This paper examines the frequency, pervasiveness, and determinants of product switching by US manufacturing firms. We find that one-half of firms alter their mix of five-digit SIC products every five years, that product switching is correlated with both firm- and firm-product attributes, and that product adding and dropping induce large changes in firm scope. The behavior we observe is consistent with a natural generalization of existing theories of industry dynamics that incorporates endogenous product selection within firms. Our findings suggest that product switching contributes to a reallocation of resources within firms toward their most efficient use.

We explore firm size heterogeneity in production networks. In comprehensive data for Belgium, firms with more customers have higher total sales but lower sales and lower market shares per customer. Downstream factors, especially the number of customers, explain the vast majority of firm size dispersion. We rationalize these facts with a model of network formation and two-dimensional firm heterogeneity. Higher productivity generates more matches and larger market shares among customers. Higher relationship capability generates more customers and higher sales. Model estimates suggest a strong negative correlation between productivity and relationship capability and potentially large welfare gains from improving relationship capability.

We study how heterogeneity in performance evaluations across supervisors affects employee and supervisor careers and firm outcomes using data on the performance system of a Scandinavian service sector firm. Supervisors vary widely in how they rate subordinates of similar quality. In our model, this ratings heterogeneity can arise because supervisors can differ in their ability to manage subordinates or in their leniency when rating subordinates. Furthermore, firms might or might not be informed about this heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that supervisor heterogeneity stems, in part, from real differences in managerial ability that firms are partially informed about.

How should a survey-based measure of well-being be implemented? How could it be constructed in a systematic and politically neutral way? These questions should be approached by economists with the same level of care that has been taken in the theoretical and practical development of GDP. We focus on two essential requirements for implementation: formulating a list of different aspects of well-being that is theoretically valid and can be measured accurately via surveys, and choosing and interpreting the survey response scales. We discuss progress to date on these issues, remaining challenges, and some possible approaches to overcoming them.

This study examines the impact of the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 on CEO compensation costs in affected organizations. Contrary to the stated objective of the Act that executive compensation is “just and reasonable,” we find that CEO compensation costs for affected nonprofits during the post-regulation periods have increased by about 6.3 percent when compared with a control group of comparable unaffected nonprofits. In addition, the relative increase in CEO compensation appears to come from nonprofits that have experienced greater regulatory cost increases. We do not find evidence that the Act resulted in a change in CEO pay performance sensitivity. The observed CEO pay increase is not systematically different across nonprofits that underpaid versus those that overpaid their CEOs during pre-Act periods. Overall, this paper highlights the unintended consequences of regulatory attempts to enhance governance in the not-for-profit sector.

When regulated firms are offered compensation to prevent them from relocating, efficiency requires that payments be distributed across firms so as to equalize marginal relocation probabilities, weighted by the damage caused by relocation. We formalize this fundamental economic logic and apply it to analyzing compensation rules proposed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, where emission permits are allocated free of charge to carbon-intensive and trade-exposed industries. We show that this practice results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. Efficient permit allocation reduces the aggregate risk of job loss by more than half without increasing aggregate compensation.

Intrafirm Trade and Product Contractibility by Andrew B. Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 444-48 of American Economic Review, May 2010

Wholesalers and Retailers in US Trade by Andrew B. Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 408-13 of American Economic Review, May 2010

Recent research in international trade emphasizes the importance of firms’ extensive margins for understanding overall patterns of trade as well as how firms respond to specific events such as trade liberalization. In this paper, we use detailed U.S. trade statistics to provide a broad overview of how the margins of trade contribute to variation in U.S. imports and exports across trading partners, types of trade (i.e. arm’s-length versus related-party) and both short and long time horizons. Among other results, we highlight the differential behaviour of related-party and arm’s-length trade in response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

Since the early 1990s, as the United States borrowed heavily from the rest of the world, employment in the US goods-producing sector has fallen. We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with several mechanisms that could generate declining goods-sector employment: foreign borrowing, nonhomothetic preferences, and differential productivity growth across sectors. We find that only 15.1 percent of the decline in goods-sector employment from 1992 to 2012 stems from US trade deficits; most of the decline is due to differential productivity growth. As the United States repays its debt, its trade balance will reverse, but goods-sector employment will continue to fall.