Knowledge that Transforms

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20-23. Western Finance Association sessions will be at the Quality Inn. The seventeen sessions include cocurrent sessions with empirical and theoretical papers from the major areas of financial research plus two sessions devoted to aspects of the teaching of finance. Three featured sessions are:

The net monetary position of a firm, defined as the nominal value of its monetary assets minus the nominal value of its monetary liabilities, partly determines the wealth transferred to (or from) the firm's owners when unanticipated price level change occurs. Price level change (a random variable) is defined as unanticipated when assessments of (the moments of) its probability distribution are systematically incorrect or biased. During unanticipated inflation, which conventionally means an underestimate of the expected value of the distribution of price level change, the real dollar returns of net monetary debtor firms are enhanced—the unforeseen honoring of debt contracts in dollars of lower purchasing power is a wealth transfer to the firm's owners from the firm's creditors. Conversely, real returns of net monetary creditor firms suffer during unanticipated inflation and gain during unanticipated deflation.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

[This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which private commodities are allocated through competitive markets and public commodities according to government allocation and taxing rules that depend on information communicated to the government by consumers regarding their preferences. A wide range of strategic behavior for consumers in their communication with the government is allowed; in particular, consumers may understate their preferences and be "free riders" if they choose. Although several examples of allocation-taxation schemes falling within the general model are discussed, the major contribution of the paper is the formulation of a particular government allocation-taxation scheme for which the behavioral equilibria are Pareto optimal. That is, given the government rules, consumers find it in their self-interest to reveal their true preferences for public goods.]

[In recent studies of economic organization [9 and 15] it has been found necessary to impose certain restrictions (regularity conditions) on the communication process. Such restrictions limit the class of environments for which the organization is Pareto satisfactory. We show that a class of environments admits a Pareto satisfactory (and regular) resource allocation mechanism if and only if the graph of the Pareto correspondence is a union of continuous functions. We also study the shape of the Pareto set for a given environment and the way that set varies as the environment varies. We present examples showing that near any environment whose Pareto utility frontier is homeomorphic to a simplex there is whose Pareto frontier is badly chopped up. We also give an example of a class of environments for which the Pareto correspondence has no continuous selection through a given point.]

[Available theorems establishing the existence of general equilibrium in models incorporating imperfectly competitive firms rely on the assumption that reaction curves are continuous functions (or convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondences). However, this property has not been derived from conditions on the fundamental data of tastes, technology, and maximizing behavior. We show here that continuity may fail even in extremely simple cases, with the result that equilibrium price and/or quantity choices fail to exist. The non-pathological nature of the examples we present suggests the need for a fundamental re-examination of the way our partial and general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition fit together.]

If there exist heterogeneous capital goods, a steady state may be "paradoxical" in the sense that increasing the rate of interest above the Golden Rule level may lead to an increase in consumption or utility, rather than to the decrease which always occurs in one-sector models. It is shown that, in many cases, a path of capital accumulation which maximizes the minimum consumption or utility level is unlikely to converge to a paradoxi- cal steady state of this kind.