Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because i t leads managers to sacrifice long-term interests in order to boost c urrent profits. If stockholders are imperfectly informed, temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued, increasing t he likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price; hence the manage rial concern with current bottom line. The magnitude of the problem d epends on a variety of factors, including the attitudes and beliefs o f shareholders, the extent to which corporate raiders have inside inf ormation, and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaini ng control of their firms. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.

The capital asset pricing model provides a theoretical structure for the pricing of assets with uncertain returns. The premium to induc e risk-averse investors to bear risk is proportional to the nondivers ifiable risk, which is measured by the covariance of the asset return with the market portfolio return. In this paper, a multivariate, gen eralized-autoregressive, conditional, heteroscedastic process is esti mated for returns to bills, bonds, and stocks where the expected retu rn is proportional to the conditional covariance of each return with that of a fully diversified or market portfolio. It is found that the conditional covariances are quite variable over time and are a signi ficant determinant of the time-varying risk premia. The implied betas are also time varying and forecastable. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.

This paper investigates empirically a model of aggregate consumption and leisure decisions in which utility from goods and leisure is nontime-separable. The nonseparability of preferences accommodates intertemporal substitution or complementarity of leisure and thereby affects the comovements in aggregate compensation and hours worked. These cross-relations are examined empirically using postwar monthly U. S. data on quantities, real wages, and the real return on the one-month Treasury bill. The estimated values of the parameters governing preferences differ significantly from the values assumed in several studies of real business models. Several possible explanations of these discrepancies are discussed.

Nils Gottfries, Torsten Persson; Empirical Examinations of the Information Sets of Economic Agents*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 103, Issue 1, 1

Wilfrid W. Csaplar, Jr., Edward Tower; Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly: Comment, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 103, Issue 3, 1 August 1

A canonical price-normalized form is proposed as a generalization of the ordinary consumer's surplus expression commonly used to evaluate changes in economic welfare. This familiar-looking formula, it is proved, can be rigorously interpreted as representing the first- and second-order terms of a Taylor-series expansion for the equivalent-variation or willingness-to-pay function of a single consumer. In principle, the lowly consumer's surplus triangle-and-rectangle methodology can be rigorously defended as an exact approximation to a theoretically meaningful measure as long as prices are appropriately deflated. The appropriate price deflator is derived, and some implications are discussed.

The expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates supplemented by the rational expectations and time-invariant risk premium assumption implies that the spread between the long and the short rate has in general predictive power for the short rate. This implication was consistently rejected in recent studies Time variations of the risk premium, which are probably important for the behavior of the yield on long-term bonds, are not an entirely satisfactory explanation for these findings. In a more recent article of Mankiw and Miron [1986], who analyzed quarterly data for three-and six-month interest rates over the period 1890-1979, an interesting new explanation for the failure of the expectations theory emerged. They showed that the spread had substantial predictive power for changes in the short rate in the period before the founding of the Federal Reserve (1890-1914), whereas for all other periods considered (1915-1933, 1934-1951, 1951-1958, and 1959-1979), the spread did not help to predict the short rate. Thus, Mankiw and Miron suggested that the rejection of the expectations theory with recent data is a consequence of the commitment of the Federal Reserve to stabilize interest rates resulting in random walk behavior of the short rate. Under these circumstances, expected future short rates are equal to the actual short rate and variations of the spread are only brought about by changes in the risk premium.

We show that a new product monopolist may benefit from (delayed) competition if consumers incur setup costs. Setup costs create a dynamic consistency problem: the monopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs. We show that, if customers anticipate this problem, the monopolist's profits can be improved through ex ante commitment to competition in the post-adoption market, if setup costs are large. If setup costs are small, the monopolist can typically achieve the same level of profits without price commitment as with.

Abstract. This paper considers an intrafirm resource allocation model with a single principal and n agents. Each agent represents a division manager who uses a centrally provided input together with other inputs, including effort, to produce and sell final products. The principal represents an owner who is responsible for providing an input to the divisions. It is assumed that each agent (division manager) knows the local profit function for the division and has disutility for effort. The principal seeks to maximize firm‐wide profits net of the costs of the centrally provided input and compensation to the agents. In this setting, which incorporates divergence of preferences and asymmetric information, it is shown that the principal and the n agents can strictly improve their welfare by moving from a set of compensation functions that do not include any allocation of costs to compensation functions that are based on cost allocation. Résumé. Les auteurs se penchent sur un modèle de répartition des ressources intraentreprise en présence d'un seul mandant et de n mandataires. Chaque mandataire représente un directeur de division qui utilise un intrant, fourni par l'échelon central, en conjonction avec d'autres intrants, y inclus l'effort, pour fabriquer et vendre des produits finis. Le mandant représente un propriétaire à qui incombe la responsabilité de fournir un intrant aux divisions. L'on suppose que chaque mandataire (directeur de division) connaît la fonction de profit de sa division et a l'effort en aversion. Le mandant cherche à maximiser les profits globaux de l'entreprise, compte tenu des coûts de l'intrant fourni par l'échelon central et de la rémunération des mandataires. Dans cette situation, qui fait intervenir des préférences divergentes et de l'information asymétrique, l'on démontre que le mandant et les n mandataires peuvent strictement améliorer leur situation en passant d'un ensemble de fonctions de rémunération qui ne prévoient aucune ventilation des coûts à des fonctions de rémunération basées sur la ventilation des coûts.