Knowledge that Transforms

Private information, Moral Hazard, Contracting, Risk

The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an example. It then offers methodological insights on the standard approach to modeling incomplete contracts; in particular it discusses a tension between two assumptions made in the literature, namely rationality and the existence of transaction costs. Last, it argues that, contrary to what is commonly argued, the complete contract methodology need not be unable to account for standard institutions such as authority and ownership; and it concludes with a discussion of the research agenda.

The neoclassical growth model focuses on factor accumulation as an engine of growth, while the neo-Schumpetarian growth model stresses innovation. This paper argues that these two views of growth may capture different phases of a single growth experience. In the model presented below, the balanced growth path is unstable and the economy achieves sustainable growth through cycles under an empirically plausible condition, perpetually moving back and forth between two phases. One phase is characterized by higher output growth, higher investment, no innovation, and a competitive market structure. The other phase is characterized by lower output growth, lower investment, high innovation, and a more monopolistic market structure. Both investment and innovation are essential in sustaining growth indefinitely, and yet they move in an asynchronized way; only one of them appears to play a dominant role in each phase. The economy grows faster along the cycles than along the Zunstable. balanced growth path.

I provide a systematic treatment of the asymptotic properties of weighted M-estimators under variable probability stratified sampling. The characterization of the sampling scheme and representation of the objective function allow for a straightforward analysis. Simple, consistent asymptotic variance matrix estimators are proposed for a large class of problems. When stratification is based on exogenous variables, I show that the unweighted M-estimator is more efficient than the weighted estimator under a generalized conditional information matrix equality. When population frequencies are known, a more efficient weighting is possible. I also show how the results carry over to multinomial sampling.

When players have identical time preferences, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs coincides with the convex hull of the underlying stage- game payoffs. Moreover, all feasible and individually rational payoffs can be sustained by equilibria if the players are sufficiently patient. Neither of these facts generalizes to the case of different time preferences. First, players can mutually benefit from trading payoffs across time. Hence, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs is typically larger than the convex hull of the underlying stage-game payoffs. Second, it is not usually the case that every trade plan that guarantees individually rational payoffs can be sustained by an equilibrium, no matter how patient the players are. This paper provides a simple characterization of the sets of Nash and of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games.

We study a longitudinal sample of over one million French workers from more than five hundred thousand employing firms. We decompose real total annual compensation per worker into components related to observable employee characteristics, personal heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, and residual variation. Except for the residual, all components may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. At the level of the individual, we find that person effects, especially those not related to observables like education, are a very important source of wage variation in France. Firm effects, while important, are not as important as person effects. At the level of firms, we find that enterprises that hire high-wage workers are more productive but not more profitable. They are also more capital and high-skilled employee intensive. Enterprises that pay higher wages, controlling for person effects, are more productive and more profitable. They are also more capital intensive but are not more high-skilled labor intensive. We find that person effects explain about 90% of inter-industry wage differentials and about 75% of the firm-size wage effect while firm effects explain relatively little of either differential.

Continuing rapid growth in U.S. gasoline consumption threatens to exacerbate environmental and congestion problems. We use flexible semiparametric and nonparametric methods to guide analysis of household gasoline consumption, and including this variable cuts the estimated income elasticity in half. Slower projected future growth in licensed drivers points to slower growth in gasoline consumption. A parsimonious representation of age, income, lifecycle and location effects is developed and tested. We show how flexible methods also helped reveal fundamental problems with the available price data.

In this paper we derive a model of aggregate investment that builds from the lumpy microeconomic behavior of firms facing stochastic fixed adjustment costs. Instead of the standard sharp (S,s) bands, firms' adjustment policies take the form of a probability of adjustment (adjustment hazard) that responds smoothly to changes in firms' capacity gap. The model has appealing aggregation properties, and yields nonlinear aggregate time series processes. The passivity of normal times is, occasionally, more than offset by the brisk response to large accumulated shocks. Using within and out-of-sample criteria, we find that the model performs substantially better than the standard linear models of investment for postwar sectoral U.S. manufacturing equipment and structures investment data.