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Estimating the Impact of the Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam's Global Gathering *

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2009 124(3), 1133-1170 open access
We estimate the impact on pilgrims of performing the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. Our method compares successful and unsuccessful applicants in a lottery used by Pakistan to allocate Hajj visas. Pilgrim accounts stress that the Hajj leads to a feeling of unity with fellow Muslims, but outsiders have sometimes feared that this could be accompanied by antipathy toward non-Muslims. We find that participation in the Hajj increases observance of global Islamic practices, such as prayer and fasting, while decreasing participation in localized practices and beliefs, such as the use of amulets and dowry. It increases belief in equality and harmony among ethnic groups and Islamic sects and leads to more favorable attitudes toward women, including greater acceptance of female education and employment. Increased unity within the Islamic world is not accompanied by antipathy toward non-Muslims. Instead, Hajjis show increased belief in peace, and in equality and harmony among adherents of different religions. The evidence suggests that these changes are likely due to exposure to and interaction with Hajjis from around the world, rather than to a changed social role of pilgrims upon return.

How does Parental Leave Affect Fertility and Return to Work? Evidence from Two Natural Experiments*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2009 124(3), 1363-1402 open access
This paper analyzes the effects of changes in the duration of paid, job-protected parental leave on mothers' higher-order fertility and postbirth labor market careers. Identification is based on a major Austrian reform increasing the duration of parental leave from one year to two years for any child born on or after July 1, 1990. We find that mothers who give birth to their first child immediately after the reform have more second children than prereform mothers, and that extended parental leave significantly reduces return to work. Employment and earnings also decrease in the short run, but not in the long run. Fertility and work responses vary across the population in ways suggesting that both cash transfers and job protection are relevant. Increasing parental leave for a future child increases fertility strongly but leaves short-run postbirth careers relatively unaffected. Partially reversing the 1990 extension, a second 1996 reform improves employment and earnings while compressing the time between births.

Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2009 124(4), 1639-1674 open access
Defaults often have a large influence on consumer decisions. We identify an overlooked but practical alternative to defaults: requiring individuals to make an explicit choice for themselves. We study such "active decisions" in the context of 401(k) saving. We find that compelling new hires to make active decisions about 401(k) enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative to a standard opt-in enrollment procedure, producing a savings distribution three months after hire that would take 30 months to achieve under standard enrollment. We also present a model of 401(k) enrollment and derive conditions under which the optimal enrollment regime is automatic enrollment (i.e., default enrollment), standard enrollment (i.e., default non-enrollment), or active decisions (i.e., no default and compulsory choice). Active decisions are optimal when consumers have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences are highly heterogeneous. Financial illiteracy, however, favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment.

Superstar CEOs*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2009 124(4), 1593-1638 open access
Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the United States follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of “superstars” enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to measure shocks to CEO status. We find that award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. At the same time, they extract more compensation following the awards, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firms. They also spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies, such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak corporate governance. Our results suggest that the ex post consequences of media-induced superstar status for shareholders are negative.

Building Criminal Capital behind Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2009 124(1), 105-147 open access
This paper analyzes the influence that juvenile offenders serving time in the same correctional facility have on each other's subsequent criminal behavior. The analysis is based on data on over 8,000 individuals serving time in 169 juvenile correctional facilities during a two-year period in Florida. These data provide a complete record of past crimes, facility assignments, and arrests and adjudications in the year following release for each individual. To control for the nonrandom assignment to facilities, we include facility and facility-by-prior-offense fixed effects, thereby estimating peer effects using only within-facility variation over time. We find strong evidence of peer effects for burglary, petty larceny, felony and misdemeanor drug offenses, aggravated assault, and felony sex offenses. The influence of peers primarily affects individuals who already have some experience in a particular crime category. We also find evidence that the predominant types of peer effects differ in residential versus nonresidential facilities; effects in the latter are consistent with network formation among youth serving time close to home.

Does Medicare Save Lives?*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2009 124(2), 597-636 open access
Health insurance characteristics shift at age 65 as most people become eligible for Medicare. We measure the impacts of these changes on patients who are admitted to hospitals through emergency departments for conditions with similar admission rates on weekdays and weekends. The age profiles of admissions and comorbidities for these patients are smooth at age 65, suggesting that the severity of illness is similar on either side of the Medicare threshold. In contrast, the number of procedures performed in hospitals and total list charges exhibit small but statistically significant discontinuities, implying that patients over 65 receive more services. We estimate a nearly 1-percentage-point drop in 7-day mortality for patients at age 65, equivalent to a 20% reduction in deaths for this severely ill patient group. The mortality gap persists for at least 9 months after admission.

Market Sidedness: Insights into Motives for Trade Initiation

Journal of Finance 2009 64(1), 375-423 open access
We infer motives for trade initiation from market sidedness. We define trading as more two‐sided (one‐sided) if the correlation between the number of buyer‐ and seller‐initiated trades increases (decreases), and assess changes in sidedness (relative to a control sample) around events that identify trade initiators. Consistent with asymmetric information, trading is more one‐sided before merger news. Consistent with belief heterogeneity, trading is more two‐sided before earnings and macro announcements with greater dispersion in analyst forecasts, and after news with larger announcement surprises. We examine the codeterminacy of sidedness, bid‐ask spread, volatility, number of trades, and order imbalance.

Share Repurchases and Pay‐Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts

Journal of Finance 2009 64(1), 117-150 open access
I show that share repurchases increase pay‐performance sensitivity of employee compensation and lead to greater employee effort and higher stock prices. Consistent with the model, I find that after repurchases, employees and managers receive fewer stock option and equity grants, and that the market reacts favorably to repurchase announcements when employees have many unvested stock options. Managers are more likely to initiate share repurchases when employees hold a large stake in the firm. Moreover, since employees are forced to bear more risk in firms that repurchase shares, they exercise their stock options earlier and receive higher compensation.

Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm

Journal of Finance 2009 64(1), 263-308 open access
Based upon a large data set of public and private firms in the United Kingdom, I find that compared to their public counterparts, private firms rely almost exclusively on debt financing, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to avoid external capital markets, leading to a greater sensitivity of their capital structures to fluctuations in performance. I argue that these differences are due to private equity being more costly than public equity. I further examine the private firms subsample to show that private equity is more costly than its public counterpart due to information asymmetry and the desire to maintain control.

Sensation Seeking, Overconfidence, and Trading Activity

Journal of Finance 2009 64(2), 549-578 open access
This study analyzes the role that two psychological attributes—sensation seeking and overconfidence—play in the tendency of investors to trade stocks. Equity trading data from Finland are combined with data from investor tax filings, driving records, and mandatory psychological profiles. We use these data, obtained from a large population, to construct measures of overconfidence and sensation seeking tendencies. Controlling for a host of variables, including wealth, income, age, number of stocks owned, marital status, and occupation, we find that overconfident investors and those investors most prone to sensation seeking trade more frequently.