Knowledge that Transforms

Contrary to the predictions of traditional life-cycle models, household consumption is excessively sensitive to current income. Similarly, weak evidence of income hedging runs against standard portfolio theory. We link these two puzzles by modifying the theoretical framework of Viceira (2001) to study how consumption-income sensitivities generated by income in the utility function affect households' portfolio choices. Empirically, we find that consumption-income sensitivities affect asset allocation through the income hedging channel. In particular, we show that the interaction between consumption-income sensitivity and the correlation of income growth to stock market returns is an important explanatory variable for households' stock market holdings. Received October 20, 2016; editorial decision April 25, 2018 by Editor Wayne Ferson.

We study the workup protocol, an important size discovery mechanism in the U.S. Treasury market. We find that workup order flow shocks explain 6%–8% of the variation of returns on benchmark notes and, across maturities, 10% of the variation of the yield curve level factor. Information related to proprietary client order flow is more likely to show up in workup trades, whereas information derived from public announcements tends to come through preworkup trades. Our findings highlight how the nature of information affects the trade-off between speed and execution price when informed traders choose between the lit and workup channels. Received May 3, 2017; Editorial decision August 1, 2018 by Editor Thierry Foucault. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. Internet Appendix tables are numbered with “IA” prefix.

I assess time-series return predictability using a weighted least squares estimator that is around 25% more efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS) because it incorporates timevarying volatility into its point estimates. Traditional predictors, such as the dividend yield, perform better in-and out-of-sample when using my estimator, indicating the insignificant OLS estimates may be false negatives driven by a lack of power. Some newer predictors, such as the variance risk premium and the president's political party, are insignificant when using my estimator, indicating the significant OLS estimates may be false positives driven by a few periods with high expected volatility.

The continuously compounded (CC) interest rate on a one-month Treasury bill observed at the end of month t–1 is the sum of a CC expected real return and a CC expected inflation rate, Rt–1 = Et–1(rt) + Et–1(It). Two approaches are used to split Rt–1 between its two components. In the first, models for rt produce estimates of Et–1(rt), which are used to infer Et–1(It) as Rt–1 – Et–1(rt). The second approach models It to produce estimates of Et–1(It) and infer Et–1(rt) as Rt–1 – Et–1(It). By design, the estimates of Et–1(rt) and Et–1(It) from both approaches have the properties implied by rational bill prices. Received October 10, 2018; Editorial decision December 31, 2018 By Editor Jeffrey Pontiff

Using data on over a million land transactions during 2004–2016 where local governments are the sole seller, we find that firms linked to members of China's supreme political elites—the Politburo—obtained a price discount ranging from 55.4% to 59.9% compared with those without the same connections. These firms also purchased slightly more land. In return, the provincial party secretaries who provided the discount to these “princeling” firms are 23.4% more likely to be promoted to positions of national leadership. To curb corruption, President Xi Jinping stepped up investigations and strengthened personnel control at the province level. Using a spatially matched sample (e.g., within a 500-meter radius), we find a reduction in corruption of between 42.6% and 31.5% in the provinces either targeted by the central inspection teams or whose party secretary was replaced by one appointed by Xi. Accordingly, this crackdown on corruption has also significantly reduced the promotional prospects of those local officials who rely on supplying a discount to get ahead.

We examine the within- and across-firm shipment decisions of tens of thousands of goods-producing and goods-distributing establishments. This allows us to quantify the normally unobservable forces that determine firm boundaries, that is, which transactions are mediated by ownership control, as opposed to contracts or markets. We find firm boundaries to be an economically significant barrier to trade: having an additional vertically integrated establishment in a given destination ZIP code has the same effect on shipment volumes as a 40% reduction in distance. These effects are larger for high value-to-weight products, faraway destinations, differentiated products, and IT-intensive industries.

How important is human capital at the top of the U.S. income distribution? A primary source of top income is private “pass-through” business profit, which can include entrepreneurial labor income for tax reasons. This article asks whether top pass-through profit mostly reflects human capital, defined as all inalienable factors embodied in business owners, rather than financial capital. Tax data linking 11 million firms to their owners show that top pass-through profit accrues to working-age owners of closely held mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries. Pass-through profit falls by three-quarters after owner retirement or premature death. Classifying three-quarters of pass-through profit as human capital income, we find that the typical top earner derives most of her income from human capital, not financial capital. Growth in pass-through profit is explained by both rising productivity and a rising share of value added accruing to owners.

Across the social sciences, a key question is how societies manage to enforce cooperative behavior in social dilemmas such as public goods provision or bilateral trade. According to an influential body of theories in psychology, anthropology, and evolutionary biology, the answer is that humans have evolved moral systems: packages of functional psychological and biological mechanisms that regulate economic behavior, including a belief in moralizing gods; moral values; negative reciprocity; and emotions of shame, guilt, and disgust. Based on a stylized model, this article empirically studies the structure and evolution of these moral traits as a function of historical heterogeneity in extended kinship relationships. The evidence shows that societies with a historically tightly knit kinship structure regulate behavior through communal moral values, revenge taking, emotions of external shame, and notions of purity and disgust. In loose kinship societies, on the other hand, cooperation appears to be enforced through universal moral values, internalized guilt, altruistic punishment, and an apparent rise and fall of moralizing religions. These patterns point to the presence of internally consistent but culturally variable functional moral systems. Consistent with the model, the relationship between kinship ties, economic development, and the structure of the mediating moral systems amplified over time.

We adapt simple tools from computational linguistics to construct a new measure of political risk faced by individual U.S. firms: the share of their quarterly earnings conference calls that they devote to political risks. We validate our measure by showing that it correctly identifies calls containing extensive conversations on risks that are political in nature, that it varies intuitively over time and across sectors, and that it correlates with the firm’s actions and stock market volatility in a manner that is highly indicative of political risk. Firms exposed to political risk retrench hiring and investment and actively lobby and donate to politicians. These results continue to hold after controlling for news about the mean (as opposed to the variance) of political shocks. Interestingly, the vast majority of the variation in our measure is at the firm level rather than at the aggregate or sector level, in the sense that it is captured neither by the interaction of sector and time fixed effects nor by heterogeneous exposure of individual firms to aggregate political risk. The dispersion of this firm-level political risk increases significantly at times with high aggregate political risk. Decomposing our measure of political risk by topic, we find that firms that devote more time to discussing risks associated with a given political topic tend to increase lobbying on that topic, but not on other topics, in the following quarter.

I study whether exposure to teacher stereotypes, as measured by the Gender-Science Implicit Association Test, affects student achievement. I provide evidence that the gender gap in math performance, defined as the score of boys minus the score of girls in standardized tests, substantially increases when students are assigned to math teachers with stronger gender stereotypes. Teacher stereotypes induce girls to underperform in math and self-select into less demanding high schools, following the track recommendation of their teachers. These effects are at least partially driven by lower self-confidence on math ability of girls exposed to gender-biased teachers. Stereotypes impair the test performance of girls, who end up failing to achieve their full potential. I do not detect statistically significant effects on student outcomes of literature teacher stereotypes.