American Economic Review200292(4), 1222-1235open access
Competitive Pressure and Labor Productivity: World Iron-Ore Markets in the 1980's by José E. Galdón-Sánchez and James A. Schmitz Jr.. Published in volume 92, issue 4, pages 1222-1235 of American Economic Review, September 2002
American Economic Review200292(4), 745-778open access
We document the return to investing in U.S. nonpublicly traded equity. Entrepreneurial investment is extremely concentrated, yet despite its poor diversification, we find that the returns to private equity are no higher than the returns to public equity. Given the large public equity premium, it is puzzling why households willingly invest substantial amounts in a single privately held firm with a seemingly far worse risk-return trade-off. We briefly discuss how large nonpecuniary benefits, a preference for skewness, or overestimates of the probability of survival could potentially explain investment in private equity despite these findings.
American Economic Review200292(3), 411-433open access
An income tax provides implicit insurance by dampening the variability of disposable income and consumption. Using an empirical framework derived from the consumption insurance literature and data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics we examine the effect of federal income tax reforms of the 1980's on automatic stabilization of consumption. Overall, ERTA and TRA86 reduced consumption stability by about 50 percent. Recently increased EITC generosity restored or enhanced consumption insurance. The welfare cost of moving to the post-TRA86 system is sizable for relatively risk-averse households facing large income risk but is much more modest for the typical household.
American Economic Review200292(2), 236-240open access
The scope for growth of trade in services is vast. Although services currently make up over 60 percent of world production, they account for only about 20 percent of world trade. A primary reason why international trade in services has been limited is that the performance of many services necessitates physical contact between producers and consumers, a condition that renders service provision to distant locations infeasible. New technology, in particular, the Internet, provides a medium of exchange that overcomes such historical trading hurdles for many services, effectively reducing transport costs from infinity to virtually nothing. There is ample anecdotal evidence that the Internet is having just this sort of an effect on services trade. The accounting firm Netlink maintains the books for 6,000 employees in Reyanosa, Mexico, from their offices in Manhattan. Infosys of India provides softwareconsulting services to international clients, including Apple Computers, Lucent Technologies, and Microsoft. A medical-transcription company in South Africa, ITS, receives digital recordings from abroad electronically and returns a transcribed text file the next day. Still, the question remains as to whether electronic sharing of information is an important enough development to alter significantly the geography of service provision. Indeed, many services need to be tailored to the consumer’s needs and monitored for quality, and these are likely to be more effective if the provider is close by and speaks the same language. In addition, in the event of a dispute, resolution will be less complicated if both parties are subject to the same legal system. Finally, there may be security concerns with allowing foreign access to some documents or systems. Thus, for some services, especially those where familiarity, communication, and non-standardization contribute to quality, the Internet would not be expected to have a large impact on international trade. To determine whether the Internet has significantly affected international service provision in practice, we estimate a general model of services trade across countries and examine whether the inclusion of data on Internet penetration, as measured by the number of Internet hosts in a country, is statistically significant. Overall, our results offer evidence that the Internet is related to growth in services trade. After controlling for GDP and exchange-rate movements, we find that a 10-percent increase in Internet penetration in a foreign country is associated with about a 1.7-percentage-point increase in export growth and a 1.1-percentagepoint increase in import growth. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications.
American Economic Review200292(3), 625-643open access
Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey to the winner's curse, they weigh their private and common value information in roughly the same manner as rational bidders, with observed efficiencies close to predicted levels. Increased competition and reduced uncertainty about the common value positively affect revenues and efficiency. The public release of information about the common value also raises efficiency, although less than predicted.
The standard class of affine models produces poor forecasts of future Treasury yields. Better forecasts are generated by assuming that yields follow random walks. The failure of these models is driven by one of their key features: Compensation for risk is a multiple of the variance of the risk. Thus risk compensation cannot vary independently of interest rate volatility. I also describe a broader class of models. These aessentially affine‐ models retain the tractability of standard models, but allow compensation for interest rate risk to vary independently of interest rate volatility. This additional flexibility proves useful in forecasting future yields.
We investigate the role of information‐based trading in affecting asset returns. We show in a rational expectation example how private information affects equilibrium asset returns. Using a market microstructure model, we derive a measure of the probability of information‐based trading, and we estimate this measure using data for individual NYSE‐listed stocks for 1983 to 1998. We then incorporate our estimates into a Fama and French (1992) asset‐pricing framework. Our main result is that information does affect asset prices. A difference of 10 percentage points in the probability of information‐based trading between two stocks leads to a difference in their expected returns of 2.5 percent per year.
We provide evidence that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts earn lower future returns than otherwise similar stocks. This effect is most pronounced in small stocks and stocks that have performed poorly over the past year. Interpreting dispersion in analysts forecasts as a proxy for differences in opinion about a stock, we show that this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that prices will reflect the optimistic view whenever investors with the lowest valuations do not trade. By contrast, our evidence is inconsistent with a view that dispersion in analysts' forecasts proxies for risk.
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports “political” theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash‐flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash‐flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.