Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the tying of lending to investment banking business by universal banks. Tying may alleviate credit rationing by assuring the lender of an adequate share of the social surplus that its lending generates; however, tying raises the profitability of loans to troubled entrepreneurs, softening entrepreneurial budget constraints and reducing effort levels. When investment banking is uncompetitive, the former effect dominates, and there is too little tying; when investment banking is competitive, there is too much tying. We relate our results to the authority structure of the universal bank, which we argue is the appropriate focus for regulation.

During 2004 and 2005, long-horizon interest rates fell sharply in major international government bond markets (Greenspan's “conundrum”). This common fall mainly reflected lower long real rates. To investigate possible causes, the authors apply a no-arbitrage affine modeling framework to understanding the UK real term structure. The authors find that time-varying term premia are important in explaining movements in long real forward rates. And, although there is evidence that long-horizon expected short real rates declined over the conundrum period, the authors’ results suggest that lower term premia played the dominant role. This could be consistent with the so-called “search for yield” and excess liquidity explanations for the conundrum.

The authors use proprietary loan contracts and financial information negotiated between banks and private equity sponsors to explore the financial covenant structure and the determinants of covenant restrictiveness in a large set of leveraged buyouts. With respect to the covenant structure, we analyze the utilized types of financial covenants in sponsored loans and in comparable nonsponsored loans, such as highly levered term loans or loans used toward M&A. The authors find that sponsored loans show less variation in the included types and combinations of covenants and include more financial covenants than the comparable nonsponsored loans. With respect to covenant restrictiveness, the authors measure precisely the distance between threshold and financial forecast. They show that two competing mechanisms, reduced information asymmetry costs and increased financial risk, affect the restrictiveness in sponsored loans.

The authors study the impact of a powerful nonfinancial stakeholder—unionized workers—on the pricing of corporate debt. Firms in more unionized industries have lower bond yields. This relation is stronger in firms with weaker financial conditions and cannot be explained by the correlation of unionization with industry characteristics, governance mechanisms, or financial leverage. Firms in unionized industries implement less risky investment policies and are less likely targets of acquisitions. Unionization reduces yields by more when firms’ takeover barriers are lower. Hence, unions are viewed favorably in the bond market because, through their influence on corporate affairs, they protect bondholders’ wealth.

I examine the effects of venture capital backing on the corporate governance of the entrepreneurial firm at the time of transition from private to public ownership. Using a selection model framework that instruments for venture backing with variations in the supply of venture capital, I conduct three sets of tests comparing corporate governance in venture- and non–venture-backed initial public offering (IPO) firms. Venture-backed firms have lower levels of earnings management, more positive reactions to the adoption of shareholder rights agreements, and more independent board structures than similar non–venture-backed firms, consistent with better governance. These effects are not common to all pre-IPO large shareholders.

This paper presents an equilibrium model in a pure exchange economy when investors have three possible sources of heterogeneity. Investors may differ in their beliefs, in their level of risk aversion, and in their time preference rate. The authors study the impact of investors’ heterogeneity on equilibrium properties and, in particular, on the consumption shares, the market price of risk, the risk-free rate, the bond prices at different maturities, the stock price and volatility as well as on the stock's cumulative returns, and optimal portfolio strategies. The authors relate the heterogeneous economy with the family of associated homogeneous economies with only one class of investors. Cross-sectional as well as long-run properties are analyzed.

This paper examines why large private equity (PE) funds earn lower returns. The article argues that large PE funds are suited to making large investments and small PE funds are suited to nurturing start-ups. Thus, the suboptimal investment in small companies is one driver of the size effect in PE. A theoretical model and empirical results from a sample of 1,222 funds in the USA support this prediction. The largest 25% of PE funds earn internal rates of return of 5.17% when they invest in the largest 25% of companies but only −2.98% when they invest in the smallest 25%. This suggests that investment size is a driver of the size effect in PE.

Equity risk measured by beta is of great interest to both academics and practitioners. Existing estimates of beta use historical returns. Many studies have found option-implied volatility to be a strong predictor of future realized volatility. We find that option-implied volatility and skewness are also good predictors of future realized beta. Motivated by this finding, we establish a set of assumptions needed to construct a beta estimate from option-implied return moments using equity and index options. This beta can be computed using only option data on a single day. It is therefore potentially able to reflect sudden changes in the structure of the underlying company.

Using a detailed German data set on venture capital contracts, the authors document that contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and their portfolio firms specify more complete conditions for future financing for firms that do have no suitable outside financing option and therefore lower ex post bargaining power. The authors’ result is consistent with theories of holdup, where complete contracts protect the entrepreneur from expropriation by the financier. Moreover, there is evidence of learning by VCs. Other possible explanations for observed contracts, such as multitasking or coordination costs, instead have little explanation power.

When contracts are unobserved (and nonexclusive), agents can promise the same asset to multiple counterparties and subsequently default. I show that a central mechanism can extract all relevant information about contracts that agents enter by inducing them to report one another. The mechanism sets position limits and reveals the names of agents who hit the limits according to (voluntary) reports from their counterparties. This holds even if sending reports is costly and even if agents can collude. In some cases, an agent’s position limit must be nonbinding in equilibrium. The mechanism has some features of a clearinghouse.