominantly by less sophisticated individual investors. This evidence is particularly relevant to standard-setters and regulators given that Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and subsequent SEC regulations are specifically designed to protect ordinary investors from misleading pro forma information.

The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting and economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set of results. We believe that these mixed results are partially attributable to the difficulty in generating reliable and valid measures for the complex construct that is termed “corporate governance.” Using a sample of 2,106 firms and 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, existence of debtholders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables), our exploratory principal component analysis suggests that there are 14 dimensions to corporate governance. We find that these indices have a mixed association with abnormal accruals, little relation to accounting restatements, but some ability to explain future operating performance and future excess stock returns.

This paper uses a multi-method, multi-case field research design to study the evolving portfolio of the management control systems (MCSs) of 78 early-stage startup companies. We examine 46 individual systems from eight different MCS categories—financial planning, financial evaluation, human resource planning, human resource evaluation, strategic planning, product development, sales/marketing, and partnerships. We report analysis of the following: (1) The speed of adoption of financial planning and financial evaluation systems in relation to six other MCS categories. These systems are considered key MCSs associated with management accounting. We find financial planning to be the most widely adopted MCS category at an early stage, followed by the human resource planning and strategic planning categories. Financial evaluation systems are typically adopted at a later stage. (2) Variables associated with the rate of adoption of MCSs. Our results indicate that number of employees, presence of venture capital, international operations, and time to revenue are positively associated with the rate of adoption. Furthermore, the rate of adoption simultaneously affects company size. (3) CEO turnover and the rate of adoption of MCSs. We find that CEOs who have adopted fewer MCSs have shorter tenures. This is consistent with the hypothesized difference between entrepreneurs and managers. Overall, the evidence strongly supports the relevance of MCSs to the growth of early-stage startup companies.

Studies analyzing return expectations of financial market participants like fund managers, CFOs or individual investors are highly influential in academia and practice. We argue and show that the results in these surveys above are easily influenced by the elicitation mode of return expectations. Surveys that ask for future stock price levels are more likely to produce mean reverting expectations than surveys that directly ask for future returns. Furthermore, we conduct a questionnaire study that explicitly analyzes whether the specific elicitation mode affects return expectations in the above direction. In our study, subjects were asked to state mean forecasts for seven time series. Using a between subject design, one half of the subjects was asked to state future price levels, the other group was directly asked for returns. We observe a highly significant framing effect. For upward sloping time series, the return forecasts stated by investors in the return forecast mode are significantly higher than those derived for investors in the price forecast mode. For downward sloping time series, the return forecasts given by investors in the return forecast mode are significantly lower than those derived for investors in the price forecast mode. We argue that this finding is consistent with behavioral theories of investor expectation formation based on the representativeness heuristic.

This paper examines the determinants of the time it takes for an index options market to return to no arbitrage values after put-call parity deviations, using intraday transactions data from the French index options market. We employ survival analysis to characterize how limits to arbitrage influence the expected duration of arbitrage deviations. After controlling for conventional limits to arbitrage, we show that liquidity-linked variables are associated with a faster reversion of arbitrage profits. The introduction of an Exchange Traded Fund also affects the survival rates of deviations, but this impact essentially stems from the reduction in the level of potential arbitrage profits.

This paper proposes a simple back testing procedure that is shown to dramatically improve a panel data model's ability to produce out of sample forecasts. Here the procedure is used to forecast mutual fund alphas. Using monthly data with an OLS model it has been difficult to consistently predict which portfolio managers will produce above market returns for their investors. This paper provides empirical evidence that sorting on the estimated alphas populates the top and bottom deciles not with the best and worst funds, but with those having the greatest estimation error. This problem can be attenuated by back testing the statistical model fund by fund. The back test used here requires a statistical model to exhibit some past predictive success for a particular fund before it is allowed to make predictions about that fund in the current period. Another estimation problem concerns the use of a single statistical model for all available mutual funds. Since no one statistical model is likely to fit every fund, the result is a great deal of misspecification error. This paper shows that the combined use of an OLS and Kalman filter model increases the number of funds with predictable out of sample alphas by about 60%. Overall, a strategy that uses very modest ex-ante filters to eliminate funds whose parameters likely derive primarily from estimation error produces an out of sample risk-adjusted return of over 4% per annum.

Why is the issuer's reservation price not disclosed in bookbuilding? We analyze the differential effect of reservation price disclosure on the underpricing required to elicit truthful indications of interest from investors. We find that a policy of disclosure would increase proceeds for firms with a reservation price sufficiently high relative to possible investor valuations of the shares, but would decrease proceeds for issuers with lower reservation prices. The former group is likely to be absent from the IPO market, explaining why secrecy in reservation prices is the norm.