Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT In the 1980s, U.S. banks became systematically less profitable and riskier as nonbank competition eroded the profitability of banks' traditional activities. Bank failures rose exponentially during this decade. The leading explanation for the persistence of these trends centers on fixed‐rate deposit insurance: the insurance gives bank equityholders an incentive to take on risk when the value of bank charters falls. We propose and test an alternative explanation based on corporate control considerations. We show that managerial entrenchment played a more important role than did the moral hazard associated with deposit insurance in explaining the recent behavior of the banking industry.

Microstructure research has recently forged two theoretical frameworks characterizing stock specialist behavior: a Walrasian inventory-theoretic individual optimization model sometimes with asymmetric information, and a queue-theoretic disequilibrium market model of the continuous auction process. To test the Brock and Kleidon (Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16 (1992) 451–489) continuous auction process, two simultaneous autoregressive equations for ask prices and for bid prices are estimated using transactions data for IBM for calendar year 1988. The results support Brock and Kleidon's distinguishing implications — namely, increased trading volume raises the ask and lowers the bid, and a Hausman-type specification test fails to reject the exogeneity of order flows at the bid and the ask. Also, greater price volatility within a fifteen minute interval leads to both lower bids and lower asks as buyers are accorded a risk premium, consistent with Brown, Harlow and Tinic's (Journal of Financial Economics, 22 (1988) 355–385) uncertain information hypothesis for efficient markets.

In this paper we extend the study of mean reversion behavior by modelling the fundamental value as a stochastic process. The market value of the asset is then modelled as a mean reverting Ornstein Uhlenbeck process towards the fundamental value. Solving backwards, we determine the functional form of the regression equation of changes in asset prices and returns to changes to the fundamental value. Using earnings and dividends as proxies for the fundamental value we test our model empirically. In general, other than the shortest horizon of 1-year, our model shows good explanatory power. Since our model is compatible with Campbell and Shiller (1988) framework in the earnings case and Fama and French (1988) model in the dividend case, the performance of our model has been compared with those two models. In comparison, the performance of our model is comparable to that of Campbell and Shiller and compares favorably with Fama and French.

A popular explanation for the explosive growth in banks' off-balance sheet (OBS) activities is the avoidance of capital adequacy requirements. Several studies have examined this and other motivations behind bank OBS activities with mixed results. We shed further light on the issue of OBS growth by modelling OBS products as financial innovations subject to a logistic diffusion adoption pattern. Our data also allows us to investigate the impact of important changes in capital adequacy regulations on OBS diffusion rates. We find that changes in capital requirements have had no consistent impact on the speed of diffusion across OBS activities.