Knowledge that Transforms

This study tests the competitive equilibrium predictions of a multi-period model of audit pricing and independence in two sets of laboratory markets: a control set consisting of human subjects in the role of auditors contracting with robot clients, and a treatment set in which both auditors and clients are human subjects. The results in all the control-set markets and some of the treatment markets support the predictions of "lowball" pricing and that heterogeneous beliefs among auditors regarding the treatment of a client-reporting issue is a necessary condition for independence impairment. By contrast, several treatment-set markets exhibit cooperative behavior between auditors and clients to achieve jointly beneficial outcomes. This behavior deviates from the price-independence relationship predicted in the competitive equilibrium, exhibiting instead a price-independence relationship that is characterized by an absence of lowballing and frequent independence impairment, even when auditors have homogeneous beliefs.

This study examines whether certain types of financial reporting fraud result in a higher likelihood of litigation against independent auditors. We expect that auditors are more likely to be judged responsible for failing to detect commonly occurring frauds of those that stem from fictitious transactions. We examine companies with SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and designate whether each fraud present in their financial statements in common and/ or arises from fictitious transactions. We then examine whether these types of fraud are related to auditor litigation in analyses that control for various client, auditor and case characteristics. Our results provide some support for our two primary hypotheses - auditors are more likely to be sued when the financial statement frauds are of a common variety or when the frauds arise from fictitious transactions.

This study investigates the relationship between insider trading and fraud. We find that in the presence of fraud, insiders reduce their holdings of company stock through high levels of selling activity as measured by either the number of transactions, the number of shares sold, or the dollar amount of shares sold. Moreover, we present evidence that a cascaded logit model, incorporating insider trading variables and firm-specific financial characteristics, differentiates companies with fraud from companies without fraud.

This paper presents a model that relates properties of the analysts' information environment of the properties of their forecasts. First, we express forecast dispersion and error in the mean forecast in terms of analyst uncertainty and consensus (that is, the degree to which analysts share a common belief). Second, were reserve the relations to show how uncertainability and consensus cab be measured by combining forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast, and the number of forecasts. Third, we show that the quality of common and private information available to analysts can be measured using these same observable variables. The relations we present are intuitive and easily applied in empirical studies.

This paper examines cross-sectional differences in the optimistic behavior of financial analysts. Specifically, we investigate whether the predictive accuracy of past information (e.g., time-series of earnings, past returns, etc.) is associated with the magnitude of the bias in analysts' earnings fore- casts. We posit that there is higher demand for non-public information for firms whose earnings are difficult to accurately predict than for firms whose earnings can be accurately forecasted using public information. Assuming that optimism facilitates access to management's non-public information, we hypothesize that analysts will issue more optimistic forecasts for low predictability firms than for high predictability firms. Our results support this hypothesis.

This paper provides evidence that firms with high disclosure quality ratings from financial analysis enjoy a lower effective interest cost of issuing debt. This findings is consistent with the argument that a policy of timely and detailed disclosures reduces lenders' and underwriters' perception of default risk for the disclosing firm, reducing its constant of debt. The results also indicate that the relative importance of disclosures is greater in situations where there is greater market uncertainty about the firm as reflected by the variance of stock returns. Since debt financial is an important source of external financing for publicly traded firms, the results have important implications on our understanding of the motives and consequences of corporate disclosures.

We empirically examine the hypothesis that access to deposits with inelastic rates (core deposits) permits a bank to make contractual agreements with borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay market rates for its funds. Access to core deposits insulates a bank's costs of funds from exogenous shocks, allowing the bank to insulate its borrowers against exogenous credit shocks. We find that, controlling for competitive conditions in loan markets, banks funded more heavily with core deposits provide more smoothing of loan rates in response to exogenous changes in aggregate credit risk. This suggests that a distinctive feature of bank lending is that firms and banks form multiperiod lending relationships in which loans need not break even period by period. It also partially explains the declining share of bank loans (or near substitutes for bank loans) in credit markets. As banks have increasingly been forced to pay market rates for an increasing share of their funds, multiperiod relationship lending has become increasingly less feasible and bank loans have lost some of their comparative advantage over securities. Our results suggest that access to core deposits is one of the foundations of relationship lending.

I consider the costs and benefits of introducing a new security in a standard framework where uninformed traders with hedging needs interact with risk-averse informed traders, Opening a new market may make everyboby worse off, even when the new security is traded in equilibrium, This article emphasizes cross-market links between hedging and speculative demands: risk-averse arbitrageurs can use the new market to hedge their positions in the preexisting security, which cart affect liquidity in the old market. More generally, the availability of such hedging opportunities will influence the strategies to which traders will direct resources.

Constraints on the gamma of the replicating portfolio, constraints on portfolio amounts, and constraints on the number of shares are also considered.

A number of recent papers have used nonparametric density estimation or nonparametric regression to study the instantaneous spot interest rate, and to test term structure models. However, little is known about the performance of these methods when applied to persistent time-series, such as U.S. interest rates. This paper uses the Vasicek [1977] model to study the performance of kernel density estimates of the ergodic distribution of the instantaneous spot rate. The model's tractability allows me to analyze the MISE of the kernel estimate as a function of persistence, variance of the ergodic distribution, span of the data, sampling frequency, and kernel bandwidth. Our principle result is that persistence has an important impact on optimal bandwidth selection and on finite sample performance. We also find that sampling the data more frequently has little effect on estimator quality. We also examine one of Ait-Sahalia's [1996a] new nonparametric tests of parametric continuous-time Markov ...