Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the efficiency of a market relative to a non-market institution—an auction relative to a quota—as allocation mechanisms in the presence of frictions. We use data from water markets in southeastern Spain and explore a specific change in the institutions to allocate water. On the one hand, frictions arose because poor farmers were liquidity constrained. On the other hand, farmers who were part of the wealthy elite were not liquidity constrained. We estimate a structural dynamic demand model by taking advantage of the fact that water demand for both types of farmers is determined by the technological constraint imposed by the crop’s production function. This approach allows us to differentiate liquidity constraints from unobserved heterogeneity. We show that the institutional change from an auction to a quota increased total efficiency for the farmers considered. Welfare increased by 23.4 real pesetas per farmer per tree, a 6 % increase in total production relative to the market.

How do cities grow in the process of structural transformation? To answer this question, we develop a multi-sector spatial equilibrium model with endogenous land use: land is used either for agriculture or housing. Urban land, densely populated due to commuting frictions, expands out of agricultural land. With low productivity and high subsistence needs, farmland is expensive, households cannot afford large homes and cities are very dense. Increasing productivity reallocates factors away from agriculture, freeing up land for urban expansion and limiting the increase in land values despite higher income and urban population. With the area of cities growing faster than urban population, urban density can persistently decline, as in the data over a long period. The quantitative evaluation calibrated to historical data assembled for France over 180 years explains a large fraction of the joint evolution of urban areas, population density and land values across time and space.

An important class of structural models studies the determinants of skill formation and the optimal timing of interventions. In this article, I provide new identification results for these models and investigate the effects of seemingly innocuous scale and location restrictions on parameters of interest. To do so, I first characterize the identified set of all parameters without these additional restrictions and show that important policy-relevant parameters are point identified under weaker assumptions than commonly used in the literature. The implications of imposing standard scale and location restrictions depend on how the model is specified, but they generally impact the interpretation of parameters and may affect counterfactuals. Importantly, with the popular constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, commonly used scale restrictions fix identified parameters and lead to misspecification. Consequently, simply changing the units of measurements of observed variables might yield ineffective investment strategies and misleading policy recommendations. I show how existing estimators can easily be adapted to solve these issues. As a byproduct, this article also presents a general and formal definition of when restrictions are truly normalizations.

We investigate how technologies that reduce the costs of monitoring by central authorities have shaped the historical transition from small patrimonial states to large bureaucratic organizations. Our analysis is based on a novel dataset that traces changes in the organizational structure and geographic presence of the U.S. federal government over the nineteenth century. To identify causal effects, we develop a new identification strategy that exploits the expansion of the railroad network as a source of variation in the travel time–and thus monitoring costs–between Washington D.C. and other locations. We present three main findings. First, reductions in travel time to Washington D.C. significantly increased the likelihood of federal government presence in a location. Second, this effect is stronger for occupations and tasks characterized by more severe agency problems. Third, decreases in travel time to Washington D.C. are associated with a decline in patrimonial features of the federal government in the location, in line with enhanced monitoring capacity reducing dependence on personal trust and connections.

I develop a unified theoretical framework with schools and residential choices to study the welfare consequences of public schools’ switching from the traditional neighbourhood assignment to the deferred acceptance mechanism. I find that when families receive higher priorities at neighbourhood schools, the deferred acceptance mechanism creates higher aggregate or utilitarian welfare than neighbourhood assignment. Under a common school ranking assumption, I also show that the deferred acceptance creates higher aggregate welfare with neighbourhood priorities than without them.

We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emissions control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018, we find that collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and increases buyer and producer surplus. Due to increased pollution, welfare decreases by € 1.57–5.57 billion. We show how environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in preventing noncompliance.

This paper studies the long-term effects of technology and know-how transfers on structural transformations. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union supported the construction of the 156 Projects, which were large-scale, capital-intensive industrial clusters in China. These projects included a technology transfer, consisting of state-of-the-art Soviet machinery and equipment, and a know-how transfer, via the training of Chinese engineers, production supervisors, and high-skilled technicians by Soviet experts. We use newly assembled data that follow steel plants for over four decades, and we exploit natural variation in the transfers they eventually received. We find that, while production advantages stemming from Soviet technology faded away if not complemented with training, the know-how transfer had a long-lasting impact on plant performance, stimulated technology upgrade when China was a closed economy, and increased exports to the Western world when China engaged in international trade. The know-how transfer also generated productivity and technology spillovers onto complementary establishments.

When employers face a trade-off between being large and paying low wages—and in this sense have monopsony power—some productive employers decide against building large business networks, forgo sales, and remain small. These decisions have adverse consequences for aggregate labour productivity. Using high-quality administrative data from Germany, we document that East German plants (compared to West German ones) face steeper size-wage curves, invest less in their business networks, remain smaller, and are less productive. A model with labour market monopsony, product market power, and business network investments matching these features of the data predicts a 10% lower aggregate labour productivity in East Germany.

We study empirically and theoretically the effects of international financial flows on resource allocation. Using the universe of firms in Hungary, we show that removing capital controls lowers firms’ cost of capital and increases household consumption, with the latter playing a dominant role. The consumption channel leads to reallocation of resources toward high expenditure elasticity activities—such as services—promoting both the expansion of incumbents and firm entry. A multi-sector heterogeneous firm model replicates these dynamics. Our model shows that nonhomotheticity in consumption can quantitatively account for the reallocation of resources towards services and successfully replicates the dynamics of aggregate productivity following episodes of financial openness.

We analyse discontinuous Markovian strategies for differential games. The best response correspondence uniquely maps almost all profiles of opponents’ strategies back to the strategy space. We thus make Markov-perfect equilibria in a wide class of differential games well-behaved, resolving a long-standing open problem. We provide a readily applicable necessary and sufficient condition for best responses and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria. We demonstrate our methods in a canonical model of non-cooperative mitigation of climate change. Our approach provides novel, economically important results: we obtain the entire set of symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria and demonstrate that the best equilibria can yield a major welfare improvement over the equilibrium which previous literature has focused on. International climate negotiations can be seen as being about coordination on good equilibria, rather than about bargaining over the limited surplus available in a dynamic prisoner’s dilemma.