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Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code

Jerold B. Warner; Michelle J. White

Journal of Finance 1983 38(2), 477-488 open access

BANKRUPTCY COSTS are the deadweight economic costs of firms going bankrupt. They include both ex post bankruptcy costs incurred after a firm's bankruptcy filing, such as transactions costs, and ex ante bankruptcy costs incurred before the filing, such as those resulting from creditors' attempts to reduce their losses if bankruptcy occurs and/or managers' attempts to raise the expected return to equity by increasing the firm's risk.1 This paper has two purposes. First it proposes a model of bankruptcy costs which focuses on the costs of inefficient decision making before the firm's actual bankruptcy filing. The model implies upper bound expressions for total bankruptcy costs. Second, the new U.S. Bankruptcy Code2 went into effect late in 1979 and made important changes in bankruptcy reorganization procedures. The paper poses the question of whether the changes made under the new Code tend to raise or lower aggregate U.S. bankruptcy costs. We approach this question by calculating the upper bound expressions suggested by the model, using parameter values from both before and after the new Code took effect.

Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration

Jonathan Eaton; Harvey S. Rosen

Journal of Finance 1983 38(5), 1489-1505 open access

ABSTRACT In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of “bonding” executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the long‐run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement, the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control, and the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970s.