Knowledge that Transforms

Generalized measures of deviation are considered as substitutes for standard deviation in a framework like that of classical portfolio theory for coping with the uncertainty inherent in achieving rates of return beyond the risk-free rate. Such measures, derived for example from conditional value-at-risk and its variants, can reflect the different attitudes of different classes of investors. They lead nonetheless to generalized one-fund theorems in which a more customized version of portfolio optimization is the aim, rather than the idea that a single “master fund” might arise from market equilibrium and serve the interests of all investors. The results that are obtained cover discrete distributions along with continuous distributions. They are applicable therefore to portfolios involving derivatives, which create jumps in distribution functions at specific gain or loss values, well as to financial models involving finitely many scenarios. Furthermore, they deal rigorously with issues that come up at that level of generality, but have not received adequate attention, including possible lack of differentiability of the deviation expression with respect to the portfolio weights, and the potential nonuniqueness of optimal weights. The results also address in detail the phenomenon that if the risk-free rate lies above a certain threshold, the usually envisioned master fund must be replaced by one of alternative type, representing a “net short position” instead of a “net long position” in the risky instruments. For nonsymmetric deviation measures, the second type need not just be the reverse of the first type, and there can sometimes even be an interval for the risk-free rate in which no master fund of either type exists. A notion of basic fund, in place of master fund, is brought in to get around this difficulty and serve as a single guide to optimality regardless of such circumstances.

This paper examines the dynamic relationship between daily stock and government bond returns of selected countries over the past decade to infer the state and progress of inter-financial market integration. We proceed to empirically investigate the influence of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on time variations in inter-stock–bond market integration/segmentation dynamics using a two-step procedure: First, we document the downward trends in time-varying conditional correlations between stock and bond market returns in European countries, Japan and the US. Second, we investigate the causality and determinants of this interdependent relationship, in particular, whether the various macroeconomic convergence criteria associated with the EMU have played a significant role. We find that real economic integration and the reduction in currency risk have generally had the desired effect on financial integration but monetary policy integration may have created uncertain investor sentiments on the economic future of the EMU, thereby stimulating a flight to quality phenomenon.

This paper examines the impact of institutional trades on volatility in international stocks across 43 countries. There is a temporary volatility spike during the trade execution period, merely reflecting the price impact costs faced by the institutions. Cross sectional regressions suggest that trade imbalances, enforcement of insider trading laws, stock prices, and an emerging market classification are positively associated with temporary volatility increases whereas the presence of market makers and better shareholders’ rights dampen such increases. In the long term, institutional trades do not destabilize markets as the levels of volatility after their trades are almost identical to their pre-decision levels.

This paper provides a brief overview of the current state of the not-for-profit sector and discusses specific governance issues in not-for-profit organizations. We offer an in-depth analysis of the issues that arise when not-for-profit organizations compete against for-profit firms in the same markets. We argue that while competition by for-profit firms can discipline not-for-profit firms and mitigate their governance problems, the effects of this competition are distorted by the not-for-profits’ corporate income tax exemptions. Based on a simple general equilibrium analysis, we argue that there is little justification for such exemptions.

We investigate market behavior in a setting where managerial incentives to manipulate earnings and market price should be apparent ex ante to market participants. We find evidence of abnormally low discretionary accruals in the period following announcements of cancellations of executive stock options up to the time the options are reissued. Nevertheless, analysts and investors are not misled. Discretionary accruals have little power in explaining stock price performance during this period. Moreover, discretionary accruals do not explain subsequent analyst forecast errors. Thus, our findings suggest that, in this transparent setting, analysts and investors do not respond to earnings management.

Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (BRS) find a negative relation between their comprehensive measure of corporate financing activities and future stock returns and future profitability. Noticing that accounting accruals are increases in net operating assets on a company's balance sheet, we question whether it is possible to distinguish between the ‘external financing anomaly’ documented by BRS and the ‘accrual anomaly’ first documented by Sloan [1996. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71, 289–315]. We show that once controlling for total accruals, the relation between external financing activities and future stock returns is attenuated and not statistically significant. These findings are consistent with Richardson and Sloan [2003. External financing, capital investment and future stock returns. Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania and University of Michigan].

We develop a comprehensive and parsimonious measure of corporate financing activities and document a negative relation between this measure and both future stock returns and future profitability. The economic and statistical significance of our results is stronger than in previous research focusing on individual categories of corporate financing activities. To discriminate between risk versus misvaluation as explanations for this relation, we analyze the association between our measure of external financing and sell-side analysts’ forecasts. Consistent with the misvaluation explanation, our measure of external financing is positively related to overoptimism in analysts’ forecasts.

We show how information technology affects transfer pricing. With coarse information technology, negotiated transfer pricing has an informational advantage: managers agree to prices that approximate the firm's cost of internal trade more precisely than cost-based transfer prices. With sufficiently rapid offers, this advantage outweighs opportunity costs of managers’ bargaining time, and negotiated transfer pricing generates higher profits than the cost-based method. However, as information technology improves, the informational advantage diminishes; the opportunity costs of managers’ bargaining eventually dominate, and cost-based methods generate higher profits. Our results explain why firms generally prefer cost-based methods, and when negotiated methods are preferable.

We examine whether information in footnotes might lack reliability because auditors permit more misstatement in disclosed, as opposed to recognized, amounts. In both the stock-compensation and lease settings, audit partners require greater correction of misstatements in recognized amounts than in the equivalent disclosed amounts. Debriefing questions indicate that the partners make these decisions knowingly, even though they expect greater client resistance to correcting recognized amounts, because they view recognized amounts as more material. Partners also spend more time on correction decisions for recognized information. While prior literature suggests that amounts are often relegated to footnotes because they are less reliable, our results suggest that the actual choice to disclose versus recognize can also reduce information reliability. These results have implications for the interpretation of prior research on the reliability of recognized and disclosed numbers, for financial-accounting standard setters who may want to consider the reliability effects of their recognition versus disclosure decisions, and for auditing standard setters who may wish to clarify auditors' responsibilities for preventing misstatements in disclosed amounts.

This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard‐to‐predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.