Knowledge that Transforms

We test for stereotyping—the exaggeration of representative traits—in a high-stakes economic environment. Using surveys administered among undergraduates at the Ohio State University as well as large-scale nationally representative data, we measure how U.S. first-year students perceive the relationship between college majors and occupations. We show that students greatly overestimate the likelihood that majors lead to their representative jobs (e.g., counselor for psychology, journalist for journalism). Using an implicit association test, we show that students associate majors with their representative careers and that these associations strongly predict belief biases, in line with a stereotyping mechanism. A simple equilibrium model of the labor market predicts that stereotyping reduces welfare by increasing misallocation, which we corroborate with correlational evidence on job/major mismatch. In a field experiment, we test a light-touch policy to reduce stereotyping and find significant effects on students’ intentions about what to study as well as the classes and majors they enroll in.

Theory predicts that outsourcing public services to the private sector can reduce costs and improve efficiency but can also induce cost-cutting and compromise quality. We assess the Brazilian Organizações Sociais de Saude model (OSS), which outsources management of public hospital services to the private sector while the state remains the residual claimant. We show that this enhances hospital production and operational efficiency without adverse effects on hospital quality and equity. Increased inpatient production addresses previously unmet demand, expanding local access to hospital care and reducing population mortality. Performance gains arise from improved operational efficiency achieved through increased hospital management capacity. This facilitates staffing adjustments, favoring higher-skilled personnel, dismissing lower-productivity staff, and adopting flexible, performance-tied employment contracts. Effects are larger among private organizations with more management experience, underscoring returns to managerial capacity. Our findings show that incentive-ownership structures can address the quantity-quality trade-off in public service delivery, even when contracts are incomplete and quality is hard to measure.

We study rainmaking as an instrumental religious belief. We present a model in which a religious leader tries to persuade people to believe. Praying for rain can persuade only where the hazard of rainfall during a dry spell is increasing over time, so that prayer is most likely to succeed when people most want rain. We present evidence from prayers for rain in Murcia, Spain, where the hazard rate is increasing, that the church’s prayers for rain predict rainfall over two centuries. To generalize this finding, we gather an original data set of whether ethnic groups around the world traditionally prayed for rain. We find that ethnic groups facing an increasing rainfall hazard are 47% more likely to pray for rain, consistent with our model’s prediction that societies are more likely to pray for rain where prayer is persuasive.

This article examines how the American Medical Association (AMA) helped shape the development of the U.S. health insurance system in the critical period after World War II. Working with the political public relations firm Campaigns, Inc., the AMA launched a nationwide campaign to weaken support for national health insurance by framing it as “socialized medicine,” while simultaneously enrolling people in private health insurance plans to shift demand away from a public alternative. Drawing on newly assembled archival data, we find that greater exposure to the campaign explains about 20% of the rise in private health insurance enrollment and a comparable decline in public support for a national program. The campaign also appears to have influenced policy making through coordinated messaging, resolutions passed by civic organizations, congressional rhetoric, and political donations. These findings suggest that the rise of private health insurance in the United States was not solely due to macroeconomic forces or collective bargaining; rather, it was also enabled by a strategic, interest group–financed effort to shape citizen views and influence policy.

Why do managers matter for firm performance? This article provides evidence of the critical role of managers in matching workers to jobs within the firm using the universe of personnel records from a large multinational firm. The data cover 200,000 white-collar workers and 30,000 managers over 11 years in 100 countries. I identify good managers by their speed of promotion and leverage exogenous variation induced by the rotation of managers across teams. I find that good managers cause workers to reallocate within the firm through lateral and vertical transfers and generate large and persistent gains in workers’ career progression and productivity. My results imply that the visible hands of managers match workers’ specific skills to specialized jobs, leading to an improvement in the productivity of existing workers that outlasts the managers’ time at the firm.

We introduce and validate a novel approach to identifying good managers. In a preregistered lab experiment, we causally identify managerial contributions by randomly assigning managers to teams and controlling for individual skill. We find that manager contributions are crucial for team success, and that people who self-select into management roles perform worse than randomly assigned managers. Managerial performance is strongly predicted by economic decision-making skill but not by demographic characteristics. Two validation studies support our experimental results. Participants who succeed in the lab receive more real-world promotions and, in a separate study of retail store managers, skill measures strongly predict store sales. A one standard deviation increase in manager quality increases annual per store sales by US$4.1 million (25% increase). Selecting managers on skills rather than demographic characteristics or the desire to lead could substantially improve organizational performance.

Does information about the long-run financial costs of reduced labor supply increase mothers’ working hours? We document descriptively that long-term financial factors are not top of mind when mothers decide on their employment level. Moreover, a substantial share of women holds overly optimistic expectations about pension receipt and wage growth under part-time work. In a large-scale field experiment in Switzerland, we randomly assign mothers working part-time as teachers to receive objective information about the long-run costs of reduced labor supply. The treatment increases both demand for financial information and future labor supply plans, in particular among women who underestimate the costs of part-time work. Leveraging linked employer administrative data one year post-intervention, we find that this group of mothers increases working hours by 7%. These findings underscore that policies reducing information frictions in labor supply decisions may help address remaining gender gaps in the labor market.

This article uses labor force surveys from 160 countries to build a new microdatabase on hours worked covering 97% of the world population in cross section. We also construct time series spanning over 20 years in 86 countries. Hours worked per adult slightly decline with GDP per capita but are weakly correlated with development overall. Hours worked by the young (aged 15–19) and elderly (aged 60+) fall with development, driven entirely by growing school attendance and public pension coverage. Hours worked among prime-age adults (aged 20–59) are stable with development but undergo a great gender reshuffling: falling hours per male worker have been exactly offset by increases in female labor force participation in many countries. Labor income taxes are strongly negatively related to hours worked across countries. This correlation is attenuated when controlling for social spending and disappears when further controlling for working hours regulations. Both social spending and working hours regulations are associated with lower hours worked.

Stock markets play a dual role: they provide information about firms’ fundamentals, which improves resource allocations, and they provide liquidity. We propose a setting in which these two roles interact: if stocks are used more intensively for liquidity, then prices reveal less information about fundamentals. We structurally estimate stock price informativeness for several countries and show that it declines when alternative liquidity sources, such as banks, are in distress. To study the real effects of this mechanism, we devise a strategy to integrate our stock-trading module into a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. We calibrate the model to the United States and simulate recessions with and without banking distress. In a standalone recession, prices become more informative and allocation improves, mitigating output losses by 4.4%. If the recession coincides with banking distress, agents rely more on stock markets to obtain liquidity, prices become less informative, and allocation deteriorates, magnifying output losses by 22%.

We develop a system of disaggregated economic accounts. The system breaks down national accounting positions into bilateral flows between consistently defined groups of consumers (consumer cells), groups of producers (producer cells), the government, and the rest of the world. We disaggregate the full circular flow of money, including consumer spending, labor compensation, firm profits, intermediates trade, foreign trade, and government transactions, while satisfying all national accounting identities. We implement the disaggregated system for small region-by-industry cells in Denmark and present stylized facts, such as variation in domestic spending, local and urban bias in consumer spending, and a pattern of triangular flows across regions. Cell-level measures of spending intensity capture how much spending by a cell contributes to the income of cells experiencing unemployment after a shock. Using a general equilibrium model, we show that fiscal transfers raise aggregate GDP by more when they target cells with high spending intensity on unemployed cells. The disaggregated economic accounts help governments select more effective policies.