Knowledge that Transforms

Repetition and Reputation: Implications for Trust and Trustworthiness When Institutions Change by Iris Bohnet and Steffen Huck. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 362-366 of American Economic Review, May 2004

The types of knowledge, skills, and proficiencies that should be imparted to students in graduate economics programs are a matter of long-standing controversy. A 1953 American Economic Association (AEA) report cataloged major shortcomings in graduate economic education and recommended changes to enhance the quality and effectiveness of economics Ph.D. programs (Howard R. Bowen, 1953). By the 1980’s, the perception grew that economics Ph.D. programs devoted excessive attention to theoretical work at the expense of real-world application (Wassily Leontief, 1982). This development triggered David Colander and Arjo Klamer (1987) to conduct an independent study based on interviews with graduate students at elite Ph.D. programs. Their study reinforced the views of many, including leaders in the AEA, the National Science Foundation, and several private foundations, that something was amiss. In 1988, the AEA established the Commission on Graduate Education in Economics (COGEE) to undertake a thorough study of graduate training. The Commission’s major concern, based on extensive surveys and interviews of graduate students, faculty, and employers, was that graduate education in economics had removed itself from real-world economic problems (Anne O. Krueger et al., 1991). The COGEE study is distinguished by its attempt to determine the emphasis given to cultivating a set of economic proficiencies in graduate school and the importance of an array of skills for success in graduate school and later on the job (Hansen, 1991). The proficiencies included in the COGEE study were: providing rigorous training in economic theory, providing training in econometrics and measurement, applying theory to real-world problems, using economic theory in empirical applications, and conducting independent economic research. For this study, we added three proficiencies to the COGEE list: understanding economic institutions and history and understanding the history of economic ideas, to capture concerns about curriculum changes that eliminated or scaled back training in these two fields, and developing teaching skills, to reflect recent emphasis on improving the quality of instruction (William E. Becker, 2003). The skills included in the COGEE study were: critical judgment (analyzing ideas, reviewing literature, formulating pertinent comments), analytics (understanding and solving problems, making and analyzing logical arguments), application (seeing practical implications of abstract ideas, analyzing real-world policies and processes), mathematics (constructing and analyzing proofs, manipulating mathematical abstractions), computation (effectively and quickly finding and manipulating relevant data, estimating economic relationships using statistical software), communication (speaking and writing effectively, quickly understanding spoken and written ideas of others, explaining ideas clearly), and creativity (conceiving interesting questions, finding new means of analysis). We added instruction (being an effective classroom teacher) to the skills list for the same reason mentioned above.

We estimate the effect of high school graduation on participation in criminal activity accounting for endogeneity of schooling. We begin by analyzing the effect of high school graduation on incarceration using Census data. Instrumental variable estimates using changes in state compulsory attendance laws as an instrument for high school graduation uncover a significant reduction in incarceration for both blacks and whites. When estimating the impact of high school graduation only, OLS and IV estimators estimate different weighted sums of the impact of each schooling progression on the probability of incarceration. We clarify the relationship between OLS and IV estimates and show that the "weights" placed on the impact of each schooling progression can explain differences in the estimates. Overall, the estimates suggest that completing high school reduces the probability of incarceration by about .76 percentage points for whites and 3.4 percentage points for blacks. We corroborate these findings using FBI data on arrests that distinguish among different types of crimes. The biggest impacts of graduation are associated with murder, assault, and motor vehicle theft. We also examine the effect of drop out on self-reported crime in the NLSY and find that our estimates for imprisonment and arrest are caused by changes in criminal behavior and not educational differences in the probability of arrest or incarceration conditional on crime. We estimate that the externality of education is about 14-26% of the private return to schooling, suggesting that a significant part of the social return to education comes in the form of externalities from crime reduction.

This paper presents a model that provides an explanation, based on regime switching in the real interest rate and learning, of why tests based on stock-adjustment models, Euler equations, or decision rules—which emphasize short-run fluctuations in inventories and the interest rate—are unlikely to uncover a negative relationship between inventories and the real interest rate. The model, however, predicts that inventories will respond to long-run movements, that is, to regime shifts in the real interest rate. Tests emphasizing cointegration techniques confirm this prediction and show a significant long-run relationship between inventories and the real interest rate.

If individuals care about their status, defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one “positional” good, then the consumer's problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others. In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good. Using techniques from auction theory, we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income. In a richer society, almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption, and individual utility is lower at each income level. In a more equal society, the poor are worse off.

Lucas (1990) argued that it was a paradox that more capital does not flow from rich countries to poor countries. He rejected the standard explanation of expropriation risk and argued that paucity of capital flows to poor countries must instead be rooted in externalities in human capital formation favoring further investment in already capital rich countries. In this paper, we review the various explanations offered for this “paradox.” There is no doubt that there are many reasons why capital does not flow from rich to poor nations – yet the evidence we present suggests some explanations are more relevant than others. In particular, as long as the odds of non repayment are as high as 65 percent for some low income countries, credit risk seems like a far more compelling reason for the paucity of rich-poor capital flows. The true paradox may not be that too little capital flows from the wealthy to the poor nations, but that too much capital (especially debt) is channeled to “debt intolerant” serial defaulters.

We present a model of the creation of social networks, such as political parties, trade unions, religious coalitions, or political action committees, through discussion and mutual persuasion among their members. The key idea is that people are influenced by those inside their network, but not by those outside. Once created, networks can be "rented out" to politicians who seek votes and support for their initiatives and ideas, which may have little to do with network members' core beliefs. In this framework, political competition does not lead to convergence of party platforms to the views of the median voter. Rather, parties separate their messages and try to isolate their members to prevent personal influence from those in the opposition.

Identifying the Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act Using State-Law Variation: Preliminary Evidence on Educational Participation Effects by Christine Jolls. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 447-453 of American Economic Review, May 2004

Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing "Conditional Cooperation" in a Field Experiment by Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier. Published in volume 94, issue 5, pages 1717-1722 of American Economic Review, December 2004

Taken from page 76 -- "The specter of a “liquidity trap,” originally proposed as a theoretical possibility by John Maynard Keynes (1936) but long considered to be of doubtful practical relevance, has recently created alarm among the world’s central banks. In Japan, the overnight rate has been essentially at zero for most of the time since February 1999, making further interest-rate cuts impossible. Yet until well into 2003, growth remained anemic while prices continued to fall, suggesting a need for further monetary stimulus. Since March 2001, the Bank of Japan has supplemented its “zero-interest-rate policy” with a policy of “quantitative easing,” under which additional bank reserves are supplied beyond those needed to keep overnight interest rates at zero. Yet an increase in base money of more than 50 percent failed to halt the deflation, suggesting a liquidity trap. More recently, other central banks, including the Fed, have come close enough to the zero bound to worry about how they would deal with a similar predicament. Here we first discuss whether monetary policy should actually become ineffective when the zero bound on interest rates is reached. We argue that open-market operations, even of “unconventional” types, will be ineffective if they do not change expectations about the future conduct of policy; in this sense, a liquidity trap is possible. Nonetheless, a credible commitment regarding future policy can largely mitigate the distortions created by the zero bound. We fully characterize the optimal commitment in a simple example."