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Courtship as a Waiting Game

Journal of Political Economy 1993 101(1), 185-202 open access
In most times and places, women on average marry older men. We propose a partial explanation for this difference and for why it is diminishing. In a society in which the economic roles of males are more varied than the roles of females, the relative desirability of females as marriage partners may become evident at an earlier age than is the case for males. We study an equilibrium model in which the males who regard their prospects as unusually good choose to wait until their economic success is revealed before choosing a bride. In equilibrium, the most desirable young females choose successful older males. Young males who believe that time will not treat them kindly will offer to marry at a young age. Although they are aware that young males available for marriage are no bargain, the less desirable young females will be offered no better option than the lottery presented by marrying a young male. We show the existence of equilibrium for models of this type and explore the properties of equilibrium.

Labor Hoarding and the Business Cycle

Journal of Political Economy 1993 101(2), 245-273 open access
This paper investigates the sensitivity of Solow residual based measures of technology shocks to labor-hoarding behavior. Using a structural model of labor hoarding and the identifying restriction that innovations to technology shocks are orthogonal to innovations in government consumption, the authors estimate the fraction of the variability of the Solow residual that is due to technology shocks. Their results support the view that a significant proportion of movements in the Solow residual are artifa cts of labor-hoarding behavior. Specifically, the authors estimate that the variance of innovations to technology is roughly 50 percent less than that implied by standard real business cycle models. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Durable Goods: An Explanation for Their Slow Adjustment

Journal of Political Economy 1993 101(2), 351-384 open access
At the microeconomic level, durable purchases are often discontinuous and relatively large. This feature has the potential to explain why aggregate expenditure on durables responds only slowly (relative to the frictionless permanent income model) to wealth and other aggregate innovations. In this paper I develop new results on the problem of dynamic aggregation of stochastically heterogeneous units, which help to characterize the connection between microeconomic behavior and aggregate dynamics in the presence of nonconvex adjustment costs. Using these results and splitting postwar U.S. aggregate durable purchases into different subcategories and time periods, I provide further support for the view that lumpy microeconomic purchases play an important role in explaining the time-series behavior of aggregate expenditure on durable goods.

On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model

Journal of Political Economy 1993 101(3), 473-484 open access
A single seller of an indivisible good operates in a market with many consumers who differ in their ability to process information. The consumers' constraints are modeled in two submodels: the first in terms of the limits on the number of sets in the partition of the price space, and the second in terms of the limits on the complexity of the operation he can use to process a price offer. For the construction of the second submodel, the tool of a "perceptron" is borrowed from the parallel computation literature. Assuming a negative correlation between the seller's cost of supply of the good and the consumer's ability to process information, I demonstrate that the heterogeneity of consumer's abilities can be used by the seller to profitably discriminate among them.

Measures of Fit for Calibrated Models

Journal of Political Economy 1993 101(6), 1011-1041 open access
This paper suggests a new procedure for evaluating the fit of a dynamic structural economic model. The procedure begins by augmenting the variables in the model with just enough stochastic error so that the model can exactly match the second moments of the actual data. Measures of fit for the model can then be constructed on the basis of the size of this error. The procedure is applied to a standard real business cycle model. Over the business cycle frequencies, the model must be augmented with a substantial error to match data for the postwar U.S. economy. Lower bounds on the variance of the error range from 40 percent to 60 percent of the variance in the actual data.

The review process as a control for differential recall of evidence in auditor judgments

Accounting, Organizations and Society 1993 18(6), 559-574 open access
This experiment examines whether there are systematic offsetting differences in the manner in which initial decision makers and reviewers attend to information which ensure that evidence inconsistent with initial judgments is given adequate consideration. Differences in attention are proposed, which result in differential recall of evidence by the initial decision maker and reviewer and thus influence what knowledge initial decision makers and reviewers bring to their discussions and subsequent decisions. The results suggest that the review process can act as an effective control by increasing the chances that the implications of inconsistent evidence are considered.

The Association Between Nonearnings Disclosures by Small Firms and Positive Abnormal Returns.

The Accounting Review 1993 68(3), 668-680 open access
Abstract We formulate and test the hypothesis that nonearnings disclosures of small, but not large, firms generally are "good news." Nonearnings disclosures are defined as disclosures by managers and outsiders about news other than earnings (e.g., stock splits, takeovers, new orders). "Good news" is defined as a positive stock price reaction at the time of the information disclosure. Our hypothesis is motivated by two lines of prior research. First, managers have incentives to disclose their private information voluntarily when they expect the effects of the information on firm value to exceed the disclosure costs (Verrecchia 19831. Second, the "firm-size differential information hypothesis," advanced by Atiase (1980, 1985) and the corroborating empirical evidence of Atiase (1985, 1987), Freeman (1987), and Bhushan (1989) suggest that incentives for information production and dissemination by outsiders are an increasing function of firm size. Thus, assuming that nonearnings disclosures concerning small firms are initiated primarily by managers, whereas those of large firms are not, small (but not large) firms' nonearnings disclosures are more likely to be good rather than bad news. Using firm-specific nonearnings disclosures, identified from the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service data base over the 1982 to 1987 period, we show that small firms' nonearnings disclosures, on average, are associated with significant stock price increases, whereas large firms' nonearnings disclosures, on average, are valuation-neutral. Given these results and the evidence that nonearnings disclosures are often made around the time of earnings announcements (Hoskin et al. 1986; Thompson et al. 1987), we reexamine the puzzling result of Chari et al. (1988) that on-time earnings announcements of small, but not large, firms are associated with positive abnormal returns, unconditional upon the nature of the earnings news. We hypothesize that this phenomenon is attributable to nonearnings disclosures of good news around the time of small firms' earnings announcements. We show that small and large firms' "pure" on-time earnings announcements are not associated with positive abnormal returns, and that small (but not large) firms' "contaminated" on-time earnings announcements are associated with positive abnormal returns. We conclude that the Chari et al. (1988) results do not pertain to small firms' on-time earnings announcements per se, but to those that are accompanied by nonearnings news.

Where Do Betas Come From? Asset Price Dynamics and the Sources of Systematic Risk

Review of Financial Studies 1993 6(3), 567-592 open access
In this article we break assets’ betas with common factors into components attributable to news about future cash flows, real interest rates, and excess returns. To achieve this decomposition, we use a vector autoregressive time-series model and an approximate log-linear present value relation. The betas of industry and size portfolios with the market are largely attributed to changing expected returns. Betas with inflation and industrial production reflect opposing cash flow and expected return effects. We also show how asset pricing theory restricts the expected excess return components of betas.

Stock Prices, News, and Business Conditions

Review of Financial Studies 1993 6(3), 683-707 open access
Previous research finds that fundamental macroeconomic news has little effect on stock prices. We show that after allowing for different stages of the business cycle, a stronger relationship between stock prices and news is evident. In addition to stock prices, we examine the effect of real activity news on proxies for expected cash flows and equity discount rates. We find that when the economy is strong the stock market responds negatively to news about higher real economic activity. This negative relation is caused by the larger increase in discount rates relative to expected cash flows.