Knowledge that Transforms

We condition security price reactions to quarterly earnings announcements on whether firms disclose supplementary balance sheet and/or cashflow information that can be used to estimate the consequences of earnings management. Disclosure of supplementary information is voluntary, and thus, we consider the possibility that firms that disclose balance sheet and/or cashflow information differ systematically from firms that do not disclose. Results indicate that investors discount evidence of earnings management at the disclosure date when supplementary information is disclosed. Such results indicate more informed earnings interpretations of quarterly earnings when firms provide balance sheet and/or cashflow information concurrently.

Abstract This paper uses the residual income valuation technique outlined in Feltham and Ohlson 1996 to examine the relation between stock valuations and accounting numbers for a prototypical banking firm. Prior work of this nature typically assumes a manufacturing setting. This paper contributes to the prior research by clarifying how the approach can be extended to settings where value is created from financial assets and liabilities. Key elements of our model include allowing banks to generate positive net present value from either lending or borrowing activities, and allowing for accounting policy to affect valuation through the loan loss allowance. We validate our model using archival data analysis, and interpret coefficients in light of our modeling assumptions. These results suggest that banks create value more from deposit‐taking activities than from lending activities. Vuong tests confirm that our model outperforms adaptations of the unbiased accounting model of Ohlson 1995 and adaptations of the base model proposed by Beaver, Eger, Ryan, and Wolfson 1989. However, our model is outperformed by the popular net income‐book value model used in many empirical studies, and we can formally reject one of our key modeling assumptions. These tests of our model suggest future avenues for improving upon the theoretical analysis.

Abstract Prior research using the residual income valuation model and linear information models has generally found that estimates of firm value are negatively biased. We argue that this could result from the way in which accounting conservatism effects are reflected in such models. We build on the conservative accounting model of Feltham and Ohlson 1995 and the Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1999 (DHS) methodology to propose a valuation model that includes a conservatism‐correction term, based on the properties of past realizations of residual income and “other information”. “Other information” is measured using analyst‐forecast‐based predictions of residual income. We use data comparable to the DHS sample to compare the bias and inaccuracy of value estimates from our model and from models similar to those used by DHS and Myers 1999. Valuation biases are substantially less negative for our model, but valuation inaccuracy is not markedly reduced.

Abstract This paper solves a model that links earnings quality to the equity risk premium in an infinite‐horizon consumption capital asset pricing model (CAPM) economy. In the model, risk‐averse traders hold diversified portfolios consisting of risk‐free bonds and shares of many risky firms. When constructing their portfolios, traders rely on noisy reported earnings and dividend payments for information about the risky firms. The main new element of the model is an explicit representation of earnings quality that includes hidden accrual errors that reverse in subsequent periods. The model demonstrates that earnings quality magnifies fundamental risk. Absent fundamental risk, poor earnings quality cannot affect the equity risk premium. Moreover, only the systematic (undiversified) component of earnings‐quality risk contributes to the equity risk premium. In contrast, all components of earnings‐quality risk affect earnings capitalization factors. The model ties together consumption CAPM and accounting‐based valuation research into one price formula linking earnings quality to the equity risk premium and earnings capitalization factors.

Be honest to those who are honest, and be honest to those who are not honest.

Abstract This paper examines whether firms that voluntarily recognize stock option expense in their financial statements manage that expense downward more than firms that do not recognize the expense by adjusting option‐pricing model assumptions. To examine this issue, I collect option‐pricing model assumptions from fiscal year 2002 for both a sample of firms that voluntarily recognize stock option expense (“recognizing firms”) and a sample of control firms that do not (“disclosing firms”). The empirical results suggest that recognizing firms manage the recognized stock‐based compensation expense reported in their financial statements downward more than do firms that only disclose the expense. Additional analyses reveal that recognizing firms assume a lower level of volatility than disclosing firms in the option‐pricing model calculations; however, I find no evidence that recognizing firms manage the dividend yield and risk‐free interest rate assumptions more than disclosing firms. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recently issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123(R), which requires the expensing of the fair value of stock options, so these results may be of interest to capital‐market participants and the FASB as they assess the reliability of stock option expense as determined by option‐pricing models.