Knowledge that Transforms

Aggregate U.S. bank lending to firms expanded following the outbreak of COVID‐19. Using loan‐level supervisory data, we show that this expansion was driven by draws on credit lines by large firms. Banks that experienced larger credit line drawdowns restricted term lending more, crowding out credit to smaller firms, which reacted by reducing investment. A structural model calibrated to match our empirical results shows that while credit lines increase total bank credit in bad times, they redistribute credit from firms with high propensities to invest to firms with low propensities to invest, exacerbating the decrease in aggregate investment.

Can banks’ reputational concerns improve the quality of opaque, off‐balance sheet securities, such as mortgage‐backed securities? We study this question in a uniquely parsimonious setting. In the 1760s, Dutch banking partnerships securitized West‐Indian plantation mortgages that were risky and opaque. High‐reputation banks originated better mortgages and issued securities that, on average, retained 17.5% more of their value during a market collapse. Reputational effects are attenuated when the managing partners were married into wealth or received a large share of profits in the short term, suggesting that bank reputation only works if bankers are personally exposed to (long‐run) reputational losses.

We assess the long‐term effects of managerial stress on aging and mortality. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we apply neural network–based machine‐learning techniques to CEOs' facial images and show that exposure to industry distress shocks during the Great Recession produces visible signs of aging. We estimate a one‐year increase in “apparent” age. Moreover, using data on CEOs since the mid‐1970s, we estimate a 1.1‐year decrease in life expectancy after an industry distress shock, but a two‐year increase when antitakeover laws insulate CEOs from market discipline. The estimated health costs are significant, both in absolute terms and relative to other health risks.

This paper documents new stylized facts about returns and cashflow growth rates on stocks and housing over decade‐long holding periods. While cashflow growth rates on the two assets comove positively, their returns comove negatively until the Global Financial Crisis and positively thereafter. These facts present a puzzle for representative‐agent models that imply positive return comovement for assets with similar cashflows. I consider a heterogeneous‐agent model with segmented stock and housing markets connected through credit. News about the aggregate economy generates negative return comovement. Recent shifts such as wealthier homebuyers and institutional housing purchases reduce the importance of credit and segmentation.

Young firms' contribution to aggregate employment has been underwhelming. We show that a similar trend is not apparent, however, in their contribution to aggregate sales or stock market capitalization, implying that these firms have exhibited a high average‐to‐marginal revenue product of labor. We study the implications of a gradual shift in the average‐to‐marginal revenue product of labor within a model of dynamic firm heterogeneity. We show that this shift provides (i) a unified explanation for several aspects of the decline in dynamism and (ii) a possible explanation for why large declines in young‐firm employment may have only a moderate effect on aggregate output and consumption.

Farmer, Schmidt, and Timmermann (FST) document time‐variation in market return predictability, identifying “pockets” of significant predictability through kernel regressions. However, our analysis reveals a critical discrepancy between the method outlined by FST and the code actually implemented. Instead of using a one‐sided kernel, which guarantees out‐of‐sample forecasts, they perform in‐sample estimation with a two‐sided kernel. As a result, future information leaks into the forecasting model, undermining its reliability. Rectifying this error qualitatively alters the findings, invalidating most conclusions of the FST study. Thus, attempts to exploit such “pockets”—should they exist—offer little help in forecasting market returns.

Short‐sale costs eliminate the abnormal returns on asset pricing anomaly portfolios. While many anomalies persist out‐of‐sample before accounting for short‐sale costs, they cannot be exploited with long‐short strategies due to stock borrow fees. Using a comprehensive sample of 162 anomalies, the average long‐short portfolio return is a significant 0.14% per month before short‐sale costs, and the returns are due to the short leg. However, the average is −0.01% once returns are adjusted for borrow fees. Moreover, anomalies are not profitable even before fees if the high‐fee observations, representing 12% of stock dates, are excluded from the analysis.

This paper establishes that mutual funds strategically time their trades in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) stocks around disclosure dates to inflate their sustainability ratings. This claim is supported by three empirical findings. First, we show that funds' ESG betas increase shortly before disclosure and decrease shortly afterwards. Second, we document that post‐disclosure fund returns are higher but have lower ESG exposure than disclosed portfolios. Third, we provide evidence that ESG stock prices temporarily rise before disclosure and decline afterwards. Overall, we establish that green window dressing positively impacts fund sustainability ratings, performance, and flows.

We develop a capital structure model in which firms differ in their ability to adjust output prices. Firms with inflexible prices are more exposed to nominal and real shocks, leading to lower leverage, shorter debt maturity, higher cost of debt, tighter covenants, and greater precautionary cash holdings. Shocks to cash flow volatility raise the cost of debt more for firms with less pricing flexibility. We empirically confirm these predictions: Firms with inflexible prices experience significantly larger increases in credit spreads following monetary policy shocks and the 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, especially when they face high preshock rollover risk.