Data-driven lending relies on the calibration of models using training periods. We find that this type of lending is not resilient in the presence of economic conditions that are materially different from those experienced during the training period. Using data from a small business fintech lending platform, we document that the small business credit supply collapsed during the COVID-19 crisis of March 2020 even though the demand for loans doubled relative to pre-pandemic levels. As the month progressed, most lenders significantly reduced or halted their lending activities, likely due to the heightened risk of model miscalibration under the new economic conditions.

This paper considers share repurchases as the way long-term shareholders preserve their ability to use corporate information for speculative purposes when insider trading regulation is enforced. This use of corporate information increases the adverse selection losses of short-term shareholders. Thus, buy-back programs reduce their incentive to invest in stocks that back the most productive technology, leading to a socially inefficient equilibrium. It follows that insider trading should not be banned when share repurchases are allowed. More generally, the paper argues that the regulation of insider trading and repurchases can not be considered in isolation, and analyzes their interplay.

We derive equilibrium restrictions on the range of the transaction prices of American options on the stock market index and index futures. Trading over the lifetime of the options is accounted for, in contrast to earlier single-period results. The bounds on the reservation purchase price of American puts and the reservation write price of American calls are tight. We allow the market to be incomplete and imperfect due to the presence of proportional transaction costs in trading the underlying security and due to bid-ask spreads in option prices. The bounds may be derived for any given probability distribution of the return of the underlying security and admit price jumps and stochastic volatility. We assume that at least some of the traders maximize a time- separable utility function. The bounds are derived by applying the weak notion of stochastic dominance and are independent of a trader's particular utility function and initial portfolio position.

Journal Article A Theorem on Technical Progress Get access M. Kalecki M. Kalecki Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 8, Issue 3, June 1941, Pages 178–184, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967601 Published: 01 June 1941

We investigate the motivations and effects of financial firms’ hiring of former US financial regulatory employees. The number of top executives with regulatory experience per firm has increased 24% over 2001–15, and hiring is associated with positive average announcement returns and a salary premium. In the quarter after hire, market and balance sheet measures of firm risk decrease significantly and measures of risk management activity increase, especially for hires from prudential regulators, who directly monitor financial firm risk. The absence of this result for unregulated firms and for exogenous shocks to regulatory experience suggests that firms hire ex-employees of their regulators when they perceive a need to reduce risk, consistent with a schooling hypothesis. We find little direct evidence of quid pro quo behavior in regulatory event frequency and fines.

Compensation policy has become one of the most important ingredients of corporate governance. In this paper we take a new look at the issue, by contrasting the use of options with that of stock. We do this by integrating the repricing or resetting aspect of options with that of industrial structure. We show that industry competition may play an important role in dictating which form of compensation is optimal. When aggressive competition for key professional staff is an issue, the flexibility of options may actually become a disadvantage and therefore pure stock compensation may survive as an equilibrium. Thus compensation trends may be partly explained by trends in the nature of the competitive environment.

An unsettled issue in the literature relating to the relative wage effect of unions is the appropriate treatment of union status in a wage determination model. In the context of a three-equation model determining union membership and union- and nonunion-sector wage rates, this paper presents an instrumental variables (IV) procedure for estimating the parameters of the wage equations and a test of the exogeneity of union status using the Hausman specification test. An advantage of our IV procedure in comparison to the widely used inverse Mill's ratio procedure is that our procedure is a distribution-free estimator, whereas the inverse Mill's ratio estimator hinges in the assumption that the error term of the choice equation is normally distributed. Using data for a sample of middle-aged white workers, we estimate the parameters of the union and nonunion wage equations with both procedures. On the key question of the endogeneity of union status, the Hausman test decisively rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity. The inverse Mill's ratio procedure, in contrast, provides coefficient estimates on the selectivity terms that fail to indicate evidence of sample selectivity in either sector.

Purchases and sales of operating assets by firms generated $162 billion for shareholders over the past 20 years. This contrasts sharply with the evidence on mergers. This paper characterizes the behavior of value-maximizing firms, which could grow organically, purchase existing assets, or sell assets. The approach yields an endogenous selection model that links asset purchases and sales to fundamental properties of the firm. Empirical tests confirm the predictions of the model. In particular, return on assets and size strongly predict when firms purchase or sell assets, and the transaction size covaries with the value of capital employed by the firm. These findings indicate that corporate asset purchases and sales are consistent with efficient investment decisions.

This paper resolves the disagreement between Longstaff et al. [2001. Journal of Finance Economics 62, 39–66] and Andersen and Andreasen [2001. Journal of Financial Economics 62, 3–37] over the effectiveness of the common business practice of using best-fit single-factor term structure models to deduce exercise strategies of Bermudan swaptions. I examine the cost of using recalibrated single-factor models to determine the exercise strategy for Bermudan swaptions in a multifactor world. I show that single-factor exercise strategies applied in a multifactor world only give rise to economically insignificant losses. Furthermore, I find that the conditional model risk as defined in Longstaff et al. [2001. Journal of Finance Economics 62, 39–66] is statistically insignificant given the number of observations. Additional tests using the Primal–Dual algorithm of Andersen and Broadie [2004. Management Science 50(9)] indicate that losses found in Longstaff et al. [2001. Journal of Finance Economics 62, 39–66] cannot, as claimed, be ascribed to the number of factors.