Knowledge that Transforms

This study investigates the role of passive investors in the equity lending market by utilizing the expansion of exchange-traded fund (ETF) markets due to the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) ETF purchasing program. We find that the BOJ’s purchases increase equity prices particularly for stocks with limited availability in the equity lending market. However, over the longer term, the BOJ’s cumulative purchases reduce lending fees, thus weakening the program’s effects. These findings suggest that ETF managers supply stocks that constitute ETFs to the equity lending market, and the lending behavior of ETFs, influenced by the BOJ’s program, alleviates short-selling constraints.

Internalization happens when orders submitted through the same broker are intentionally matched to each other on-exchange or off-exchange. We study the impact of allowing (modes of) internalization on trading rates, investor welfare, and payment for order flow (PFOF). Internalization affects the choice between limit orders and market orders and the participation of dealers in trading. Greater dealer participation creates a greater scope for PFOF. A crucial determinant is the size of the tick. For small ticks, compared with the absence of internalization, its presence leads to higher trading rates, lower investor welfare, and more PFOF. The opposite holds for wide ticks.

We examine various implementation issues related to the calibration of output floors in setting minimum bank capital requirements under the finalized version of the Basel III capital accord. The main raison d’être of output floors is to limit the capital savings enjoyed by large banks due to regulatory arbitrage under the internal model paradigm. We consider regulatory arbitrage through the bank’s incentive to optimize its grading system in order to lower as much as possible the capital requirement given the structure of its asset portfolio in terms of internal ratings and default probabilities. Based on a fictional portfolio of SME loans observed over a full business cycle, we conduct a counterfactual analysis in order to compare the effect of the output floor implemented with respect to two benchmarks: ( i ) a standardized approach calibrated from credit ratings assigned by external rating agencies, as proposed in the finalized version of the Basel III capital accord; and ( ii ) an alternative, more granular, and comprehensive standardized approach benchmark, based on an external grading system that mimics the in-house credit assessment systems used by certain national central banks. Our results show that a more granular, risk-sensitive, benchmark is likely to reduce the effect of the output floor on the minimum capital requirement. We also reveal that output floors exhibit a countercyclical pattern, which is an interesting feature of the mechanism from a macroprudential point of view.

Stablecoins seek to address the high price fluctuations of unbacked cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and Ether. However, recent studies as well as the collapse of stablecoin USTC (Terra) cast doubt on the stability of stablecoins. Using well-known Markowitz portfolio optimization methods, we combine five leading stablecoins into a global minimum variance portfolio that represents a stable aggregate stablecoin (SAS). We find that SAS is much more stable than its constituent stablecoins. Also, in a stress test adding USTC to the portfolio, SAS remains stable with a narrow price range over time. Importantly, the construction of SAS using modern diversification methods has practical implications for the ongoing development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).

We introduce digital currency into a macro model with a banking sector in which financial frictions generate endogenous systemic risk and instability. In the model, digital currency is fully integrated into the financial system . Stablecoin issuance significantly increases the probability of a banking-sector crisis because it depresses bank deposit spreads, particularly during crises, which limits banks’ ability to recapitalize following losses. While banking-sector stability suffers, household welfare can still improve significantly. Financial frictions nevertheless limit the potential benefits of digital currencies. The optimal level of digital currency could be below what would be issued in a competitive environment. In contrast to stablecoins, which are backed by debt, tokenized deposits backed by traditional bank assets improve welfare without harming financial stability . The scope for welfare gains from stablecoins or tokenized deposits depends on how households value the liquidity services of digital currency relative to traditional deposits and on the cost of issuing stablecoins.

Using earnings conference calls, we investigate banks’ views of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to understand why TARP generated so few loans. We find that banks generally regarded TARP favorably and many mentioned using TARP funds to make loans. However, actual loan growth fell well below expectations based on prior capital ratios, even among banks that publicly committed to lending. Other banks highlighted that the funds would improve their capital ratios. We show that these perspectives are largely unrelated to banks’ ex-ante financial characteristics, but instead reflect the evolving conditions during the crisis period. These shifts are consistent with a large decline in the fraction of banks that commented on the favorable pricing of the preferred stock over time. Our findings suggest that banks primarily used TARP funds to strengthen capital ratios, partly driven by CEO career concerns. Weak loan demand and evolving market conditions also contributed to the sluggish loan growth following the TARP injections.

We construct a novel panel of insider ownership for roughly 600 U.S. bank holding companies from 2003 to 2014 to test whether ownership structure shaped recapitalizations around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Insider ownership shows no discrete shift around the GFC. Using a difference-in-differences design with BHC and time fixed effects, we find that, after Q3 2008, banks with higher pre-crisis insider stakes issued significantly less common equity than otherwise similar peers. This effect is more pronounced where insiders enjoy greater private benefits of control, as proxied by insider lending and earnings opacity—consistent with dilution reluctance as the mechanism. The findings hold in propensity score matched regressions and when employing instrumental variables for insider ownership. These results reveal that ownership structure affects banks’ equity issuances in crises, underscoring the importance of accounting for ownership structure in bank stress tests and capital-regulation frameworks.

• How does product market competition affect corporate environmental footprint? • We examine restructuring of U.S. electric utilities, the number one emissions-intensive sector. • Cost-cutting actions are the key driver of changes in operations and emissions of electric plants. • Cost-cutting actions lower environmental footprint when plant technology allows greener production. • Without such technology, competition worsens environmental outcomes. Banks face pressure to integrate a wider range of risks into lending decisions, including both traditional product-market risks and the increasingly important environmental risk. Yet how these two types of risk interact remains unclear. We show that production technology is pivotal in shaping the impact of product-market competition on environmental risk. Focusing on the restructuring of the US electric utility industry, which introduced product-market competition into a highly polluting sector, we find that technological capacity is key. When technology enables cost-saving production decisions that also improve environmental performance, competition reduces environmental footprint. Otherwise, it exacerbates it. These findings suggest that lenders must assess not only individual risk factors of borrowers but also their potential interactions, with firms’ technological capacity playing a crucial role.

We examine the effects of cross-border supervisory arbitrage on corporate lending and firm performance. We show that subsidiaries of banking groups improve loan conditions for firms when the group’s opportunities to take risks in other countries are curbed. The expansion in lending is targeted towards firms of higher quality and firms that the group is already familiar with. The improved lending conditions have positive real effects, allowing recipient firms to increase capital spending and leading to higher profits. Taken together, our results suggest that there can be benefits for firms in countries that receive lending inflows due to the supervisory arbitrage.