Knowledge that Transforms

Deviations from put-call parity contain information about future stock returns. Using the difference in implied volatility between pairs of call and put options to measure these deviations, we find that stocks with relatively expensive calls outperform stocks with relatively expensive puts by 50 basis points per week. We find both positive abnormal performance in stocks with relatively expensive calls and negative abnormal performance in stocks with relatively expensive puts, which cannot be explained by short sale constraints. Rebate rates from the stock lending market directly confirm that our findings are not driven by stocks that are hard to borrow. The degree of predictability is larger when option liquidity is high and stock liquidity low, while there is little predictability when the opposite is true. Controlling for size, option prices are more likely to deviate from strict put-call parity when underlying stocks face more information risk. The degree of predictability decreases over the sample period. Our results are consistent with mispricing during the earlier years of the study, with a gradual reduction of the mispricing over time.

This paper offers a rational explanation for the puzzling empirical fact that stock returns decrease with an increase in the volatility of liquidity. We model liquidity as a stochastic price impact process and define the liquidity premium as the additional return necessary to compensate a multiperiod investor for the adverse price impact of trading. The model demonstrates that a fully rational, utility maximizing, risk-averse investor can take advantage of time-varying liquidity by adapting his trades to the state of liquidity. We provide new empirical evidence supportive of the model.

We find that the market’s recent cross-sectional dispersion in stock returns is positively related to the subsequent value book-to-market premium and negatively related to the subsequent momentum premium. The partial relation between return dispersion (RD) and the subsequent value and momentum premiums remains strong when controlling for macroeconomic state variables suggested by the literature. Our findings are consistent with recent theoretical insights and empirical evidence that suggest that the market’s RD may serve as a leading countercyclical state variable, that the value premium is countercyclical, and that the momentum premium is procyclical.

Option pricing models and longer-term value-at-risk (VaR) models generally require volatility forecasts over horizons considerably longer than the data frequency. The typical recursive procedure for generating longer-term forecasts keeps the relative weights of recent and older observations the same for all forecast horizons. In contrast, we find that older observations are relatively more important in forecasting at longer horizons. We find that the Ederington and Guan (2005) model and a modified EGARCH (exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic) model in which parameter values vary with the forecast horizon forecast better out-of-sample than the GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic), EGARCH, and Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (GJR) models across a wide variety of markets and forecast horizons.

This paper provides a theory of debt and hedging based on human capital. We distinguish human capital from physical capital in two ways: (1) human capital is inalienable and can exercise a one-sided option to leave the firm and (2) human capital is not perfectly replaceable. We show that a firm may reach the first best solution while issuing debt or equity to outsiders provided that either the insiders receive a senior claim or that the firm hedges. We then show that given asymmetric information concerning costs the only viable solution has the firm issuing debt to outsiders and hedging.

It is a widely held perception, although empirically contentious, that credit rationing is an important phenomenon in the UK small business sector. In response to this perception the UK government initiated a loan guarantee scheme (SFLGS) in 1981. In this paper we use a unique dataset comprised of small firms facing a very real, and binding, credit constraint, to question whether a corrective scheme such as the SFLGS has, in practice, alleviated such constraints by promoting access to debt finance for small credit constrained firms. The results broadly support the view that the SFLGS has fulfilled its primary objective.

We analyze financial support for the entrepreneurial sector. State support can raise welfare by relaxing financial constraints, but it can also reduce lending standards if entrepreneurs substitute public sources of collateral for their own assets, if it encourages excessive entrepreneurial entry, or if it undermines bank monitoring incentives. We derive a “pecking order” for support schemes: support funds should be channeled first to credit guarantee schemes and then, when entrepreneurs start to substitute public for private collateral, to co-funding entrepreneurial projects. The optimal level of credit guarantee is diminishing in the costs of incentivising bank monitoring. We show in an extension that the long-term effect of public subsidies may be to impair the private sector’s initiative to uncover cost savings.

We argue herein that there is a fundamental and an important difference between the market risk and the potential market risk in financial markets. We also argue that the spectrum of smooth Lyapunov exponents can be used in (λ,σ2)-analysis, which is a method to measure and monitor these risks. The reason is that these exponents focus on the stability properties (λ) of the stochastic dynamic system generating asset returns, while more traditional risk measures such as value-at-risk are concerned with the distribution of asset returns (σ2).

Partial credit guarantee schemes have experienced renewed interest from governments keen to promote financial access for small enterprises, not least as a response to the credit crunch in advanced economies. While the market can find uses for partial credit guarantees, the attractions for public policy can be illusory: indeed their most attractive feature for myopic politicians may be the ease with which the true cost of guarantees can be understated, at least at the outset. In practice, the actual fiscal cost of existing schemes has varied widely across countries and has represented a high per dollar subsidy in some cases. Despite the recent application of some innovative techniques, the social benefit of such schemes has proved difficult to estimate, not least because their goals have been vague. Operational design has influenced the cost and apparent effectiveness of different schemes and has also varied widely. Clear and precise goals, against which performance is regularly monitored, realistic pricing verified by consistent and transparent accounting, and attention to the incentive features of operational design, especially for the intermediaries, are among the prerequisites for such schemes to have a good chance of truly achieving improvements in social welfare.

Recently, developing countries have witnessed a sharp increase in foreign bank participation. We examine the impact on banking outreach using newly gathered data for Mexico, where foreign bank participation rose from 2% to 83% of assets during 1997–2005. Country-, bank-, and bank-municipality-level estimations show a decline in the number of deposit and loan accounts. While country- and bank-level estimations indicate an increase in the share of municipalities with bank branches and in the likelihood of bank presence, bank-municipality regressions show that only rich and urban municipalities benefited. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a decline in outreach.