Knowledge that Transforms

A model of corporate financial policy (debt-equity ratios and dividend payout rates) is included in the Harberger general equilibrium model of incidence of the corporate income tax. Illustrative calculations of the distortions of financial policy and increases in risk premiums induced by the corporate tax are provided. Because risk premiums on corporate securities would be reduced, eliminating the corporate tax or integrating it into the personal tax would increase the income of noncorporate investors relatively more than that of investors in corporate securities, and is therefore less regressive than is commonly thought.

Noncooperative oligopoly behavior in nonrenewable resource markets is analyzed under stationary conditions assuming perfect information. The existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in output paths is established under standard cost and demand assumptions, and a number of comparative dynamic results are obtained. If all suppliers have the same costs, for instance, and total reserves are fixed, either increasing the number of suppliers or equalizing their reserve holdings causes more rapid resource use. If suppliers' costs differ, it is shown that equilibrium involves inefficient production; high-cost reserves may even be exhausted before low-cost reserves.

In an open economy with a floating exchange rate, the efficacy of fiscal and monetary policy depends fundamentally on the wage-setting process. In the canonical models of Mundell and Fleming, monetary expansion raises output via an exchange rate depreciation, while fiscal expansion has no output effect. These results hold only when real wages can be altered by exchange rate movements; if the real wage is fixed, the Mundell-Fleming ranking of policy is reversed. This paper explores the interaction of wages and policy in short- and long-run models, under the assumptions of perfect foresight and world capital mobility.

This paper extends Merton Miller's 1977 analysis of corporate capital structure decisions to the incomplete capital markets case. As in Miller's model, aggregate demand for corporate leverage is curtailed as interest rates on taxable bonds rise. Unlike Miller's model, however, capital structure is not a matter of indifference to all equilibrium shareholders. Market incompleteness and tax arbitrage restrictions combine to prevent marginal rates of substitution from being equalized for all investors and hence their preferences are not unanimous. In addition, costs associated with debt induce a tendency for lower cost firms to issue a larger proportion of total corporate debt.

This paper examines the implications of microstructure theory for empirical research on stock price behavior

In placing a new security issue, an investment banker has an opportunity to obtain private information by conducting preselling activities during the registration period. The task of the issuer is to design a contract that both induces the banker to use this information to the issuer's advantage and provides a disincentive for the banker to price the issue too low in order to reduce the effort required to sell the issue. This paper characterizes the class of price response functions that the issuer can induce the banker to choose under a delegation scheme and demonstrates that delegating the pricing decision to the banker can be optimal.

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