Knowledge that Transforms

This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matching pattern. Although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models.

Emerging market business cycles exhibit strongly countercyclical current accounts, consumption volatility that exceeds income volatility, and “sudden stops†in capital inflows. These features contrast with developed small open economies. Nevertheless, we show that a standard model characterizes both types of markets. Motivated by the frequent policy regime switches observed in emerging markets, our premise is that these economies are subject to substantial volatility in trend growth. Our methodology exploits the information in consumption and net exports to identify the persistence of productivity. We find that shocks to trend growth—rather than transitory fluctuations around a stable trend—are the primary source of fluctuations in emerging markets. The key features of emerging market business cycles are then shown to be consistent with this underlying income process in an otherwise standard equilibrium model.

A large literature in medicine documents variation across areas in the use of surgical treatments that is unrelated to outcomes. Observers of this phenomena have invoked "flat of the curve medicine" to explain these facts, and have advocated for reductions in spending in high-use areas. In contrast, we develop a simple Roy model of patient treatment choice with productivity spillovers that can generate the empirical facts. Our model predicts that high-use areas will have higher returns to surgery, better outcomes among patients most appropriate for surgery, and worse outcomes among patients least appropriate for surgery, while displaying no relationship between treatment intensity and overall outcomes. Using data on treatments for heart attacks, we find strong empirical support for these and other predictions of our model, and reject alternative explanations such as waste or supplier induced demand, for geographic variation in medical care.

We study the optimal design of organizations under the assumption that agents in a contest care about their relative position. A principal determines the number and size of status categories in order to maximize output. We first consider the pure status case without tangible prizes. Our results connect the optimal partition in status categories to properties of the distribution of ability among contestants. The top status category always contains a unique element. For distributions that have an increasing failure rate (IFR), a proliferation of status classes is optimal, whereas the optimal partition involves only two categories if the distribution of abilities is sufficiently concave. Moreover, for IFR distributions, a coarse partition with two status categories achieves at least half of the output obtained in the optimal partition with many categories. Finally, if status is derived solely from monetary rewards, we show that the optimal partition in status classes contains only two categories.

This article studies a search model of the labor market in which firms have private information about the quality of their vacancies, they can costlessly communicate with unemployed workers before the beginning of the application process, but the content of the communication does not constitute a contractual obligation. At the end of the application process, wages are determined as the outcome of an alternating offer bargaining game. The model is used to show that vague noncontractual announcements about compensation—such as those one is likely to find in help wanted ads—can be correlated with actual wages and can partially direct the search strategy of workers.

Real option analysis typically assumes that projects are continuously evaluated and launched at precisely the time determined to be optimal, but real world projects cannot be managed in this way because of the costs of formally evaluating an investment opportunity. This paper shows that immediate investment is more attractive if evaluation costs are high or the amount of information to be revealed by an evaluation is large. The optimal delay until a reevaluation is long if evaluation costs are high or the amount of information to be revealed by an evaluation is small. The reduction in the value of project rights is especially severe when the value of the completed project is strongly mean reverting because then precision in investment timing is particularly important.

Bayesian learning claims that the strength of the price impact of unanticipated information depends on the relative precision of traders' prior and posterior beliefs. In this paper, we test for this implication of Bayesian models by analyzing intraday price responses of T-bond futures to U.S. employment announcements. By employing additional detailed information in addition to the widely used headline figures, we extract release-specific precision measures. We find that the price impact of more precise information is significantly stronger, even after controlling for an asymmetric price response to “good” and “bad” news. This result strengthens previous findings that differences in earnings response coefficients across companies are related to proxies for the credibility of the reported financial information.

We investigate how price discovery occurs in the options markets through traders' trade size choice. By employing transactions data on all options traded on a sample of 100 firms, we show that informed traders fragment their orders into small (medium) trades for low (high) volume contracts. We also find that almost 60% of the price discovery occurs in the exchange with the largest market share for a given option, where informed traders favor medium size trades. Upon examining distinct option series for a given stock, we find that at-the-money calls display the highest information share.

We investigate incentive effects of a typical hedge fund contract for a manager with power utility. With a one-year horizon, the manager displays risk taking that varies dramatically with fund value. We extend the model to multiple yearly evaluation periods and find that the manager's risk taking is rapidly moderated if the fund performs reasonably well. The most realistic approach to modeling fund closure uses an endogenous shutdown barrier where the manager optimally chooses to shut down. The manager increases risk taking as fund value approaches that barrier, and this boundary behavior persists strongly with multiyear horizons.

This paper tests the expectations hypothesis (EH) using U.S. monthly data for bond yields spanning the 1952–2003 sample period and ranging in maturity from one month to 10 years. We apply the Lagrange multiplier test developed by Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) and extend it to increase the test power by introducing economic variables as conditioning information and by using more than two bond yields in the model and testing the EH jointly on more than one pair of yields. While the conventional bivariate procedure provides mixed results, the more powerful testing procedures suggest rejection of the EH throughout the maturity spectrum examined.