Knowledge that Transforms

The present article is an attempt to resolve the controversies concerning the concept of barriers to entry. We begin by contrasting the definitions of an entry barrier proposed in the economics literature. We then introduce a classification system to clear up the existing confusion, and we employ it to assess the nature of the barriers posed by scale economies and sunk costs.

An important challenge in the crime literature is to isolate causal effects of police on crime. Following a terrorist attack on the main Jewish center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, all Jewish institutions received police protection. Thus, this hideous event induced a geographical allocation of police forces that can be presumed exogenous in a crime regression. Using data on the location of car thefts before and after the attack, we find a large deterrent effect of observable police on crime. The effect is local, with no appreciable impact outside the narrow area in which the police are deployed.

Why Is Manufacturing Trade Rising Even as Manufacturing Output is Falling? by Raphael Bergoeing, Timothy J. Kehoe, Vanessa Strauss-Kahn and Kei-Mu Yi. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 134-138 of American Economic Review, May 2004

The Role of Information in Medical Markets: An Analysis of Publicly Reported Outcomes in Cardiac Surgery by David M. Cutler, Robert S. Huckman and Mary Beth Landrum. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 342-346 of American Economic Review, May 2004

Economics

We present simple one-shot distribution experiments comparing the relative importance of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion, as well as the relative performance of the fairness theories by Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels and by Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt. While the Fehr-Schmidt theory performs better in a direct comparison, this appears to be due to being in line with maximin preferences. More importantly, we find that a combination of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and selfishness can rationalize most of the data while the Bolton-Ockenfels and Fehr-Schmidt theories are unable to explain important patterns.

In this paper, we study the effectiveness of monetary policy in a severe recession and de?ation when nominal interest rates are bounded at zero. We compare two alternative proposals for ameliorating the effect of the zero bound: an exchange-rate peg and price-level targeting. We conduct this quantitative comparison in an empirical macroeconometric model of Japan, the United States and the euro area. Furthermore, we use a stylized micro-founded two-country model to check our qualitative ?ndings. We ?nd that both proposals succeed in generating in?ationary expectations and work almost equally well under full credibility of monetary policy. However, price-level targeting may be less effective under imperfect credibility, because the announced price-level target path is not directly observable. JEL Classification: E31, E52, E58, E61

We empirically decompose the S&P 500's dividend yield into (1) a rational forecast of long-run real dividend growth, (2) the subjectively expected risk premium, and (3) residual mispricing attributed to the market's forecast of dividend growth deviating from the rational forecast. Consistent with the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis, we find that the level of inflation explains almost 80% of the time-series variation in stock-market mispricing.

Explanations of unethical behavior often neglect the role of competition, as opposed to greed, in assuring its spread. Using the examples of child labor, corruption, "excessive" executive pay, corporate earnings manipulation, and commercial activities by universities, this paper clarifies the role of competition in promoting censured conduct. When unethical behavior cuts costs, competition drives down prices and entrepreneurs' incomes, and thereby reduces their willingness to pay for ethical conduct. Nonetheless, I suggest that competition might be good for ethical behavior in the long run, because it promotes growth and raises incomes. Higher incomes raise the willingness to pay for ethical behavior, but may also change what people believe to be ethical for the better.

Real incomes are routinely compared internationally using methods that “correct” for deviations from purchasing power parity. The most widely used of these is the Geary method which, though theoretically suspect, underlies the Penn World Table. This paper provides a theoretical foundation for the Geary method which I call the GAIA (“Geary-Allen International Accounts”) system. I show that the Geary method is exact when preferences are non-homothetic Leontief and, more generally, gives a (possibly poor) approximation to the GAIA benchmark. An empirical application suggests that both it and other widely used methods underestimate the degree of international inequality.