Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines whether the market reacts more strongly to earnings forecast revisions when financial analysts supplement their earnings forecasts with sales forecasts. I find that earnings forecast revisions supplemented with sales forecast revisions have a greater impact on security prices than do stand-alone earnings forecast revisions, controlling for the incremental information content in sales forecasts. Supplemented earnings forecasts are more accurate ex post, controlling for other individual analyst characteristics. Results are robust to controlling for earnings persistence and time effects. Taken as a whole, financial analysts are more likely to supplement their earnings forecasts with sales forecasts when they have better information. Supplementary sales forecasts appear to lend credibility to earnings forecasts because financial analysts provide sales forecasts when they are more informed.

To curb opportunism in financial reporting, researchers and regulators have proposed that firms be required to report reconciliations of prior year estimates. We provide experimental evidence that such disclosures are not sufficient for nonprofessional investors to identify firms that are opportunistic in their estimates. We also offer evidence suggesting that the value of these disclosures can be enhanced when nonprofessional investors seek out information about the estimate accuracy of other firms in the industry (i.e., consensus information). Our study provides insights about these disclosures and the mechanisms that enhance their effectiveness. Our findings have broad implications for standard-setters and future research designed to assist in identifying opportunistic management behavior.

In many settings, including venture capital financing, mergers and acquisitions, and lease competition, the structure of the contracts over which firms compete differs. Furthermore, the structure of the contract affects the future incentives of the firm to engage in value-creating activities by potentially diluting effort or investment incentives. We study, both theoretically and in the lab, the performance of debt and equity auctions in the presence of both private information and hidden effort. We show that the revenues to sellers in debt and equity auctions differ systematically depending on the returns to entrepreneurial effort. Using a controlled laboratory experiments we test the model's predictions and find strong support for the theory.

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been proposed as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle, and experiments indicate that investors exhibit behavior consistent with MLA. But a caveat is that a large bulk of financial assets is managed by investment managers whose objectives may differ substantially from those of private investors. Most importantly they manage their clients' money, not their own. In this paper we test experimentally how individuals take risk with other people's (“clients”) money. We find that subjects behave consistently with MLA over their clients' money and take less risk with their clients' money than with their own.

We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their state-owned shareholders to examine whether companies benefit or lose from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors. Minority shareholders seem to be expropriated in firms controlled by local governments, firms with a large proportion of local government directors on their board, firms without central government directors, and firms in provinces where local government bureaucrats are less likely to be prosecuted for corruption. In contrast, firms controlled by the central government (or having central government affiliated directors), benefit in related party transactions with their government parents.

We explore the effects of fat tails on the equilibrium implications of the long-run risks model of asset pricing by introducing innovations with dampened power law to consumption and dividends growth processes. We estimate the model structural parameters by maximum likelihood. We find that the stochastic volatility model with fat tails can generate implied risk premium, expected risk free rate and their volatilities comparable to the magnitudes observed in data. The model with fat tails leads to a significant increase in implied risk premia over the benchmark Gaussian model, but similar values for other equilibrium quantities of interest.

We examine empirically the response of bond returns and their volatility to good and bad macroeconomic news during expansions and recessions. We find that macroeconomic announcements are most important when they contain bad news for bond returns in expansions and, to a lesser extent, good news in contractions. In expansions, the bond market responds most strongly to bad news in non-farm payrolls, while in recessions good news about inflation is relatively more important. We also document that macroeconomic news impacts the volatility of bond returns at all maturities by increasing jump intensities and altering the jump size distribution.

We study high-frequency exchange rates over the period 1993–2008. Based on the recent literature on volatility and liquidity risk premia, we use a factor model to capture linear and non-linear linkages between currencies, stock and bond markets as well as proxies for market volatility and liquidity. We document that the Swiss franc and Japanese yen appreciate against the US dollar when US stock prices decrease and US bond prices and FX volatility increase. These safe haven properties materialise over different time granularities (from a few hours to several days) and non-linearly with the volatility factor and during crises. The latter effects were particularly discernible for the yen during the recent financial crisis.

This paper studies the impact of financing constraints in patent races. We develop a model of optimal contracting where firms finance their R&D expenditures with an investor who cannot verify their effort. In equilibrium, firms are more likely to win the more cash and assets they hold prior to the race, and the less cash and assets their rivals hold prior to the race. Evidence from US pharmaceutical patents awarded between 1975 and 1999 supports our theoretical predictions.

We consider mean-variance portfolio choice of a robust investor. The investor receives advice from J experts, each with a different prior for expected returns and risk, and follows a min-max portfolio strategy. The robust investor endogenously combines the experts' estimates. When experts agree on the main return generating factors, the investor relies on the advice of the expert with the strongest prior. Dispersed advice leads to averaging of the alternative estimates. The robust investor is likely to outperform alternative strategies. The theoretical analysis is supported by numerical simulations for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and for 81 European country and value portfolios.