Knowledge that Transforms

Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions and threatens the world’s most diverse ecosystems. Much of this deforestation is driven by illegal logging. We use novel satellite data that tracks annual deforestation across eight years of Indonesian institutional change to examine how local officials’ incentives affect deforestation. Increases in the number of political jurisdictions lead to increased deforestation and lower timber prices, consistent with Cournot competition between jurisdictions. Illegal logging and local oil and gas rents are short-run substitutes, but this effect disappears over time with political turnover. The results illustrate how local officials’ incentives affect deforestation and show how standard economic theories can explain illegal behavior.

This article establishes six stylized facts about firms' export prices using detailed customs data on the universe of Chinese trade flows. First, across firms selling a given product, exporters that charge higher prices earn greater revenues in each destination, have bigger worldwide sales, and enter more markets. Second, firms that export more, enter more markets, and charge higher export prices import more expensive inputs. Third, across destinations within a firm-product, firms set higher prices in richer, larger, bilaterally more distant and overall less remote countries. Fourth, across destinations within a firm-product, firms earn bigger revenues in markets where they set higher prices. Fifth, across firms within a product, exporters with more destinations offer a wider range of export prices. Finally, firms that export more, enter more markets, and offer a wider range of export prices pay a wider range of input prices and source inputs from more origin countries. We propose that trade models should incorporate two features to rationalize these patterns in the data: more successful exporters use higher quality inputs to produce higher quality goods (stylized facts 1 and 2), and firms vary the quality of their products across destinations by using inputs of different quality levels (stylized facts 3, 4, 5, and 6).

The collapse of AAA‐rated structured finance products in 2007 to 2008 has brought renewed attention to conflicts of interest in credit rating agencies (CRAs). We model competition among CRAs with three sources of conflicts: (1) CRAs conflict of understating risk to attract business, (2) issuers' ability to purchase only the most favorable ratings, and (3) the trusting nature of some investor clienteles. These conflicts create two distortions. First, competition can reduce efficiency, as it facilitates ratings shopping. Second, ratings are more likely to be inflated during booms and when investors are more trusting. We also discuss efficiency‐enhancing regulatory interventions.

Using mutual fund redemptions as an instrument for price changes, we identify a strong effect of market prices on takeover activity (the “trigger effect”). An interquartile decrease in valuation leads to a seven percentage point increase in acquisition likelihood, relative to a 6% unconditional takeover probability. Instrumentation addresses the fact that prices are endogenous and increase in anticipation of a takeover (the “anticipation effect”). Our results overturn prior literature that finds a weak relation between prices and takeovers without instrumentation. These findings imply that financial markets have real effects: They impose discipline on managers by triggering takeover threats.

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager–shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. In the model, firms face taxation, refinancing costs, and liquidation costs. Managers own a fraction of the firms’ equity, capture part of the free cash flow to equity as private benefits, and have control over financing decisions. Using data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we find that agency costs of 1.5% of equity value on average are sufficient to resolve the low‐leverage puzzle and to explain the dynamics of leverage ratios. Our estimates also reveal that agency costs vary significantly across firms and correlate with commonly used proxies for corporate governance.

We use price pressure resulting from purchases by mutual funds with large capital inflows to identify overvalued equity. This is a relatively exogenous overvaluation indicator as it is associated with who is buying—buyers with excess liquidity—rather than what is being purchased. We document substantial stock price impact associated with purchases by high‐inflow mutual funds, and find the probability of a seasoned equity offering (SEO), insider sales, and the probability of a stock‐based acquisition increase significantly in the four quarters following the mutual fund buying pressure. These results provide new evidence that firm managers are able to identify and exploit overvalued equity.

Secondary market trading in loans elicits a significant positive stock price response by a borrowing firm's equity investors. We find the major reason for this response is the alleviation of borrowing firms’ financial constraints. We also find that new loan announcements are associated with a positive stock price effect even when prior loans made to the same borrower already trade on the secondary market. We conclude that the special role of banks has changed due to their ability to create an active secondary loan market while simultaneously maintaining their traditional role as information producers.

This paper explores the economic role credit rating agencies play in the corporate bond market. We consider three existing theories about multiple ratings: information production, rating shopping, and regulatory certification. Using differences in rating composition, default prediction, and credit spread changes, our evidence only supports regulatory certification. Marginal, additional credit ratings are more likely to occur because of, and seem to matter primarily for, regulatory purposes. They do not seem to provide significant additional information related to credit quality.

We investigate a structural model of market and firm‐level dynamics in order to jointly price long‐dated S&P 500 index options and CDO tranches of corporate debt. We identify market dynamics from index option prices and idiosyncratic dynamics from the term structure of credit spreads. We find that all tranches can be well priced out‐of‐sample before the crisis. During the crisis, however, our model can capture senior tranche prices only if we allow for the possibility of a catastrophic jump. Thus, senior tranches are nonredundant assets that provide a unique window into the pricing of catastrophic risk.

Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable “routine” insider trading that is not informative about firms’ futures. A portfolio strategy that focuses solely on the remaining “opportunistic” traders yields value‐weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. The most informed opportunistic traders are local, nonexecutive insiders from geographically concentrated, poorly governed firms. Opportunistic traders are significantly more likely to have SEC enforcement action taken against them, and reduce trading following waves of SEC insider trading enforcement.