Knowledge that Transforms

Are some banks prone to perform poorly during crises? If yes, why? In this paper, we show that a bank's stock return performance during the 1998 crisis predicts its stock return performance and probability of failure during the recent financial crisis. This effect is economically large. Our findings are consistent with persistence in a bank's risk culture and/or aspects of its business model that make its performance sensitive to crises. Banks that relied more on short‐term funding, had more leverage, and grew more are more likely to be banks that performed poorly in both crises.

Public policy discussions typically favor greater corporate disclosure as a way to reduce firms' agency problems. This argument is incomplete because it overlooks that better disclosure regimes can also aggravate agency problems and related costs, including executive compensation. Consequently, a point can exist beyond which additional disclosure decreases firm value. Holding all else equal, we further show that larger firms will adopt stricter disclosure rules than smaller firms and firms with better disclosure will employ more able management. We show that mandated increases in disclosure could, in part, explain recent increases in both CEO compensation and CEO turnover rates.

Mutual funds are held by investors in taxable and tax‐qualified retirement accounts. We investigate whether the characteristics, investment strategies, and performance of mutual funds held by these diverse tax clienteles differ. Examining both mutual fund distributions and mutual fund holdings, we find that funds held primarily by taxable investors choose investment strategies that result in lower tax burdens than funds held primarily in tax‐qualified accounts. Despite these differences, we find no evidence that any investment constraints that may arise from these tax‐efficient investment strategies result in performance differences between funds held by different tax clienteles.

I examine how media coverage of good and bad corporate news affects stock prices, by studying the effect of investor relations (IR) firms. I find that IR firms “spin” their clients' news, generating more media coverage of positive press releases than negative press releases. This spin increases announcement returns. Around earnings announcements, however, IR firms cannot spin the news and their clients' returns are significantly lower. This pattern is consistent with positive media coverage increasing investor expectations, creating disappointment around hard information. Using reporter connections and geographical links, I argue that IR firms causally affect both media coverage and returns.

To produce significant net present value, an entrepreneur has to differentiate her enterprise from the ordinary. To take collaborators with her, she needs to have substantial ownership, and thus financing. But it is hard to raise finance against differentiated assets. So an entrepreneur has to commit to undertake a second transformation, standardization, that will make the human capital in the firm, including her own, replaceable, so that outside financiers obtain control rights that will allow them to be repaid. A vibrant stock market helps the entrepreneur commit to these two transformations. The nature of firms and financing are intimately linked.

We use panel data on S&P 1500 companies to identify external network connections between directors and CEOs. We find that firms with more powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint directors with ties to the CEO. Using changes in board composition due to director death and retirement for identification, we find that CEO‐director ties reduce firm value, particularly in the absence of other governance mechanisms to substitute for board oversight. Moreover, firms with more CEO‐director ties engage in more value‐destroying acquisitions. Overall, our results suggest that network ties with the CEO weaken the intensity of board monitoring.

U.S. exchange‐traded stock options are exercisable before expiration. While put options should frequently be exercised early to earn interest, they are not. In this paper, we derive an early exercise decision rule and then examine actual exercise behavior during the period January 1996 through September 2008. We find that more than 3.96 million puts that should have been exercised early remain unexercised, representing over 3.7% of all outstanding puts. We also find that failure to exercise cost put option holders $1.9 billion in forgone interest income and that this interest is systematically captured by market makers and proprietary firms.

This study investigates whether and how customer-base concentration affects supplier firm fundamentals and stock market valuation. I compile a comprehensive sample of supply chain relationships and develop a measure (CC) to capture the extent to which a supplier's customer base is concentrated. In contrast to the conventional view of customer-base concentration as an impediment to supplier firm performance, I document a positive contemporaneous association between CC and accounting rates of return, suggesting that efficiencies accrue to suppliers with concentrated customer bases. Consistent with a cause-and-effect link between customer-base concentration and supplier firm performance, analysis of intertemporal changes demonstrates that CC increases predict efficiency gains in the form of reduced operating expenses per dollar of sales and enhanced asset utilization. Using stock returns tests, I find that investors underreact to the implications of changes in customer-base concentration for future firm fundamentals when setting stock prices. A trading strategy that exploits investors' underreaction yields abnormal stock returns over the 30-year period studied. JEL Classifications: M41; L25; G14. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources indicated in the text.

This study examines the sources of credit risk associated with asset securitizations and whether credit-rating agencies and the bond market differ in their assessment of this risk. Measuring credit risk using credit ratings, we find the securitizing firm's credit risk is positively related to the firm's retained interest in the securitized assets and unrelated to the portion of the securitized assets not retained by the firm. Measuring credit risk using bond spreads, we find the securitizing firm's credit risk is positively related to both the firm's retained interest in the assets and the portion of the securitized assets not retained by the firm. Additionally, our findings indicate the bond market does not distinguish between the retained and non-retained portions of the securitized assets when assessing the credit risk of the securitizing firm. These different assessments of sources of credit risk associated with asset securitizations provide insight into ongoing controversies surrounding the financial reporting for asset securitizations and the efficacy of credit ratings.

I investigate the possibility that recent price movements include significantly larger speculative components than those observed historically, where speculation is defined as the component of price that does not co-move with fundamentals. Specifically, at the aggregate level, price and accounting fundamentals co-move historically (1979–1993) but do not co-move recently (1994–2008). The lack of co-movement in recent periods is accompanied by a significant reduction in the positive association between ratios of accounting fundamentals-to-price with future market returns. Changes in measurement error in accounting fundamentals do not appear to cause the lack of co-movement in recent periods, and risk- and growth-based explanations are not supported by the data. The results of this study provide evidence of a structural change in the long-run association between price and accounting fundamentals. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the study.